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Note on contributors

Catherine Akca

Catherine Akca recently completed an MA in English Language and Literature (psycholinguistics) at Kafkas University in Turkey, where she also works as a Lecturer. She has previously published articles in Epiphany, the journal of the International University of Sarajevo, and in the Journal of Language and Linguistics. Catherine also teaches English to children at a Turkish primary school.

James Arvanitakis

Dr. James Arvanitakis is a lecturer in the Humanities at the University of Western Sydney and is a member of the University’s Centre for Cultural Research. James has worked as a human rights activist throughout the Pacific, Indonesia and Europe. A regular media commentator, James’ latest book, *Contemporary Society: A sociological analysis of everyday life*, was launched with Oxford University Press in February 2009.

John O’Carroll

John O’Carroll works at Charles Sturt University, Australia. Prior to that, he worked at the University of Western Sydney, and the University of the South Pacific (Fiji). He has published numerous essays on literature and culture in Australia as well as in the Pacific. With Bob Hodge, he is the author *Borderwork in Multicultural Australia* (Allen and Unwin), and with Chris Fleming he has written on modernity in general, as well as a series of essays on generative anthropology.

Victor Osaro Edo

Dr. Victor Osaro Edo is a lecturer in the Department of History, University of Ibadan, Ibadan. He specializes in Benin Studies as well as political and cultural history. Edo has published a number of articles in books and journals. Some of his published books include: *African Culture and Civilization* (Ibadan, 2005), co-edited with O. Oguntomisin and *African Civilisation from the Earliest Times to 1500 A.D.* (Ibadan, 2007). He is a member of the Historical Society of Nigeria (HSN) and is currently the coordinator of postgraduate programmes of the Department of History of the University.

Kane X. Faucher

Kane X. Faucher received his doctorate from the University of Western Ontario’s Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism. He is an experimental novelist living in Canada. His works of literary and academic endeavour have appeared recently in *Exquisite Corpse, Recherche Litteraire, Janus Head, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 3711Atlantic, Zygote in My Coffee 9, Quill and Ink, Jack Magazine and Defenestration* (only to name a few). He has provided an editor’s introduction to Che Elias’ novel, *The Pagan Ellipsis*. His novel, *Urdox!* was released in 2004, and *Codex Obscura* (with an introduction by Raymond Federman) in 2005. His chapbook, *Cystem SansCrit*, has been released by Dusty Owl Press. He is an editorial member of the journal, *Skandalon*. 
Chris Fleming

Dr Chris Fleming is Head of Program (Dean’s Scholars) and Senior Lecturer in the School of Humanities and Languages at the University of Western Sydney, and a member of its Writing and Society Research Group. He is on the Editorial Board of the UCLA journal *Anthropoetics* and is the author of *René Girard: Violence and Mimesis* (Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell, 2004).

Ali Gunes

Associate Professor Ali Gunes is Acting Dean at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the International University of Sarajevo. He is currently teaching in the department of English Language and Literature at the International University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Associate Professor Gunes has published numerous articles on modern English literature, feminist and cultural issues and has presented several papers at International academic conferences across the world. He published his first complete book in 2007 under the name of *Dark Fields of Civilisation: A Cultural and Ideological Approach to The Issues of Women in the Novels of Virginia Woolf*.

Matthew Homer

Matthew Homer graduated with a First Class Honours in English with Media Studies from the University of Portsmouth where he completed papers on the counterculture and American national identity, British comedy and postmodern literature. He recently completed a Masters in Literature, Film and Visual Culture at the University of Sussex and has conducted research on Pop Art, Romanticism and African American folktales. He was also involved in a documentary film on the Mod and Rocker subcultures which was screened at the See Documentary Festival in Brighton. Matthew continues his research at the University of Brighton and will be speaking about his work on digital technologies and the music industry at Bolton University’s ‘Conference in the City’ this October. Matthew can be contacted at m.j.homer@brighton.ac.uk or matthewjhomer@hotmail.com.

Matthew Ingram

Dr Matthew Ingram is a senior lecturer in Pharmaceutical Sciences at the University of Brighton. In addition to being a researcher in pharmaceutical sciences he also has interests in the research of modern technology for both educational and recreational purposes.

Omolola Ladele

Omolola Ladele is a senior Lecturer at the Dept. of English, Lagos State University, Ojo, Nigeria, where she teaches and supervises graduate and undergraduate students in several literary courses. Ms Ladele’s current areas of interest include Women’s wrtings, Gender and Feminist theories and Postcolonial literatures. She has published some articles in local and international journals in these areas.
Steve Redhead

Professor of Sport and Media Cultures in the Chelsea School, University of Brighton in the United Kingdom, Steve Redhead directs research into Mobile Accelerated Nonpostmodern Culture (MANC). He is Head of the Research Student Division of the Chelsea School. He has published fourteen books. He is co-editor of Berg’s Subcultural Style book series. He was educated at the Universities of Manchester and Warwick. Formerly Professor of Law and Popular Culture at Manchester Metropolitan University where he created and co-directed the Manchester Institute for Popular Culture (MIPC), he has also worked in Canada and Australia. His website is www.steveredhead.com.

Thomas J. Roach

Thomas J. Roach is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Cultural Studies in the Department of Literary and Cultural Studies at Bryant University. His recent publications include an analysis of cinematic representations of homicidal gay “buddies,” entitled, “Murderous Friends: Homosocial Excess in Hitchcock’s Rope (1948) and Van Sant’s Elephant (2003),” (The Quarterly Review of Film and Video, v. 29.2; forthcoming) as well as an exploration of the complex and compelling friendship between philosopher Michel Foucault and novelist/filmmaker Hervé Guibert, “Impersonal Friends: Foucault, Guibert, and an Ethics of Discomfort” (new formations 55, Spring 2005).

Emmanuel Folorunso Taiwo

Dr Emmanuel Folorunso Taiwo currently teaches in the Department of Classics at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria.

By Catherine Akca and Ali Gunes

The feminist writer Kate Millett asserts that although the woman may have been allocated a role no less significant than that of the man by ancient societies with their cult of fertility, over time the role of the woman in procreation was de-emphasised and new religions emerged in which the supremacy of a male God (or gods), became the basis upon which a patriarchal social system, rooted in notions of female inferiority, was constructed and validated (1969: Ch. 2). For example, in Greek mythology, as recounted in Hesiod’s *Theogeny*, the discredited fertility goddess Pandora is sent by the supreme god Zeus to mankind, bearing a sealed jar which, when opened as a result of her curiosity, releases into the world the evils of old age, poverty and sickness. From Pandora springs “the damnable race of women – a plague which men must live with” (Millett, 1969: Ch. 2; Miles, 1999: 37).

In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the story of origins is not dissimilar, and provokes Millett’s observation that “Patriarchy has God on its side” (Millett, 1969: Ch. 2). In the beginning was God, and from the beginning God was perceived as male since He created the first man Adam in His own image. Woman, on the other hand, was apparently an afterthought, created by God from one of Adam’s ribs, so that Adam might have a “helper like himself” (*The Holy Bible Douay Version*, Genesis: 1:27, 2:20). But woman succumbed to temptation by the serpent, ate of the fruit forbidden by God, and persuaded her husband to do likewise. Consequently, God cast Adam out of Paradise into a world of toil: “to till the earth from which he was taken” (Genesis: 3:23). God made garments of skins to cover the shame which the woman had brought upon herself and Adam. Moreover, He committed the woman to motherhood, under the authority of her husband: “In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children, and thou shalt be under thy husband’s power, and he shall have dominion over thee” (Genesis: 3:16). Adam called his wife Eve because she would be the mother of all the living.

Millett describes the story of the Fall as “the central myth of the Judeo-Christian imagination and therefore of our immediate cultural heritage”, and continues: “This mythic version of the female as the cause of human suffering, knowledge and sin is still the foundation of sexual attitudes” (Millett, 1969: Ch. 2). Through her weakness, woman is believed to have brought about the fall of humanity, represented by Adam. Woman is, therefore, both vulnerable to temptation and a temptress herself, a threat to the moral welfare of mankind. Through her desire to taste of the forbidden fruit of the tree of life and knowledge, proffered by the serpent with its phallic connotations, woman caused innocence to be forfeited. Woman is
thereby seen to disregard authority, to be capable of seeking to usurp divine (male) power, and to be carnal in her nature. In consequence, woman, her sexuality, and her reproductive function must be controlled by man. This is to be achieved through the institution of marriage and through the cult of motherhood, which confine woman to the home, under the authority and protection of her husband, the male, defined by God as the worker and the breadwinner. Thus, the Biblical story of the Creation and the Fall becomes the basis of patriarchy, defined by Rich as a “familial-social, ideological, political system …… in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male” (cited in Eisenstein, 1983: 5).

Furthermore, the Biblical, or indeed the Hesiodic, version of the female, by virtue of its theological or mythic apparatus, invests itself with a quality of universality. Thus, all women are felt to be embodied in Eve, or in Pandora; and the characteristics ascribed to the mother figure are deemed to be inherited by the daughters. The identity, which has in fact been constructed for the female by patriarchal religion, is therefore liable to be misconstrued as natural. As Millett puts it: “patriarchy has a still more tenacious or powerful hold through its successful habit of passing itself off as nature” (Millett, 1969: Ch. 2). Both sexes become acculturised to accept the patriarchal fictions of female inferiority and degradation as real and natural. Enshrined in sacred literature, the validity of these tenets, and thereby the validity of the *status quo* they support, almost resists questioning. However, as the early feminist, Poulain de la Barre, observes: “All that has been written about women by men should be suspect, for the men are at once judge and party to the lawsuit” (cited in De Beauvoir, 1949).

Poulain de la Barre’s assertion was made in the seventeenth century, by which time, as De Beauvoir observes a host of disparate (male) writers had urged that “the subordinate position of women is willed in heaven and advantageous on earth” (1949). As examples, De Beauvoir cites the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle’s argument that “we should regard the female nature as afflicted with a natural defectiveness”, alongside the view of the thirteenth century Christian theologian St. Thomas Aquinas that woman is an “imperfect man” and “an incidental being” (1949). Woman is thus defined by male authority, and therefore by the male in general, in subordinate relation to himself, even as the creation of Eve was secondary to and dependent upon the creation of Adam. As De Beauvoir puts it: “He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other” (1949). Moreover, the otherness of woman, enshrined in literature and perpetuated by patriarchal society, is not simply a function of difference, of polarity; rather, “man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the common use of *man* to designate human beings in general; whereas woman represents only the negative, defined by limiting criteria” (De Beauvoir, 1949).

Thus, by means of what Greene and Kahn refer to as the “collusion between literature and ideology” (1991: 19), misogynistic literature and scholarship condition society to accept as given the values of the male and the structures which sustain his dominance. This type of antifeminist propagandistic literature was common in the Middle Ages.

The pinnacle of this misogynistic tradition was reached in Chaucer’s *The Wife of Bath’s Prologue and Tale* (1986). The Wife is a feisty character who challenges the authority of the Church Fathers, asserts the prior validity of her own experience as a five times married woman, dominates her husbands – “I governed
hem so wel after my lawe” (123) – and is not ashamed to proclaim her sexuality, or to adduce Biblical references to St. Paul to support her own argument that the ideal of chastity promulgated by certain theologians should not be applied to all women (119). Nor does she have any qualms about tearing the leaves out of her fifth husband’s book of “wikked wives”, a compendium of tales about “wicked” women, both Biblical and legendary, drawn largely from the antifeminist tract of St. Jerome, or about finally throwing it upon the fire (Chaucer, 1986: 133-136). Chaucer’s intentions in writing *The Wife of Bath’s Prologue and Tale* are open to critical debate; he was, after all, no average medieval man. To what degree was his own attitude misogynistic? To what degree was he sympathetic to the Wife; was he, in fact, poking fun at misogyny? Or, was he, in fact, less concerned with propaganda than with writing comedy for its own sake? However, one chooses to answer these questions, the fact remains that through her words and deeds, not only does the Wife of Bath reinscribe in the mind of the reader the myth of female degradation, but she also becomes an exemplar of the very characteristics which the medieval Church found abhorrent in women. She is lustful, she is insubordinate, she is covetous, she is deceitful, she is a harridan who torments her husbands with her tongue and with her body, and she is even prepared to resort to violence to achieve her own ends. In other words, the very fact that the Wife is neither meek nor complaisant, no matter how much the modern reader may seek to interpret these qualities as marking her out as a protofeminist, reminds the medieval reader that women are dangerous creatures; as the Pardoner puts it: “I was aboute to wed a wif: allas, / What sholde I bye it on my flesh so dere?” (121). Moreover, the *Tale* told by the Wife reinforces the traditional belief that women represent a threat to men, that given the opportunity they will seek to usurp male authority, even as Eve, tempted by the fruit of the tree of knowledge, was prepared to disobey God. For the moral of the *Tale*, the terrible truth uncovered by the Knight, is that what all women desire is control over the male:

```
Wommen desire to have sovereinetee  
As wel over hir housbonde as hir love,  
And for to been in maistrye him above.  
```

(Chaucer, 1986: 142).

Furthermore, although the heroine of the *Tale* appears to gain her desire and triumph over the Knight “‘Thanne have I gete of you maistrye’, quod she, / ‘Sin I may chese and governe as me lest?’”(146) careful consideration suggests that this outcome may, in the final analysis, be as detrimental to the female cause as the *Prologue’s* repetition of antifeminist propaganda. The old hag in the *Tale* asks the Knight to choose:

```
To han me foul and old til that I deye  
And be to you a trewe humble wif,  
And never you displese in al my lif,  
Or elles ye won han me yong and fair,  
And take youre aventure of the repair  
That shal be to youre hous by cause of me-  
Or in some other place, wel may be.  
```

*Akca & Gunes: Male Myth-Making: The Origins of Feminism*
The Knight defers to her wishes – “For as you liketh it suffiseth me”, whereupon the old hag promises to be “bothe fair and good” to her husband, turns into a beautiful young woman, and thereafter “obeyed him in every thing / That mighte do him plesance or liking” (146). In other words, the ugly hag metamorphoses into the alternative female stereotype, that of the angel in the service of the male, which was to influence patriarchal society and literature and, as we shall see, to haunt female writers for centuries to come.

So, if much of the patriarchal literary output of the Middle Ages continued to propagate the traditional myth of woman as some kind of monster of depravity, the obverse of this image, the icon of female purity, was also commonplace. Ortner explains this “symbolic ambiguity” in terms of the fact that, because woman is denied cultural autonomy, she “can appear ….. to stand both under and over the sphere of culture’s hegemony” and thus becomes the embodiment of the “extremes of Otherness” which the culture of the male “confronts with worship or fear, love or loathing” (cited in Gilbert & Gubar, 2000: 19). The type of female purity originates in the Biblical figure of the virgin mother Mary, who may be contrasted with the fallen mother Eve. The image of woman as madonna or angel is no more real than the image of woman as whore or witch, yet once again the Biblical origin of the stereotype validates it and imbues it with the aura of being received truth, which helps to account for its literary longevity. As Gilbert and Gubar observe, “there is a clear line of descent from divine Virgin to [nineteenth century] domestic angel, passing through (among many others) Dante, Milton and Goethe” (2000: 20). An early and striking manifestation of the idealisation of woman occurs in the medieval concept of courtly love, much evident in the literature of the period. Rogers asserts that “Misogynistic feeling in the Middle Ages was ….. much mitigated by the cult of courtly love, which not only held that the love of woman was free of sin, but exalted it to a degree unprecedented in earlier periods, insisting that the love of women was the root of all virtue (1966: 58).

This apparent softening in the attitude of patriarchy has, however, been recognised by feminist thinkers, such as Millett, as having had little impact, in practical terms, upon the social, legal and economic status of women. They remained the subordinate group: “While a palliative to the injustice of woman’s social position, chivalry is also a technique for disguising it. One must acknowledge that the chivalrous stance is a game the master group plays in elevating its subject to pedestal level” (Millett, 1969: Ch. 2).

Moreover, the two extreme images may exist in tension with each other, so that woman is represented not simply as angel or witch, but as a composite figure, in which superficial perfection disguises the “real” nature beneath. Thus, in the medieval romance Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, on one level, the wife of Bercilak, presented as “beyond praise” in her body and her bearing (1986: 204), initially appears to be no more than the innocent servant of her husband in the game designed to test Sir Gawain’s honour: “the wooing of my wife – it was all my scheme” (235). From this perspective, Bercilak’s wife is the mere chattel of her husband, a pawn in his scheme, in which her own feelings are of no apparent consequence. However, Sir Gawain’s misogynistic tirade invites the reader to reconsider this reading, to perceive Bercilak’s wife as one in a long line of dangerous temptresses, daughters of Eve, who have beguiled men only to bring sorrow upon them:
For these were proud princes, most prosperous of old,
Past all lovers lucky, that languished under heaven, bemused.
And one and all fell prey
To women that they had used;
If I be led astray,
Methinks I may be excused” (236).

Sir Gawain holds Bercilak’s wife responsible for his failure to live up to his chivalric ideals, and resolves to wear her green girdle as a badge of the shame she has brought upon him:

This is the sign of sore loss that I have suffered there
For the cowardice and coveting that I came to there;
This is the badge of false faith that I was found in there (238).

When it emerges that the author of both the beheading game and the test of chivalry is Morgan le Faye, sinister usurper of Merlin’s magical powers and enemy of her virtuous half-brother King Arthur, a witch who “By subtleties of science and sorcerers’ arts ..... has caught many a man” (237), Sir Gawain’s misogynistic tirade is lent credibility. Moreover, when Bercilak reveals that Morgan le Fey is none other than the “old withered woman” (237) at the feast of welcome for Sir Gawain, then, in retrospect, the association made then by the poet between the beautiful young wife and the ugly old woman through a series of antithetical comparisons – “if the one was fresh, the other was faded” (204) – suggests that they are in fact but two facets of the same mythic type of evil womanhood: the ugly old witch and the beautiful enchantress (Stiller, 1980: 69).

Although the Renaissance may be differentiated from the Middle Ages as being a period of enlightenment, a period of expanding horizons and of new insights, the prevailing attitude towards women had become so much a constant of the culture as to be relatively unaffected by the momentum of change. Kelly asserts that “there was no Renaissance for women, at least not in the Renaissance” (1977, cited in Greene & Kahn, 1991: 19). Bi-Qi notes that even writers such as Spenser and Shakespeare, who appear to be reasonably free of the prejudices of their age, remain open to some charges of misogyny. Although she identifies Sidney as a notable exception, she highlights the critical consensus that the years between 1550 and 1650 were a “particularly gynophobic century” in which male authors continued to project upon women a “catalogue of vices, an endlessly random list of faults” (Bordo, 1986; Usher & McManus, 1985, both cited in Bi-Qi, 2001). Literature encodes social conventions, and since “each invocation of a code is also its reinforcement or reinscription”, literature becomes not just a mirror but a means of shaping society (Greene & Kahn, 1991: 4). Thus, with the passage of time, the ever-increasing volume of misogynist literature did not simply reflect but in fact continually reconstructed and fortified the dominant ideology.

For Virginia Woolf, one of the founders of modern feminist criticism, this process reached a climax in the work of John Milton. Gilbert and Gubar describe how Milton, in his account of the Fall of mankind
Paradise Lost, published in 1667, sets up a series of deliberate parallels between Eve, Satan and Sin (2000: 196-198). So, for example, Sin is depicted as half woman-half snake, thus establishing a three-way association between the female, the devil and evil:

The one seemed woman to the waist, and fair,
But ended foul in many a scaly fold
Voluminous and vast, a serpent armed
With mortal sting.


This is reinforced when Adam addresses Eve as “thou serpent!” (813). Through Adam, Milton reiterates the patriarchal view of Eve, and therefore of woman, as degraded: “defaced, deflowered” (798); and as vulnerable: “thy frailty and infirmer sex” (815). In the words of Woolf, in Paradise Lost “is summed up much of what men thought of our place in the universe, of our duty to God, our religion” (1918, cited in Gilbert & Gubar, 2000: 190). “What men thought” of women, the distillation of centuries of antifeminism, is rendered by Milton through Adam’s tirade against the creation of the female, who was superfluous, flawed, fallen, an eternal temptress:

….. all was but a show
Rather than solid virtue, all but a rib
Crooked by nature – bent, as now appears,
More to the part sinister – from me drawn;
Well if thrown out, as supernumerary
To my just number found! Oh, why did God,
Creator wise, that peopled highest Heaven
With spirits masculine, create at last
This novelty on earth, this fair defect
Of nature, and not fill the world at once
With men, as angels, without feminine;
Or find some other way to generate
Mankind? This mischief had not then befallen,
And more that shall befall – innumerable
Disturbances on earth through female snares,
And straight conjunction with this sex.


Almost three centuries after these lines were written, Milton, supreme poet and propagandist of “the culture myth….. at the heart of Western literary patriarchy” (Gilbert & Gubar, 2000: 191), remained for Woolf the “bogey” man whom women, and in particular aspiring female writers, had to confront if they
were to assert their relation to “the world of reality and not only to the world of men and women” (Woolf, 1992: 149).

Gilbert and Gulbar describe how patriarchy and its texts have, over the ages, subordinated and confined women, denying them both an identity of their own and the right to authorship (2000: 3-44). In *A Room of One’s Own*, Virginia Woolf discusses the apparent discrepancy between the positions of woman in fiction and woman in fact, as well as the ambiguous nature of the literary version of the female, in the period up to and including the seventeenth century: “Imaginatively she is of the highest importance; practically she is completely insignificant” (1992: 56). In real life, women were regularly abused, often illiterate, and inevitably regarded as the property of the male, whether husband or father (55-56). In literature, on the other hand, women were “heroic and mean; splendid and sordid; infinitely beautiful and hideous in the extreme; as great as a man, some think even greater” (55). Of course, these paradoxes may be resolved if one remembers that literature encodes ideology. Just as a woman may be literally confined to the home as the chattel of the male in a patriarchal society, likewise in patriarchal literature, woman is defined by the pen of the male and confined to the image which best serves his needs. This, as we have seen, tends to be a version of one of two stereotypes, the angel or the witch, neither of which reflects reality, and neither of which promotes female interests. However, the former may prove deceptive since it is not overtly anti-feminist and even appears to exalt the importance of woman.

Samuel Richardson’s *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded*, published in 1740, may be cited as an example of this. If one disregards the alternative, antifeminist reading of Pamela as a manipulative hypocrite, typified in Fielding’s parodic *Shamela* (1741), the heroine would appear, in many ways, to be a prototypical feminist role model. Pamela resists, and thereby exposes, the contemporary double standard in sexual mores. Through her virtue and the premium she places upon chastity, she converts the lust of her master, Mr B. into love and a marriage proposal, and thus triumphs in the face of his ubiquitous power - as a male, as her employer, and as the representative of institutional justice. Through her letters, she defines herself and retains control of her own story, so that she divests the male of authorship. In the final analysis, Mr. B. seeks to know Pamela’s whole personality, her moral and emotional self, as represented by her letters, even more than he desires to know her physically. Through her marriage to the aristocratic Mr. B., the servant-girl Pamela transcends her social class and transfigures her economic situation. However, despite *Pamela’s* psychological realism, and the apparent triumph of the heroine, her ultimate destiny is marriage, in which state she resolves to make the obliging of her husband her “whole study”, in line with the “indispensable rules” for her future conduct which he has been pleased to give her (Richardson, 1985: 467-470). In other words, Pamela is now established as a paragon of the matrimonial virtues, or as Armstrong puts it: “the female voice flattens into that of pure ideology” (1989: 125). Pamela’s soul has been tested and found to be equal indeed to “the soul of a princess” (Richardson, 1985: 197). The concept of chastity as a supreme virtue, which had been associated primarily with the noble lady in courtly literature, has thereby been transposed down the social scale, and found to be applicable to women of a humbler background. Thus, the patriarchal stereotype of the angel gains a wider field of application. Moreover, since the destiny of the virtuous woman is marriage, the stage has now been set for the angel to be imprisoned in domesticity as “the angel in the house”. In Armstrong’s view, through *Pamela*, male desire, which had formerly
been oriented towards a woman’s claim to family name and fortune, was “redirected … at a woman who embodied the domestic virtues” (1989: 8, 109-110). This reorientation in male desire towards the idealized figure of the virtuous wife who would make the family home a moral sanctuary reflects the values of the burgeoning, largely Puritan, middle class in the eighteenth century, and would become embedded in the patriarchal culture of the nineteenth century.

In 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft published *A Vindication of the Rights of Women*, in which she argued that the definition of woman as an inferior creature designed to do his pleasure was a male invention, which had gained credence as a consequence of his denial of education to the female. Only through education would woman attain such “habits of virtue” as would render her independent: “Strengthen the female mind by enlarging it, and there will be an end to blind obedience” (Wollstonecraft, 1792: Ch. 2). Thus, the work of this early feminist associates virtue with independence rather than with complaisance, and postulates the capacity of the female to determine her own identity if given access to education. However, as De Beauvoir notes, just as feminism began to gain a voice “woman was ordered back into the home”. The French feminist attributes women’s re-incarceration in domesticity to a male fear that competition with emancipated females in the productive arena might represent a threat to his hegemony (De Beauvoir, 1949). Thus, in the post-feudal industrial era, although the male now found it increasingly possible to forge his own place in society, he still deemed it necessary to devise “new denigrations of female nature … new celebrations of female needs for protection … (which would) exclude women from full social and political participation” (Fox-Genovese, 1982, cited in Greene & Kahn, 1991: 19). So, in *The Descent of Man*, published in 1871, the scientist Darwin who, ironically, had challenged the Biblical account of the origins of mankind with his theory of evolution, nonetheless lent new support to the patriarchal myth of the female as inferior, by describing woman as being “characteristic of … a past and lower state of civilisation” (cited in Bressler, 1999: 181). In terms of the alternative patriarchal exclusion tactic, the Victorian ideology of separate spheres fixed woman in the home as “an aesthetic object, decorous, chaste, dependent” (Kelly, cited in Greene & Kahn, 1991: 19).

The ideology of separate spheres alleged that biological differences existed between the sexes which in turn engendered specifically masculine or feminine characteristics. The passive qualities associated with femininity – self-sacrifice, patience, sympathy – were held to make the domestic arena the natural environment of the female; whereas, the active qualities associated with masculinity – determination, resourcefulness, aggressiveness, rationality – were held to justify the male domination of the public arena (Dyhouse, 1978: 175; Eisenstein, 1983: 8; Kent, 1999: 179). Since woman was biologically endowed with the capacity “for sweet ordering, arrangement and decision”, in the words of Ruskin, and since she was too pure to be exposed to public life, her proper role was to “radiate sympathy and moral influence throughout the domestic sphere” (Gillooly, 2002: 397-398). The Victorian ideal of marriage and domestic life thus incorporated romantic notions of love, companionship and spiritual equality, but in the reality of the institution women remained legally and economically subordinate to their husbands (Kent, 1999: 191). Millett cites Beigel’s observation that the romantic version of love, like the courtly, is a male concession out of the whole range of his powers. She goes on to argue that while the effect of this concession is to disguise somewhat the patriarchal nature of western culture, the attribution of impossible virtues to woman
in fact confines her to an extremely narrow sphere of behaviour (Millett, 1969: Ch. 2). By associating woman with submission and man with control, the ideology of separate spheres extended the dominance of the male over the female, in both the public and the private spheres (Eisenstein, 1983: 14). Moreover, the ideology did not fail to incorporate the other element in the traditional angel-witch dichotomy, since it also accommodated the image of the fallen woman, the woman who resists male authority and pursues her own sexual desires, but in so doing exposes herself to a different kind of male abuse (Kent, 1999: 180).

In 1851, Harriet Taylor Mill argued in *Enfranchisement of Women* that patriarchal constructions of gender identity were not based in reality, and that “the proper sphere for all human beings is the largest and highest which they are able to attain to” (Kent, 1999: 194-195). In her essay *Professions for Women*, Virginia Woolf identifies two of the obstacles which men have placed in the way of the female who aspires to be a successful novelist, and indeed of the female who aspires to success in any professional capacity (1966: 285-286). The first of these Woolf calls The Angel in the House, after the title of a book of poems by Coventry Patmore (1885), in which the iconic image of the female promulgated by nineteenth century patriarchy took literary form in the person of the heroine, Honoria. In Woolf’s view, the image of the self-sacrificing, complaisant, pure female, which was used to confine Victorian woman to the domestic sphere and to control her behaviour there, continued to haunt the female writer into the twentieth century, urging her that she should “Be sympathetic; be tender; flatter; deceive; use all the arts and wiles of our sex. Never let anybody guess that you have a mind of your own. Above all, be pure” (Woolf, 1966: 285). In other words, the female writer’s capacity to discover her own identity as an artist remained constrained by patriarchal constructions of gender-appropriate behaviour. Woolf argues that to write as a critic or novelist means to tell the truth about what you think about human relations, morality and sex (286). However, “the extreme conventionality” of the male sex with regard to the female, evident in the limits which patriarchy imposes upon a woman’s freedom to explore her sexuality, to describe her passions, to write as she truly is, remains a rock against which the woman writer continually founders (287-288). The Angel in the House thus becomes the symbol of the hold the male continues to exercise over the female psyche. Moreover, out of this arises the second obstacle to female self-realisation identified by Woolf: a woman psychologically constrained in this way cannot know herself, she will only find herself if she is allowed to express herself freely “in all the arts and professions open to human skill” (286). It follows that the fictitious but persistent Angel in the House, whom Güneş describes as the “internalised symbol of Victorian womanhood”, must be destroyed if woman is to succeed as a writer, or in any other profession (2007: 25). As Woolf herself puts it: “Killing the Angel in the House was part of the occupation of a woman writer” (1966: 286).

However, before a woman could develop a “mind of her own” she needed a “room of her own”. Just as Woolf uses the image of the Angel in the House to represent the psychological hegemony of the male, so she uses the notion of a acquiring a “room of one’s own” to symbolise the emancipation of the female writer from centuries of economic dependence upon and domestic subservience to the male. By the time she wrote *Professions for Women*, Woolf was able to acknowledge that her own path had been made smooth for her by the women writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at least in terms of the fact that she faced few material obstacles and that writing was now considered to be “a reputable and harmless occupation” (1966: 284). In contrast, in her essay *A Room of One’s Own*, Woolf describes how the social,
familial and moral values of sixteenth century patriarchal society made inevitable the loss of any female artistic talent which might otherwise have come to fruition. To illustrate her point, Woolf creates the character of Judith Shakespeare, sister of the great poet and playwright William Shakespeare, postulates that she is equally gifted, and then demonstrates how she could never have attained the heights of artistic success reached by her brother. As a girl, her education would have been inferior to that of her brother, and her time would have been filled with domestic duties; as a young woman, the path laid out for her would have been marriage in accordance with her father’s wishes; as a runaway in pursuit of the realisation of her gift, her fate as a female would have been exclusion from employment, poverty, the inability to find a “room of her own” in which to develop her talents, recourse to the protection of the unscrupulous male, loss of chastity, pregnancy, death and an unmarked grave (Woolf, 1992: 60-62). Had Judith Shakespeare somehow survived, then the nervous stress of living a free life in London, in an age when female chastity was held to be of paramount importance, would certainly have threatened her sanity and distorted her writings (64). All this would have come about because her “poet’s heart” was “caught and tangled in a woman’s body” (63), because “all the conditions of her life, all her own instincts, were hostile to the state of mind which is needed to set free whatever is in the brain” (66).

The consequence of the denial of a “room of their own” to women in the early modern period was the lack of a female literary tradition in the context of which, had it existed, the women writers of subsequent generations might have found it easier to realise their female artistic identity. In its absence, as Woolf points out, the Brontë sisters, George Eliot and George Sand found it necessary to seek refuge from exposure as women writers in the use of male pseudonyms. Woolf perceives this desire for anonymity as a relic of the cult of female chastity. In the absence of a groundbreaking female literary tradition to make their work respectable, writers such as Eliot may have feared male opprobrium, and certainly believed that a semblance of male authorship would ensure that their works would be judged on their own merits, rather than with reference to notions of gender appropriate behaviour (McSweeney, 1991: 80-81). The lack of a female literary tradition left nineteenth century women writers without any point of external reference other than that provided by the male canon. In consequence, “the whole structure ….. of the early nineteenth-century novel was raised, if one was a woman, by a mind which was slightly pulled from the straight, and made to alter its clear vision in deference to external authority” (Woolf, 1992: 96). In Woolf’s view, only Jane Austen and Emily Brontë “wrote as women write, not as men write” (97). So, for instance, Eliot, in The Mill on the Floss is unable to resolve the dilemma of her heroine Maggie Tulliver. The social and ideological formation which Maggie experiences as a child leads her in the final analysis to choose self-abnegation. She denies herself the possibility of romantic fulfilment in a relationship with Stephen because she is not prepared to sever the bonds of duty and love which attach her to her family, or to sacrifice her feminine quality of sympathy in the pursuit of selfish desires. On the other hand, Maggie’s protest against the patriarchal system which has brought her to this pass is felt, even at the end, in her “doubt in the justice of her own resolve (Eliot, n.d.: 629). Within the confines of the patriarchal system, Eliot can find no way out for Maggie which does not damage her in some way, either by alienating her from her family, or by leaving her physically or emotionally unfulfilled. As Woolf puts it, George Eliot’s heroines “charged with suffering and sensibility” yearn for something “that is perhaps incompatible with the facts of human existence” (Woolf, 1948: 217). Eliot, therefore, can only find release for Maggie in death. But
Eliot, like her heroines, was also searching: “For her too, the burden and the complexity of womanhood were not enough; she must reach beyond the sanctuary and pluck for herself the strange bright fruits of art and knowledge” (Woolf, 1948: 217). Moreover, whatever the fate of her heroines might have been, Eliot herself was successful in “confronting her feminine aspirations with the real world of men” (218). By earning her living as a writer, Eliot claimed a room of her own in the literary edifice which had previously been occupied largely by male authors. Eliot thus helped to pave the way for future generations of female writers, to the extent that in the first half of the twentieth century, Woolf was able to affirm to the aspiring woman writers, and other professionals, of her own era: “the room is your own, but it is still bare. It has to be furnished; it has to be decorated; it has to be shared” (1966: 289).

It has been the work of Woolf and subsequent generations of feminist writers and critics to engage in the process of furnishing and decorating this room of their own. For some, this has involved exposing and challenging literary stereotypes of woman. For others, it has involved re-evaluating female authors (Bressler, 1999: 190). For some, it has involved re-examining the male literary canon from a female perspective, in what Adrienne Rich calls “Re-vision – the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction” (cited in Gilbert & Gubar, 2000: 49). So, for example, the “re-visionist” might interpret Chaucer’s sympathetic treatment of the Wife of Bath’s “feminism” as an attack on the prevailing antifeminist tradition; might interpret her openness, her vitality, her resilience, and her mastery of her husbands as evidence of feminine power; might argue that her proclamation of the validity of her own experience over authority represents an early attack on the male myth-making which would long hold women subservient; and that the fictitious nature of the male version of the female is further exposed by her commonsensical declaration:

By God, if women hadden written stories,  
As clerkes han within hir oratories,  
They wolde han written of men more wikkednesse  
Than al the merk of Adam may redresse.

(Chaucer, 1986: 134).

Moreover, again from this perspective, Chaucer seems to hint, both in the Wife’s account of her fifth marriage and in the conclusion of the Tale, at the possibility that where the wife rules the husband a happy union may ensue: “And thus they live unto hir lives ende in parfait joye” (Chaucer, 1986: 146; Rogers, 1966: 82). Similarly, the “re-visionist” might interpret the fact that the beheading game in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight proves to have been organised by Morgan le Fay as evidence for a narrative of maternal origins, which might be opposed to the traditional patriarchal account of creation; or that the green girdle, the love-lace, implies feminine power over the male (Margherita, 1994: 141).

For some, it has involved challenging male-oriented approaches to literary scholarship and developing female models of literary analysis based on female experience; relying, for example, upon Freudian or Lacanian analysis of the female psyche, or upon analysis of the female use of language and of feminine
imagery within a text, or upon analysis of the impact of cultural factors upon the construction of female identity (Bressler, 1999: 190-191).

For some, such as Woolf, it has involved replacing gender polarisation with a multiplistic approach to questions of identity, as symbolised in Woolf’s Orlando, whose “continuous ambiguity and oscillation from one sex to the other, or from one position to another one, undermines the basis of the stereotypes of politically and culturally constructed gender identity (Güneş, 2007: 196-197). For others, in contrast, it has involved a woman-centred approach, which has sought to identify those aspects of female experience that were potential sources of feminine power (Eisenstein, 1983: xii). It is perhaps worth noting that this approach, if carried to the extreme, runs the risk of replacing a male myth of female inferiority with a female myth of female superiority.

Clearly then, in view of these various strands of feminist literary and critical activity, the process of furnishing and decorating is well underway. Indeed, the female writer’s “room of her own” has become a house of her own, inhabited by a real Woman in the House who, at last, has a mind of her own.

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Hooligan Writing and the Study of Football Fan Culture: Problems and Possibilities.

By Steve Redhead

ABSTRACT

This essay looks at problems and possibilities associated with research into football hooligan memoirs, or what has been called hit and tell literature. It captures material from a continuing research project on the link between football hooligans writing their own (his)tories and the history of British football hooligan subcultures, especially with regard to ‘casual’ youth culture. Interviews with the writers of these football hooligan memoirs illuminate a number of complex issues around oral history and working class writing. The research is situated at the intersection between oral history, leisure studies, cultural criminology, and post-subcultural studies. The essay considers some implications for the study of male dominated youth subcultures and the methodologies to be employed. The essay claims that the study of hooligan literature might lead, ultimately, to better informed ethnographies of subcultures.

KEYWORDS

Casuals, Youth Culture, Deviance, Skinheads, Football Hooliganism, Subculture, Masculinity, Post-Subculture, Hit and Tell Lit, Low Sport Journalism.

The best cinematic account of football hooliganism and its connection to British youth culture and popular music is in a film version of Kevin Sampson’s debut novel *Awaydays* (Sampson, 1998), based around the Pack, a group of Tranmere Rovers football casuals who strutted their stuff in the late 1970s. The film was released for the cinema in 2009 with an evocative post-punk soundtrack. But, rather than cult fiction, it is football hooligan memoirs, or hit and tell (Redhead, 2004c) stories, which have to some extent displaced,
for mass media moral panics, the incidents of football hooligan violence that seemed to punctuate the football match reports of the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. These print tales of ‘low sport journalism’ (Redhead, 2010), are also showcased now in all kinds of other media. In 2007 Carlton Leach (Leach, 2003, Leach, 2008) witnessed his story of the transition from Inter City Firm (ICF) football hooligan at West Ham United in the 1970s and 1980s to Essex gangster in the 1990s fictionally portrayed in Julian Gilbey’s film *Rise of the Footsoldier* which stands as the most pervasive and extreme use of the crossover football hooligan/gangster style to date (Redhead, 2010). In 2008 another prominent former member of West Ham’s Inter City Firm, Cass Pennant, saw his own story (Pennant, 2008) committed to celluloid in the film *Cass*. Also in 2008 a cool modernist, artistically produced edition of Dave Hewitson’s classic casual memoir *The Liverpool Boys Are In Town: The Birth of Terrace Culture* came onto the UK streets, designed by the Eleanor Suggett Studio and published by Liverpool’s Bluecoat Press.

The ‘hit and tell’ football hooligan literature certainly sells, to an extent. Large formats A-L and M-Z of Britain’s Hooligan Gangs published in 2005 sold out within a year and went into new paperback editions in the 2007-2008 British football season (Lowles and Nicholls, 2007a, 2007b). A hardback historical account of Leeds United’s football hooligan gangs written by a female BBC journalist (Gall, 2007) published in December 2007 sold out by the New Year 2008 and set the fans’ forums and websites buzzing with gossip and rumour as one of its top boy interviewees, Eddie Kelly, was arrested by West Yorkshire police within days of the book’s release. This football hooligan literature is mostly unashamedly partisan and boastful, recounting up to forty years of aggressive male football fandom associated with a particular British league club, music and fashion obsessions and the behaviour of its mob, firm or crew. There is fierce debate amongst academics about how useful they are as narrative texts (Dart, 2008, Gibbons, Dixon and Braye, 2008, Redhead, 2004c, 2010). The texts are written in the form of fan memoir. Few of them have any pretensions to academic style or journalistic convention. The hooligan fan writings are often formalised and couched in deliberately trashy formats. Quotations and conversations are seemingly made up at will. The authors are almost always male and in their late thirties, forties or fifties, old enough to have been there, done that and bought the T shirt in the so-called Golden Age of the 1970s and early 1980s. Much of the writing is untutored, and sometimes even bordering on illiteracy. By virtue of their age and their subcultural practices, however, the ‘deviant’ hooligan writers have become self-styled oral historians and archivists of a period when post-industrial Britain, and its football culture, was said to be undergoing fundamental modernisation. International academic research, and social and cultural theory, can learn from these documents. But the hooligan literature writers, for the most part, baulk at expertise, criteria for measurement and learning. Indeed academia, like the media, is the enemy, seen as partly responsible for the myriad misrepresentations of football fan culture and its history which these books perceive as a fundamental problem and consequently seek to put to rights. In the late 1960s new criminologists wrote ‘speculative sociology of soccer hooliganism’ for the National Deviancy Conference (Cohen, 1970) and debate about accuracy, authenticity and realism in hooligan research has persisted ever since.
Sweet and Tender Hooligan

The football hooligan memoir authors’ interest in the male violence and male bonding of what were once labelled in pulp fiction ‘terrace terrors’ is wrapped up in an almost camp fascination with hardness in male youth culture (1) most famously exhibited by Morrissey of The Smiths as he pursued his solo career in the 1990s and 2000s (Brown, 2008). The link between gay and skinhead subcultures is certainly worth reconsidering (Healy, 1996) in this context. The connection between football hooligan literature and football hooligan subcultures needs to be taken seriously within contemporary studies of deviance and this essay suggests some theoretical and methodological signposts for the study of subculture with an emphasis, though not exclusively forged, on casual youth culture. This research work into British football hooliganism literature also rethinks earlier work on rave culture (Redhead, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) and football hooligan subcultures (McLaughlin and Redhead, 1985, Redhead, 1987, 1991, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 2000) in the light of appreciation and critique of such work in recent youth subcultural theory debates (Blackshaw and Crabbe, 2004, Blackman, 2005, Hesmondalgh, 2005, Bennett, 2005, Greener and Hollands, 2006, Hall and Jefferson, 2006). The research of which this article forms a part maps, through a collection and reading of football hooligan fan memoirs, the history of the moments of the birth of casual in the late 1970s and the coming together of the football hooligan and rave subcultures in the late 1980s/early 1990s and the later re-mixing of these moments. The present research shows that although these football hooligan subcultures disappeared from the mainstream media gaze for a time, there remain elements or traces of these real subcultures today. The argument is that there is something of a comeback, or slight return of football hooligan subcultures in the twenty-first century (Redhead, 2008b, 2008c) buried in the retracing of the histories of the football hooligan subcultures of the past. Some hooligans who have returned to the fray after the 1990s have died (see dedication in Lowles and Nicholls, 2007b) or are in long term imprisonment after militaristic police operations and relatively severe court sentences frequently stimulated by media hyper-moral panics (Giulianotti, Bonney and Hepworth 1994: 229-261, Stott and Pearson, 2007). However a trawl through the football hooligan memoirs reveals a sustained contemporary commitment to fighting firms, especially in the lower leagues in Britain. Gilroy Shaw in his history of Wolverhampton Wanderers football crews suggests that:

A lot has been said over the last few years about the decline of the football hooligan, and the police through the media every now and then release a statement to say that they are winning the battle in the fight against hooliganism. With more banning orders, more police and stewards and CCTV, they claim that the football hooligan will soon be eradicated. That may well be in the big, mega-bucks world of the Premiership, but down in the lower leagues, believe me, nothing’s changed. You look at the unfashionable, so-called smaller clubs like Shrewsbury, Hereford, Aldershot, Newport County, Hull, Luton and Wrexham, who can all, on their day, pull a mob that would put their Premiership cousins in the shade. They’re still doing it week in, week out, and it mostly goes unreported. (Shaw and King, 2005: 130)

The research project reported on here engages contains some insights for the disciplines of cultural studies on the one hand and criminology on the other, and the respective sub-disciplines of post-subcultural
studies and cultural criminology. Indeed this essay is intended as a signpost towards what I call a post-subcultural criminology. A certain rethinking of the concept of subculture, as if we are now ‘after subculture’ (Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004) or ‘beyond subculture’ (Huq, 2006), has taken place over the past decade (Blackman, 2006, Greener and Hollands, 2006). The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) seminal work at the University of Birmingham in the 1970s (Hall and Jefferson, 2006, Hebdige, 1979) is infrequently given its due but much of its critique of earlier work on subcultures remains pertinent. A second edition of its classic collection of essays on youth subcultures in post-war Britain, *Resistance Through Rituals*, re-emphasises the pioneering nature of the work whilst coming to terms with more recent approaches such as postmodernism (Hall and Jefferson, 2006: xix-xxi) and postfeminism (Hall and Jefferson, 2006: xxiv-xxv). As has been noted elsewhere (Free and Hughson, 2003), Angela McRobbie’s strictures about gender blindness in subcultural research are as relevant to what have been called the ‘new ethnographies’ (Hughson, 1998) of football hooligan subcultures as ever they were. The specific work on football hooligan subcultures at the CCCS by writers like John Clarke (Hall and Jefferson, 2006: 80-3) linking skinheads, football hooliganism and the magical recovery of community was always exemplary. The origins of the concept of subculture in the Chicago School criminology (Jencks, 2005, Blackman, 2006) of the early part of the twentieth century risk being erased as new generations of scholars emerge in a new century, and new subcultures such as emo - from emotional punk (Simon and Kelley, 2007) - as well as older subcultures like goth (Brill, 2008), punk and northern soul (Wilson, 2007) present themselves for sustained new ethnographic and theoretical analyses. Nevertheless, the emergence of ‘clubcultures’ and ‘post-subculture’ (Redhead, 1997c) as fresh concepts and the subsequent imagining of the figure of the ‘post-subculturalist’ (see Muggleton in Redhead, 1997c) and the development of a sub-discipline of post-subcultural studies have rapidly gained pace (Muggleton, 2000, Muggleton and Weinzierl, 2003, Bennett, and Kahn-Harris, 2004, Greener and Hollands, 2006). A symposium held in Vienna, Austria shortly after the turn of the millennium in 2001 entitled ‘Post-Subcultural Studies: New Formations within Popular Culture and their Political Impact’ (Muggleton and Weinzierl, 2003: 3) helped to kick-start this new international sub-discipline which is situated at the intersection of criminology, socio-legal studies, sociology and cultural studies. Yet studies of football hooliganism have tended to eschew this sub-discipline in favour of more established views of subculture and hooliganism, however theoretically varied (Ingham, 1978, Cohen and Robins, 1978, Robins, 1984, Dunning, Murphy and Williams, 1984, Dunning, Murphy and Williams, 1988, Dunning, Murphy and Williams, 1991, Armstrong, 1998, Giulianotti, 1999, King, 2002, Dunning, Murphy and Waddington, 2002, Frosdick and Marsh, 2005, Stott and Pearson, 2007). The discussion of contemporary football hooligan literature and subcultures illuminates the general state of the sub-discipline of cultural criminology (Katz, 1988, Redhead, 1995, Ferrell and Sanders, 1995, Ferrell, Hayward, Morrison and Presdee, 2004, Presdee, 2000, Presdee, 2004, Young, Ferrell and Hayward, 2008, Hayward, 2004, Young, 1999, Young, 2007), and also theories of subculture, youth culture and popular culture overall, an amalgam I once labelled popular cultural studies (Redhead, 1995, 1997b, 1997c). Especially, this is important in terms of the conceptions of modernity employed (Young, 2007). The idea of late modernity, employed by Jock Young in a stimulating cultural criminology discussion of the ‘vertigo’ of the current conjuncture (Young, 2007) is one version. In the lonely hour of the last instance, however, late modernity seems forever present. The notion of postmodern tribe, deriving from the work of Michel Maffesoli, has received considerable discussion in the context of football and
its fan communities (Crabbe, 2008) as has the idea of liquid fandom inspired by the work of Zygmunt Bauman (Crabbe, 2008, Blackshaw, 2008). In a recent series of debates, a binary division between subcultural theorists and post-subcultural theorists has appeared (Greener and Hollands, 2006, Blackman, 2006). For some theorists (Blackman, 2006, Bennett, 2006) a general postmodern subcultural theory has been identified in these debates which includes post-subcultural theory, drawing on such theorists as Jean Baudrillard, on subculture, rave and football hooliganism which has been seen to be part of this cluster of postmodern subcultural theory (Hollands, 2002, Chatterton and Hollands, 2003, Greener and Hollands, 2006, Blackman, 2006, Bennett, 2006) where youth styles are seen to be ‘depthless, transitory and internally fragmented’ although both the theoretical endeavour and the subcultures themselves have proved to be rather more enduring.

What about the explicit connection between football hooligan subcultures and subculture in general? A recent book covering subculture as a whole fails to mention football hooligan subcultures at all (Gelder, 2007). Significantly, too, work on football hooligan subcultures has not featured in this rethinking of subculture in post-subcultural studies, or in the related sub-discipline of cultural criminology (Redhead, 1995, Ferrell and Sanders, 1995, Ferrell, Hayward, Morrison and Presdee, 2004, Presdee, 2004), though related studies of contemporary rave culture have figured strongly (Presdee, 2000, Muggleton and Weinzierl, 2003: 101-117, Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004: 65-78, Gelder, 2007: 64-5, Nayak and Kehily, 2008: 56-9). Perhaps the reason for this omission is that little sustained sociological and anthropological theorising and rigorous academic ethnography of football hooligan subcultures has been conducted over the last twenty-five years. Honourable exceptions to this rule are relatively rare (Armstrong, 1998, Robson, 2000, Sugden, 2002, Sugden, 2007, Slaughter, 2004). In these and a few other cases long term participant observation work has been carried out. Clubs’ whose football firms have been involved include Sheffield United, Millwall and Manchester United. In many other instances, it is clear that fans winding up gullible authors and journalists with hooligan stories have become almost a full time job. Another reason is that the specific intertwining of football hooligan subcultures and rave culture was generally a UK phenomenon rather than an international one (Redhead, 1990, 1991, 1993a, Anderson and Kavanaugh, 2007). A further reason is that football hooliganism has become something of, in Jean Baudrillard’s terms (Pawlett, 2007, Merrin, 2005, Redhead, 2008a), a simulacrum through media simulation. The extreme form of football hooligan subculture has manifested itself in the strange pulp faction of the once underground football thug writing scene. Much of this is now online. One way into a realm of better informed ethnographies of contemporary football hooligan subcultures is through this simulacrum (Redhead, 2008a, 2008b, 2010).

Tooty Fruities, Wacky Youth and the Spotty Dog Crew

As opposed to the relative dearth of recent cultural studies accounts of football hooligan subcultures, low culture amateur journalistic accounts continue to proliferate; what I see as ‘low sport journalism’ (Redhead, 2010). They are now extensive in number and together form a vast library of hooligan stories in the fashionable, confessional form of sports fan memoir (Hornby, 1992, Redhead, 2004c, Redhead, 2010, Redhead: Hooligan writing and the study of football fan culture}
Part of the ongoing research work is archival, involving a comprehensive collection and reading of over twenty years worth of football hooligan memoirs in book form. Other parts of the work involve studying the extensive cyberspace hooligan wars. Yet other parts involve interviewing the authors themselves about their writing. There are collected in the research archive in the Chelsea School at the University of Brighton eighty-nine books written by self-confessed hooligans about their hooligan exploits or by writers who have interviewed them about these activities. These books are listed in A-Z form in Appendix 1. Some of the football hooligan memoirs are hardback only, some were issued originally in paperback, yet others have gone into paperback after hardback editions ran out. The firms, crews and gangs covered in these books are associated with current professional Premier or Football League football clubs in England and Scotland, or clubs who have once been League members (although it is true that the general non-league scene also has firms associated with it). The clubs involved are listed in A-Z form in Appendix 2. The earliest football hooligan memoir can be dated from 1987 and there are still published memoirs in the pipeline today.

In 2002 a considerable boost to the ‘low sport journalism’ genre was given by the Writing on the Wall Festival in Liverpool, organized by author Phil Thornton, whose paperback history of casual youth culture is simply peerless (Thornton, 2003) and has sold over 30,000 copies to date. The Festival that year focused on the rise of the hooligan gang memoir. Authors Cass Pennant (West Ham United), Martin King (Chelsea) and Tony Rivers (Cardiff City) were panellists at the event. Pete Walsh of Milo Books represented the publishing arm (John Blake publishing was the only other independent competitor and was not represented). Subsequently Walsh commissioned many more hooligan books at Milo, concentrating on the angle of ‘aggro’ rather than culture to sell the texts to eager consumers. Pennant and King saw there was an opportunity to set up independent publishing ventures and Pennant books and Headhunter books were created within a year or so of the Liverpool writing event. At the time of writing the increase of football hooligan memoirs since 2002 has now slowed considerably. In the 1980s and early 1990s these hit and tell football thug authored writings appeared in underground fanzines or very limited edition, poorly distributed, hastily printed books (Redhead, 1987, 1991, 1997a). But by the late 1990s a distinctive market had been created and a number of tiny independent publishers with a finger on the pulse of the vagaries of football fan culture responded by commissioning a host of new books with relatively small margins for profit. The best example of the hit and tell genre are the true confession writings published since 1997 by the independent venture Milo Books based in North West England with its own internet website, but other small independent publishers, (also now equipped with internet sites) mainly shipping product to eager individual virtual customers, as well as high street book and music shops, have, as we have seen, been emerging in recent years. The most prominent apart from Milo are: John Blake Publishing, begun in the 1990s by the journalist John Blake, Headhunter Books, begun in 2004 by the former hooligan and writer Martin King, and Pennant Books, begun in 2005 by the former hooligan and writer Cass Pennant.

Milo, a small scale Lancashire publishing business, originally located in Bury and subsequently removed to Lytham St Annes and then Wrea Green, is the brainchild of journalist Peter Walsh, who, in his forties is the same age as the ‘old boy’ hooligans who write the memoirs that he publishes. Walsh, who was educated in Blackpool, worked as a reporter for various newspapers in his career including the Manchester Evening News, The Daily Mail, The Sun and the Coventry Evening Telegraph, and also the BBC. He
has produced provocative investigative journalism on contemporary gang violence for various different media. In particular his study of the Manchester gang wars in the 1990s is an outstanding, well researched journalistic account of organised and disorganised crime in a contemporary urban setting (Walsh, 2003). His publishing company has also showcased other sharp journalistic portrayals of the historical contours and current shape of the British underground economy. Walsh, the publisher, has also worked jointly with his authors in some cases, especially in the writing of the histories of Manchester United (O’Neill, 2005) and Manchester City (Francis and Walsh, 1997) football gangs. Walsh has subsequently expanded his publishing enterprise to include books on boxing, street fighters, bare-knuckle fighting, anti-fascist left wing violence, histories of city gangs and biographies of American gangsters but it is the hooligan memoirs which fill the bookshelves and gain most lurid publicity for his company. As a small, hand to mouth operation, Milo has gained from moral panic on the one hand and the mixing of music and football culture on the other. Milo Books, along with Pennant, John Blake and Headhunter Books, have rapidly become part of a ‘cult’ publishing category. This style has now become so familiar that it has provoked publishers to produce their own comic parodies of the genre (Fist and Baddiel, 2005, Cheetham and Eldridge, 2006) extending to contents pages, ‘Chapter Fucking One’, ‘Chapter Fucking Two’, and so on, and general sub-cultural argot. Academic analysis of this media form by Emma Poulton has resulted in the label fantasy football hooliganism (Poulton, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). In 2008 Pete Walsh of Milo Books dramatically announced that the company was not commissioning any more of what it termed ‘hoolie’ books due to the saturation of the market. Other publishers have had public fallouts with the potential authors of these confessions further increasing the likelihood of fewer books being published. Moreover, bookshops such as Waterstone’s in the UK have been involved in controversy over the sale of hooligan memoirs – the shop in Cardiff for example was inundated with complaints after ‘hit and tell’ books on Welsh football gangs were included in a section in the shop entitled ‘Pride of Wales’. Many authors are now turning to self-publishing websites like lulu.com in order to get their memoirs published. Legislation may however bring the low sport journalism genre to a premature end. In late 2008 the Labour government announced a bill which, if passed, would criminalise the publishing of confessions of criminals for profit. Both John Blake and Milo publishers condemned the proposals as unworkable and unreasonable.

Added to the myriad websites, blogs, e-zines and fans’ forums on the internet, these memoirs can be rigorously studied for an oral history contribution to the study of football fan culture. These archived memoirs are, if appropriately employed, able to add to the pre-existing body of knowledge produced in the late 1970s and 1980s (and to some extent 1990s) about football hooligan subcultures especially in the context of moral panics about football hooligan gangs in the mainstream media. The mass media media moral panics about soccer yobs are still prevalent, although not as numerous as they were in the 1970s and 1980s (Ingham, 1978, Whannel, 1979, Redhead, 1987, 1991, 1997a) but the press and TV news stories are even further removed from the street culture that they portray than they were twenty or thirty years ago. Predictably they trumpet a drug fuelled new soccer violence. For instance, a News of the World crime investigation (Panton, 2008) in 2008 labelled a ‘new breed of football louts’ as ‘hooli-sons’. It claimed that they were ‘causing mayhem at matches’ and that ‘there was an alarming rise in the number of teenage soccer yobs’ many of whom it alleged ‘were the offspring of football thugs from the 1970s and 1980s’, the same ‘old boys’ who write the football hooligan memo books. The News of the World confidently
asserted that:

‘Teenage louts, some as young as 13 and fuelled by cocaine and other drugs, are using mobile phones to organise through group texts. Punch-ups between rival fans are also arranged via Facebook and You Tube. Cops have been forced to raid burger bars to break up gangs because the teenage tearaways are too young to be served in pubs. Millwall’s young thugs call themselves the WACKY YOUTH, Liverpool’s teens louts are called the URCHINS and Barnsley’s are known as 50 UP. Arsenal’s young hooligans used to be the TOOTY FRUITIES, slang for cocaine, but dropped it after getting stick from rival louts who branded the tag effeminate. A police source said “these youngsters have been brought up to take on the mantle from their fathers and are groomed to have the same hatred for their team’s rivals”. Banning orders have helped slash levels of football violence from its peak 20 years ago. The police source said “these kids don’t respect officers. Most older generation supporters call it a day when the cops arrive but the young ones will stand and argue”. Police are convinced cocaine is behind the new soccer violence. The source said “the worrying thing is coke makes people unpredictable and more prone to violence.’

In the context of this kind of journalism the ‘amateur’ hooligan memoirs make a lot more sense than the accounts of the so-called professionals.

As has been noted (see Appendix 1) there are many dozens of low sport journalism published accounts by so-called ‘top boys’, with a variety of club firms, crews or gangs involved. There are also A-Z edited volumes of hundreds of hooligan firms, mapped historically and geographically throughout the nation. As one book’s dust jacket proclaimed, it ‘covers the whole spectrum of gangs from Aberdeen to Luton Town…the Barnsley Five-O and their vicious slashing at the hands of Middlesbrough…the combined force of Dundee Utility…the riots of the Leeds Service Crew…Benny’s Mob, the Main Firm, the Lunatic Fringe, the Bastard Squad – they’re all here, together with numerous photos of mobs, fights and riots’ (2005 first edition of Lowles and Nicholls, 2007a). The majority of these ‘hoolie lit’ books by self-styled ‘hooliologists’ (Pennant, 2008) have been published in the last few years and are mainly about events in the era of the 1970s and 1980s, and, to some extent, the 1990s, and even less about the 2000s. ‘Facts’ about these events, and conversations during them, are seemingly treated in a cavalier way and in a completely un-chronological order, though many of these texts are adorned with photographs and newscuttings kept contemporaneously by the authors in their hyper-diarising of their hooligan activities and media notoriety. The ritual stoking of the historical and geographical rivalries between fans, clubs and gangs, however, is always the aim and this purpose is more or less achieved (King, 2004). Through this methodology, drawing on football hooligan memoirs and extrapolating from the clubs they mention, there are now narrative testimonies of the existence of 151 British football hooligan gangs over the last forty years with a connection to the fans of these particular clubs (see Appendix 3). It is noteworthy that the authors of two volumes on British football hooligan gangs history (Lowles and Nicholls, 2007a, 2007b) claim to have interviewed 200 hundred former hooligans from different gangs. The number of 151 gangs is likely to be a considerable underestimate as many football hooligan gangs come in and out of existence very quickly.
or simply change their names. Another complicating factor is that main firms are frequently made up from smaller gangs in the local area. For instance it has been suggested in web forums that Middlesbrough’s infamous main firm Frontline comprised, at least in the past, local gangs known as B-Farm Boys, Border Boot Boys, Park End Crew, Newport Gang, Dogg Mob, Stockton Firm, Stockton Wrecking Crew, Redcar Reds, Port Boys, Haverton Hill Mob, NTP (actually Netherfields, Thorntree and Park End estates mob), Block 2, Bob End Crew, Ayresome Angels, Eston Boys, and Whinney Bronx Boys. The same goes for most other hooligan firms.

On an additional methodology (see Appendix 4) there are estimated to be 245 other firms, distinct from the ones talked about in football hooligan memoirs. That is in addition to the 151. These British hooligan gangs have been in existence at some time over the last forty years. Some are still in existence. The approximate total of football hooligan gangs in Britain since the watershed year of 1967-1968 (when skinheads were first emerging as a youth culture on British streets) can be calculated, adding the previous 151 identified. The overall total is 396.

**Glamorous Hooligans and Terrace Culture**

This interim audit of football hooligan gangs for ethnographic and historical research purposes for post-subcultural studies and cultural criminology is thus aided and abetted by the extensive hit and tell, low sport journalism literature and its oral history of football, culture and modernity. The books are self-reflexive about their contribution to an oral history of football, hooliganism and youth subcultures. The introduction to one of them entitled *Villains* claims:

‘Aston Villa FC is one of the biggest and best-supported football clubs in Britain… The story of their terrace army, however, has never been told – until now. Like all major clubs, Villa have had their hooligans and hardmen, who have been involved in some of the fiercest battles of the past four decades. Villains traces their gangs from the 1960s up to the present day. Through first-person testimony, it reveals for the first time the antics of the Steamers who, led by a band of colourful and fearless characters, put Villa on the hooligan map. Eventually they were superceded by the C Crew, a multi-racial gang who came together during Birmingham’s Two-Tone period and the parallel casual era.’ (Brown and Brittle, 2006: 10)

Some of the old boy authors have published more mainstream (but still well documented alternative) accounts of football fandom and working class histories around certain clubs (Allt, 2007, King and Knight, 2006). The public launches of the hooligan memoir books have effectively been celebratory gatherings of dozens of old boy hooligans who twenty or thirty years ago would have been leading their firms into battle but who now swap authors’ stories over a few beers yet there is a self-reflexivity present which would possibly surprise academics. Mark ‘Jasper’ Chester, ant-gang campaigner and author of two Milo books plus a website which offers his services for hire as a speaker to university courses, recalls the media moral
panic over the launch of one of them, his twenty-year story of ‘life with the naughty forty football firm’ attached to Stoke City. Chester says (Chester, 2005: 1-3):

‘The initial outrage…turned to a full outcry of anger and disbelief when the authorities discovered my intended launch venue and so a media campaign against the book gained momentum. Despite once being a fiercely private person, I had spilt my guts on to the keyboard of a laptop over the previous twelve months and I now found myself toe to toe with the media, the police and Stoke City Council…The fact that I was one of those “mindless thugs” who could actually hold an intellectual conversation, instead of frothing out abuse and foul-mouthed obscenities, meant the council raised no objection…The event was something a bit special even by our standards. The Kings Hall in its heyday was a concert venue, and that’s exactly what we had, a rowdy concert. In excess of 1,300 people crammed into the venue from two in the afternoon until mid-night…Between bands, DJs kept the mood moving with guest appearances from the author of Casuals, Phil Thornton, and Farm front man Peter Hooton. The whole place was enveloped in testosterone as ninety per cent of the congregation was male and most full-on football hooligans of all ages and experience.’

The hit and tell genre, recounts, indeed celebrates, hyper-violent male football fandom associated with a particular British league club and its mob, crew or firm. However, the authors are frequently at pains to emphasise that they are no longer involved in illegality and other forms of social deviance. An ‘author’s note’ to one book reads: ‘We would like to straighten out our fundamental position at the start of this book, which is that we are no longer football hooligans. We don’t believe in or condone any form of football violence on or off the pitch today. This is just a public documentation of our past’. (Brown and Brittle, 2006) Frequently the books come with a health warning about violence and read almost as moral tales. As Carlton Leach on watching the autobiographical film Rise of the Footsoldier recalls of his days with the Inter City Firm of West Ham United and Essex gang life it was hardly the life of a ‘glamorous hooligan’(2):

‘It was hard for me to watch how I fucked my life up and hurt those around me – Denny, my partner, a really lovely lady, never did me any harm, good mum, good housewife and I put her through all that shit when I went on the doors. I saw that in the film and felt quite ashamed of myself. Back then I was frightening…I want kids to realise you have to fucking look before you get into things, really go into what it’s all about, the real world, how deep, dark and nasty it is. They’re not all good people you’re going to meet. You can’t walk into a world of selling drugs and hurting people and expect it to be glamorous.’ (Leach, 2008: 302)

The rivalry between the crews or firms (the main content of the books: who did what to whom and when) is now compounded by the rivalry between the books, and authors, themselves. The books are written in the form of fan memoir but nothing could be further from the literary style and social function of the original ‘soccerati’ writing of Nick Hornby (Hornby, 1992) who helped to make football culture fashionable after Italia 90 (Redhead, 1991, 1997a, King, 2002, Guilianotti, 1999). Few of these books have
any pretensions to formal style or literary protocol, though two (Gall, 2005, 2007) are fully authored by a female professional journalist who made contact with the Birmingham City and Leeds United gangs in question. The books adopt deliberately trashy formats. It is a self-conscious punk, Do-It-Yourself trash aesthetic which is pursued. Titles are long and winding. Even if the headline is snappy, the effect is a parody of a blend of tabloid journalism and hard boiled crime fiction. Although there were female football casuals, the authors are almost always male and in their forties or fifties, the ‘old boys’ in Patrick Slaughter’s term (Slaughter, 2004). Originally what was once referred to by Nick Hornby and his media cheerleaders as the ‘new football writing’ (King, 2002) steered clear of hooligan stories. But later in the 1990s and early 2000s, as gangster chic British movies flooded the cinemas, a market was created for the hooligan hit and tell, or what the late Steven ‘Seething’ Wells (Wells, 2003) once called ‘kick lit’, accounts which were often fictionalised - in form if not in content. These non-fiction commodities were effectively pulp, appearing for sale in True Crime sections of bookshops and libraries rather than sport journalism shelves. They became so ubiquitous that it started to be a badge of honour for firms to refuse to co-operate with publishers to produce the authorised ‘old boy’ memoir of their crew. That was the only way for the contemporary mob to look distinct and different from its rivals. Leeds United hooligans were an example of this for some time but succumbed eventually to a Leeds Service Crew memoir (Gall, 2007). ‘Smaller’ clubs, ostensibly without well know firms, have often been covered in these texts. For example, the Brimson brothers Dougie and Eddie, in particular, have contributed numerous hit and tell accounts, initially about Watford but eventually over the years on British football hooliganism in general (Brimson and Brimson, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, 1998, Dougie Brimson, 1998a, 2003, 2006, 2007, and Eddie Brimson, 1998b, 2001). Dougie Brimson was also responsible for the script for a football hooligan gang feature film directed by Lexi Alexander and starring Elijah Wood, originally called The Yank but renamed Green Street (after the film’s fictional football firm the Green Street Elite) when released for the cinema in 2005 (Green Street 2 was released in 2009). Colin Ward (Ward, 1996, 1998, 2004, Ward and Henderson, 2002, Ward and Hickmott, 2000), one of the first of the hooligan authors, publishing an early memoir in the late 1980s before Nick Hornby had cornered the market for football fandom, has argued that there are a number of reasons Millwall, among the most notorious clubs for hooliganism whose away cup tie clash with Hull City in early 2009 created banner headlines, has not had a memoir published:

‘Who wants to read about days in Grimsby, Stockport, etc? They spent so long in the lower leagues and they only took a few hundred fans most weeks. They took a few to Cardiff and other places, but they never mustered the numbers like Chelsea or others. Millwall had a famous day out at Everton when they took the Everton end (1970) and ran the place ragged (a Millwall fan lost his life that day) but you could never find anybody who could talk eloquently about it. I remember them coming into The Finsbury Park Tavern before an FA Cup tie and absolutely beating everybody to a pulp. They were hurting people because it was their fun. Who wants to read about that? I was in The Shed that day when Millwall came in and after doing well initially they took a bit of a spank as they didn’t have the numbers. I was also outside The Shed one cold evening after an FA Cup replay when 200 Millwall waited for a bust up and got caned outside The Gunter Arms. A strange bunch, but they didn’t have the numbers to really make it work regularly. They had some memorable pitched battles with Chelsea and
West Ham over the years and they used to hang out waiting for known faces late on a Saturday night at Charing Cross station, but they were far too tribal and always wanted to get back to the Old Kent Road as quick as possible. Luton was their favourite day out as they loved to ambush Luton around the subway tunnels, but their violence was always about violence not the laugh element. The ICF were funny because they were so arrogant, but they were a tight knit group who gained notoriety which is why Cass has done so well. No One Likes Us, We Don’t Care Millwall sung and the fact is that I doubt many of them have learned to write."

Despite the strictures about ‘not trying this at home’ the hit and tell books celebrate and generally romanticize the history of football hooligan subcultures which began in the late 1960s with skinheads’ emergence as a British youth subculture. The late 1970s witnessed the development of casual youth culture (Redhead, 1987, 1991, Thornton, 2003, Altt, 2007: 59-100, Hough, 2007) and mutated to some extent into rave culture in the late 1980s. Designer labels and soccer have gone hand in hand since the late 1970s and early 1980s subcultural moment of casual, becoming mainstream sometime in the mid 1980s and an international youth style ever since. Casual history, or history of ‘the casual’ (3) is the missing key to the sociology of British soccer hooligan culture over the last forty years. Casual has in fact been far from a transient youth culture predicted by some postmodern criminologists in the 1980s and 1990s. Merseyside was the birthplace of what became casual youth culture (Hewitson, 2008, Altt, 2004, 2009), although that particular Northern city would not have recognised the label, preferring the monikers ‘Smoothies, Straights, Squares and Scallies’ at the time (Hewitson, 2008: 17). Merseyside was quickly followed by Manchester and then, after a time, London, and eventually by the middle of the 1980s almost all other UK cities and major towns. As Milo Books, the publishers of Ian Hough’s initial memoir of the ‘casual gangs of Manchester and Salford’, proclaimed:

‘The Perry Boys are on of the great untold stories of modern youth culture. They emerged in the pivotal year of 1979 in inner-city Manchester and Salford, a mysterious tribe of football hooligans and trendsetters united by a new fashion. Their only counterparts at the time were the Scallies of Liverpool, who became their biggest rivals both on and off the terraces. As a young follower of Manchester United, Ian Hough witnessed first-hand how the bootboys of the infamous Red Army were slowly usurped by a small but fast-growing group of unlikely-looking pretenders. They sported Fred Perry polo shirts (hence the name), Lee cords, Adidas Stan Smith trainers and wedge haircuts. With their eclectic soundtrack and appetite for amphetamine-fuelled excess, they would transform their city into the clubbing and style capital of the country.’ (back cover blurb, Hough, 2007)

Manchester then had its ‘Perry Boys’, Merseyside had its ‘Scallies’ (and London, eventually, had its ‘Chaps’). But as Hough recalls, and Hewitson emphasises, ‘the nameless thing’ persasively mushroomed outwards from the North West of England. Hough says that he had ‘seen it writ by another, namely Andy Nicholls in his book Scally, that Tottenham brought the first cockney teams up in the early Casual days’. Hough agrees ‘100%’ with this picture. He argues ‘Tottenham came to OT in green windjammers, Doc Martens and skinheads in late October 1981, in the League Cup, and then we played them again in
mid-April 1982 in the league and there they all were, in Ellesse and Tacchini trackies, black guys sporting gold and top training shoes...Leeds and Tottenham were properly the first lads to formulate a semblance of style outside the north-west but the rest blundered along soon enough.’ (Hough, 2007:116)

It is possible, through these various football hooligan memoirs, to situate casuals in a youth subcultural timeline from the scuttlers (Davies, 2008) of the late nineteenth century through teds, rockers, mods and skinheads of the 1950s and 1960s and suedeheads, rastas, rudies, Bowie boys and girls, and punks of the 1970s until they join up with ravers in the ‘acid house’ years of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Redhead, 1990). Casuals began as a ‘post-mod’ (Hewitt and Baxter, 2004, Hewitt, 2000), post-skinhead subculture in the 1977-1978 football season in Britain, initially in the North West of England. By the time Eugene McLaughlin and I wrote our seminal essay on what we called ‘soccer’s style wars’ (McLaughlin and Redhead, 1985) on the eve of the 1985-1986 soccer season, several years of growth of soccer casual culture had meant that a majority of professional league soccer teams in Britain could boast their own casual firm, or very often, multiple casual firms.

In the intervening twenty-five years many of the most active football hooligan gang members have spent considerable amounts of time in prison, convicted usually of ‘football-related offences’. Football legislation, beginning with the Football Spectators Act, 1989 followed by aspects of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, increased state intervention on football hooliganism in Britain and created a climate of militaristic policing and draconian prison sentences in the courts which extended to forbidding travel outside the country. The hit and tell memoirs often have a section of court trial and prison diaries. Increasingly, too, football hooligan subcultures overlapped in these years with a range of illegal activities in the underground economy (Sugden, 2002, 2007) from using and dealing recreational drugs, through gun running, planning heists, organising ticket touting and horse racing scams, to the routine ‘bunking in’ to stadiums and ‘jibbing’ train rides all over the world (Allt, 2007: 1-9). Again it is clear that the hooligan memoirs trace the common biography of men now in their late thirties, forties and fifties who heavily involved themselves in the rave scene of the late 1980s and drifted into various criminal activities in the 1990s (Allt, 2004, Blaney, 2005, Hough, 2007) only to frequently return to active British football firms in the 2000s. Tony O’Neill (O’Neill, 2004, O’Neill and Walsh, 2005) who entitled one of the chapters in two books on four decades of Manchester United gang hooliganism ‘They Think It’s All Over’ has claimed that his books ‘were written as I received a jail sentence and it was a way of me saying to the authorities “it’s over” but they being vindictive will ignore the point’.

Methodologically the hit and tell, low sport journalism genre allows academics to add events, stories, language and colour to a history of youth culture which was already partly written at the time in the 1970s and 1980s. It provides material for reflection and correction of previously mistaken assumptions. It adds to a rough popular memory around sport studies and subcultures and further identifies crews, faces and top boys, however partially, so that sustained ethnographic, participant observation, work can be undertaken with ‘old boy’ hooligans in various contemporary firms. Lastly, it makes possible the repair of the gaps in contemporary knowledge of football hooligan subcultures within post-subcultural studies and sport/leisure culture(4).
Appendix 1

In A-Z alphabetical order of author, the books collected in the football hooligan memoir research archive over a twenty two year period are:

*Diary of the Real Soul Crew 2* (Abraham, 2009)
*Diary of the Real Soul Crew* (Abraham, 2008)
*Bloody Casuals* (Allan, 1989)
*Flying With the Owls Crime Squad* (Allen and Naylor, 2005)
*A Smashing Little Firm* (Allt, 2009)
*The Boys from the Mersey* (Allt, 2004)
*Playing Up With Pompey* (Beech, 2006)
*Hibs Boy* (Blance and Terry, 2009)
*March of the Hooligans* (Dougie Brimson, 2007)
*Kicking Off* (Dougie Brimson, 2006)
*Eurotrashed* (Dougie Brimson, 2003)
*Barmy Army* (Dougie Brimson, 2000)
*God Save The Team* (Eddy Brimson, 2001)
*Tear Gas and Ticket Touts* (Eddy Brimson, 1998)
*Derby Days* (Brimson and Brimson, 1998)
*Capital Punishment* (Brimson and Brimson, 1997)
*England, My England* (Brimson and Brimson, 1996a)
*Everywhere We Go* (Brimson and Brimson, 1996b)
*Villains* (Brown and Brittle, 2006)
*Booted and Suited* (Brown, 2009)
*Bovver* (Brown, 2000)
*A Casual Look* (Brown and Harvey, 2001)
*Among The Thugs* (Buford, 2001)
*Bully CFC* (Buglioni and King, 2006)
*Rangers ICF* (Carrick and King, 2006)
*Inside The Forest Executive Crew* (Clarke and King, 2005)
*Sex, Drugs and Football Thugs* (Chester, 2005)
*Naughty* (Chester, 2003)
*Divide Of the Steel City* (Cowens and Cronshaw, with Allen, 2007)
*Blades Business Crew 2* (Cowens, 2009)
*Blades Business Crew* (Cowens, 2001)
*The Rise and Fall of the Cardiff City Valley Rams* (Davies, 2009)
*The Brick* (Debrick, 2005)
England’s Number One (Dodd and McNee, 1998)
These Colours Don’t Run (Dykes and Colvin, 2007)
Bring Out Your Riot Gear - Hearts Are Here (Ferguson, 1987)
Guvnors (Francis and Walsh, 1997)
Service Crew (Gall, 2007)
Zulus (Gall, 2005)
Good Afternoon Gentlemen! (Gardner, 2005)
Apex to Zulu (George, 2006)
Patches, Checks and Violence (Gough, 2007)
Perry Boys Abroad (Hough, 2009)
Perry Boys (Hough, 2007)
Soul Crew (Jones and Rivers, 2002)
Rivals (King, 2004)
A Boy’s Story (King, 2000)
The Naughty Nineties (King and Knight, 1999a)
Hoolifan (King and Knight, 1999b)
Rise of the Footsoldier (Leach, 2008)
Hooligans: A-L (Lowles and Nicholls, 2007a)
Hooligans: M-Z (Lowles and Nicholls, 2007b)
Hardcore (Lutwyche and Fowler, 2008)
It’s Only a Game (Marriner, 2006)
The Trouble with Taffies (Marsh, 2009)
Soul Crew Seasiders (Marsh, 2007)
After The Match Begins (McCall and Robb, 2007)
Scally (Nicholls, 2002)
Come On Then (O’Hagan, 2007)
Celtic Soccer Crew (Kane, 2006)
The Men in Black (O’Neill, 2005)
Top Boys (Pennant, 2005)
Cass (Pennant, 2008)
Congratulations: You Have Just Met the ICF (Pennant, 2002)
Thirty Years of Hurt (Pennant and Nicholls, 2006)
Want Some Aggro? (Pennant and Smith, 2004)
Terrace Legends (Pennant and King, 2003)
Rolling With the 6.57 Crew (Pennant and Silvester, 2003)
Suicide Squad (Porter, 2005)
The Young Guvnors (Rhoden, 2008)
Congratulations, You Have Been a Victim of Casual Violence (Rivers, 2005)
MIG Crew (Robinson, 2007)
Appendix 2

As well as the England national football team (Pennant and Nicholls, 2006) the following British football clubs are represented in the most comprehensive list that can currently be compiled from the football hooligan memoir archive. In the following audit they are listed in A-Z order of football club:

Aberdeen (Allan, 1989, Rivers, 2005)
Arsenal (Ward, 2004)
Aston Villa (Brown and Brittle, 2006, Lutwyche and Fowler, 2008)
Birmingham City (Gall, 2005, George, 2006)
Brighton and Hove Albion (Brown and Harvey, 2001)
Bristol Rovers (Brown, 2009, 2000)
Burnley (Porter, 2005)
Carlisle United (Dodd and McNee, 1998)
Celtic (O’Kane, 2006)
Dundee United and Dundee (McCall and Robb, 2007)
Everton (Nicholls, 2002)
Hearts (Ferguson, 1987)
Hibernian (Dykes and Colvin, 2007, Blance and Terry, 2009)
Huddersfield Town (O’Hagan, 2007)
Hull City (Tordoff, 2002)
Leeds United (Gall, 2007)
Luton Town (Robinson, 2005, Robinson, 2007)
Manchester City (Francis and Walsh, 1997, Rhoden, 2008, Sullivan, 2008))
Middlesbrough (Theone, 2003, Debrick, 2005)
Nottingham Forest (Clarke and King, 2005)
Preston North End (Routledge, 2008)
Rangers (Carrick, 2006)
Sheffield Wednesday (Allen and Naylor, 2005, Cowens and Cronshaw, 2007)
Stoke City (Chester, 2003, 2005)
Swansea City (Tooze and King, 2007, Marsh, 2009)
Tottenham Hotspur (Tanner, 2006)
Watford (Brimson and Brimson, 1996b)
Wolverhampton Wanderers (Shaw and King, 2005)
Wrexham (Marsh, 2009)

Appendix 3

The following crews or firms are ‘represented’ (or, by extension, implicated because of the club history) in the football hooligan memoirs collected in the research archive. The list is in A-Z order of football club:

Aberdeen Soccer Casuals (Aberdeen)
Gooners and The Herd (Arsenal)
The Steamers, C Crew, Villa Hardcore, Villa Youth and Villa Hardcore Apprentices (Aston Villa)
Zulu Warriors, Zulu Juniors and Junior Business Boys (Birmingham City)
Headhunters, North Lancing Firm, Bosun Boys and West Street (Brighton and Hove Albion)
The Pirates, Tote Enders, Gas Hit Squad and Gas Youth Squad (Bristol Rovers)
Suicide Squad, Suicide Section Fives and Suicide Youth Squad (Burnley)
Soul Crew, Inter Valley Firm, Valley Commandos, Valley Rams, Pure Violence Mob, Dirty Thirty, D Firm, The Young Boys, B Troop and C-Squad (Cardiff City)
Border City Firm and Benders Service Crew (Carlisle United)
Celtic Soccer Crew (Celtic)
Shed Boot Boys, North Stand Boys, Pringle Boys, Anti Personnel Firm and Headhunters (Chelsea)
Dundee Utility and Alliance Under Fives (Dundee and Dundee United)
Scallies and Snorty Forty (Everton)
Gorgie Boys and The Casual Soccer Firm (Hearts)
Capital City Service, Young Leith Team and Baby Crew (Hibernian)
Cowshed Enders, Khmer Blue, Kenmargra, The Pringles, Huddersfield Young Casuals and Huddersfield Youth Squad (Huddersfield Town)
Mad Young Tigers, Kempton Enders, Hull City Pyschos, Silver Cod Squad, City Casuals and The Minority (Hull City)
Leeds Service Crew, Infant Hit Squad, Intensive Care Unit, Yorkshire Republican Army and Very Young Team (Leeds United)
Annie Road Crew, The Ordinary Mob, Huyton Baddies, Scallies and The Urchins (Liverpool)
The Oak Road, The Harry’s, Castle Bar, The Hockwell Ring, Steamers, Men in Gear, The Riffs, Bury Park Youth Posse and M12s (Luton Town)
Guvnors, Young Guvnors, Cool Cats, The Borg Elite, Motorway Crew and Mayne Line Service Crew (Manchester City)
Red Army, Men in Black, Cockney Reds, Perry Boys and Inter-City Jibbers (Manchester United)
Frontline, Ayresome Angels, The Beer Belly Crew, NTP and Boro Joeys (Middlesbrough)
Red Dogs, Naughty Forty, Forest Executive Crew, Forest Mad Squad and Forest Young Lads (Nottingham Forest)
Pompey Boot Boys, 6.57 Crew (Portsmouth)
Spotty Dog Crew, Town End Mob, Preston Para Soccer, Leyland Boys and Preston Foot Patrol (Preston North End)
Inter-City Firm and Her Majesty’s Service (Rangers)
Shoreham Republican Army, Suicide Squad, Blades Business Crew, Bramall Barmy Army and Darnall Massive (Sheffield United)
East Bank Republican Army, Owls Crime Squad, Inter-City Owls and Owls Flying Squad (Sheffield Wednesday),
Naughty Forty and Under Fives (Stoke City)
Swansea Jacks, Jack Army, Jack Casuals, Stone Island Casuals, Swansea Youth Squad and Swansea Riot Squad (Swansea City)
The Yids, N17s, Tottenham Casuals, The Paxton Boys, and Tottenham Massive (Tottenham Hotspur)
Watford Boot Boys, Category C, The Watford Men, Watford Youth, Drunk and Disorderly Firm and Watford Away Raiders (Watford)
Inter-City Firm, Teddy Bunter Firm, Mile End Mob and Under Fives (West Ham United)
Yam Yam Army, Bridge Boys, Subway Army and Temple Street Mafia (Wolverhampton Wanderers).
Frontline (Wrexham)

Appendix 4

Other volumes in this considerable football hooligan literature cover numerous other firms, or ‘faces’, or
‘top boys’ of single clubs, as well as namechecks of countless British professional football clubs (Ward, 1996, 1998, Brimson, 2000, Pennant and King, 2003, Pennant, 2005, Lowles, 2005, Lowles and Nicholls, 2007a, 2007b) often from the lower leagues. Other crews or firms listed in this cultural mapping exercise, which exclude the firms which have so far had specific memoirs written about them include, in A-Z order of football club:

Section B and the Red Army Firm (Airdrie United)
A Company and East Bank Boot Boys (Aldershot)
Soccer Crew (Arbroath)
Inter-City Tykes, BHS and Five-O (Barnsley)
Darwen Mob, H Division, Tool Bar, Mill Hill Mob and Blackburn Youth (Blackburn Rovers)
The Rammy, Benny’s Mob, Bisons Riot Squad, The Muckers, Seaside Mafia, Blackpool Tangerine Service, The Mob and Blackpool Service Crew (Blackpool)
Mongy’s Cuckoo Boys, Tonge Moor Slashers, Billy Whizz Fan Club, Horwich Casuals, The Omega and Astley Boys (Bolton Wanderers)
Boscombe Casual Elite (Bournemouth)
The Ointment and Bradford Section Five (Bradford City)
Hounslow Mentals and TW8 Casuals (Brentford)
City Service Firm, Inter City Robins and East End (Bristol City)
Interchange Riot Squad and Interchange Crew (Bury)
The Main Firm, Cambridge Casuals, Pringle Boys and The Young Irish (Cambridge United)
B Mob (Charlton Athletic)
Cheltenham Volunteer Force (Cheltenham Town)
Beer Belly Crew, Chester Casual Army and The 125 (Chester City)
Chesterfield Bastard Squad (Chesterfield)
Colchester Riot Squad and Barsiders (Colchester United)
The Legion, The Coventry Casuals and Coventry Legion Youth (Coventry City)
Railway Town Firm, Crewe Youth and Gresty Road Casuals (Crewe Alexandra)
The Whitehorse, The Wilton, the Nifty Fifty, Naughty Forty and Dirty Thirty/Under Fives (Crystal Palace)
Sheddy Boot Boys, Bank Top 200, Wrecking Crew, Game As Fuck Association, Darlington Casuals, The Gaffa, The Townies and Under Fives (Darlington)
Pot-Bellied Lunatic Army, Derby Lunatic Fringe, C Seats, C Stand, Bob Bank Lunatic Army and The Orphans (Derby County)
Doncaster Defence Regiment (Doncaster Rovers), Dundee Soccer Crew (Dundee), Tannadice Trendies (Dundee United)
Carnegie Soccer Service (Dunfermline Athletic)
H Troop, City Hit Squad and The Sly Crew (Exeter City)
Falkirk Fear (Falkirk), SW6
Thames Bank Travellers, Green Pole Boys, H Block and Fulham Youth Crew (Fulham)
Gillingham Youth Firm (Gillingham)
Park Street Mafia, The Nunsthorpe Lads, Ice House Lads, Scartho Lads, Grimsby Hit Squad and
Cleethorpes Beach Patrol (Grimsby Town)
The Casuals (Halifax Town)
Pooly Till I Die, Hartlepool In The Area, Hartlepool Wrecking Crew, the Greenies, The Moose Men and
Blue Order (Hartlepool United)
Inter City Firm (Hereford United)
Ipswich Punishment Squad and North Stand Boys (Ipswich Town)
The Wise Men, Matthew and Marks Alliance, Thornby Republican Army, Inter City Harry Firm, Braunstone
Inter City Firm, Long Stop Boys, Market Traders, Baby Squad and Young Baby Squad (Leicester City)
Orient Transit Firm, Iced Buns and Doughnuts (Leyton Orient)
Clanford End Boys and Lincoln Transit Elite (Lincoln City)
Moss Rats (Macclesfield Town)
Psycho Express, SAS, Carrot Crew, The Cucumbers and Mansfield Shady Express (Mansfield Town)
Halfway Liners, Nutty Turn Out, Treatment, F-Troop and Bushwhackers (Millwall)
No Casuals and Portland Bill Seaside Squad (Montrose)
Motherwell Saturday Service, Tufty Club, Soccer Shorties and Nu-Kru (Motherwell)
The Leazes End, The Bender Squad, Mental Central, Newcastle Mainline Express and the Gremlins
(Newcastle United)
County Tavern Mob, Elly Boys and Northampton Affray Team (Northampton Town)
C Squad, C Firm, Barclay Boot Boys, NR1, The Trawlermen, Executive Travel Club, Steins, Magnificent
Seven and Norwich Hit Squad (Norwich City)
Executive Crew, The Bullwell Crew, The Lane Enders and Roadsiders (Notts County) Sewer Mob, Sholver
Leathers, Crossley Skins, Werneth Mob, Glodwick and Fine Young Casuals (Oldham Athletic)
The Business, South Midlands Hit Squad, Warlords, Headington Casuals, The 850, Oxford City Crew and
Oxford Youth Outfit (Oxford United)
Peterborough Terrace Squad, Saturday Service, Under 5s and Blue Division (Peterborough United)
A38 Crew, The Central Element, Devonport Boys, We Are The Lyndhurst, Plymouth Youth Firm and
Plymouth Youth Element (Plymouth Argyle)
Vale Lunatic Fringe and Vale Young Casuals (Port Vale)
Ladbroke Grove Mob, Fila Mob, C Mob, The Hardcore and Naughty Forty (Queen’s Park Rangers)
Kirkcaldy Soccer Casuals and Kirkcaldy Baby Crew (Raith Rovers)
New Inn Steamers, Berkshire Bovver Boys, Dirty Thirty and Reading Youth (Reading), East Dene
Mafia, Tivoli Boot Boys, The Friday Crew, Rotherham Casuals, Rotherham Express Crew and Section 5
(Rotherham United)
NN10 (Rushden and Diamonds)
Fair City Firm and Mainline Baby Squad (St Johnstone), Love Street Division (St Mirren)
The Ironclad and True Irons (Scunthorpe United), English Border Front (Shrewsbury Town)
Milton Mob, The Warres, the Inside Crew, Suburban Casuals and The Ugliest Men (Southampton)
Southend Bootboys, CS Crew and Southend Liberal Front (Southend United)
The Hit Squad, The Company and Edgeley Volunteer Force (Stockport County)
Redskins, Boss Lads, Vauxies and The Seaburn Casuals (Sunderland)
Swindon Town Aggro Boys, Gussethunters, Southsiders, South Ciders, South Side Crew and Swindon
Notes

1. *Terrace Terrors* is one of the many titles of books by the 1970s ‘pulp fiction’ author Richard Allen (real name James Moffat) who had considerable influence on the football and youth culture fiction of John King in the 1990s and 2000s (Redhead, 2000, 2007b, 2010). John King includes references to Moffat’s characters in his fiction – see King, 2008. The books were distinctly pre-casual, concentrating on skinhead and post-skinhead styles. *Suedehead* (Allen, 1971) was the second in the series and inspired Morrissey (a staunch fan of the books) to name his first solo single after The Smiths’ break-up in 1987 ‘Suedehead’. ‘Sweet and Tender Hooligan’ is the title of a Smiths’ song and exemplifies this camp ‘hardness’. The Smiths, as Johnny Marr has noted (Robb, 2009), manifestly emerged as a group from inside Manchester’s early 1980s gay culture. Other titles by Moffat include *Skinhead, Boot Boy, Skinhead Escapes, Glam,* and *Punk Rock*. The final book was called *Mod Rule*. For notions of masculinity in this ‘cult fiction’ see Healy, 1996: 87-101.

2. Glamorous Hooligan was a Bradford dance culture duo in the 1990s comprising Enzo Anneckinni and Dean Cavanagh (aka DJ Sal). Dean Cavanagh who contributed ‘Mile High Meltdown’ to Sarah Champion’s anthology of ‘fiction from the chemical generation’ (Champion, 1997) became the writing partner of Irvine Welsh (Redhead, 2000, 2008d); see for instance Welsh and Cavanagh, 2007.

3. Casual youth culture began, as this essay emphasises, in the late 1970s in the North West of England. It is still going strong today. In particular the website http://www.80casuals.co.uk/stories.html has contributions to the oral history of casuals since the 1977-78 British football season by Kevin Sampson, Phil Thornton and Ian Hough. Views on casual history http://www.80casuals.co.uk/interviews.html including interviews with Peter Hooton, Nick Love and others by author Dave Hewitson (Hewitson, 2008) are essential reading. There are also websites on casual music, football fandom and fashion - see http://www.thenamelessthing.com/Perry+Boys+and+Football+Casuals, http://www.swinemagazine.co.uk, http://www.countylads.com and http://www.footballcasuals.com.

My own illustrated books from the 1980s (Redhead, 1987, 1991) are replete with images of casual style from Merseyside and Manchester.
4. I would like to thank Ben Horne, postgraduate research student in the Chelsea School at the University of Brighton, for his tireless research work on the football hooligan memoir project. Original interview material from the project is quoted throughout this essay.

**List of Works Consulted**


Redhead: Hooligan writing and the study of football fan culture 40


Sphacelated Grammars (or: Language Likes to Hide).

By Kane X. Faucher

Like all men of the Library, I have traveled in my youth; I have wandered in search of a book, perhaps the catalogue of catalogues” (Borges, “The Library of Babel”).

*The Library is unlimited and cyclical.* If an eternal traveler were to cross it in any direction, after centuries he would see that the same volumes were repeated in the same disorder (which, thus repeated, would be an order, the Order)” (Ibid).

To begin with an anecdote. A few years after the publication of *The Order of Things*, both Foucault and Chomsky—who had then produced his own Cartesian linguistics—appeared on Dutch television for an *entretien*. Both figures were somewhat in agreement on the development of what we can now call the birth of Catholic semiotics, but they were at odds concerning the fate of language; Foucault stressing that a rigid linguistic code cannot think difference in itself, and Chomsky’s view that there is indeed a universality to language which makes communication possible. During this exchange, Foucault’s hands were fiddling under the table, and once Chomsky had noticed this, Foucault came clean with what he was doing. Foucault produced a rolled joint and asked Chomsky if he would like to partake in a puff or two. Chomsky, in a shock he could not quite conceal, declined emphatically, demonstrating perhaps a humorous example of how communication between cultures and nations do not always flow in harmonious universal rhythms.

Since then, the grail of a universal grammar has not been abandoned, but relocalized in cognitive science that is keen to prove its theory that there is an innate neurophysiological predilection to grammar, and that the advent of AI, studies in DNA, etc., will somehow yield to us the veracity of their claims. However, one cursory glance through *The Order of Things* furnishes us with the insight that this methodological trajectory echoes the birth of the human sciences, an old quest dressed in the raiment of more sophisticated technology. The anatomization of language is nothing novel, and in fact predates even the meticulous osteological fervour of the mid-18th century at the genesis of cataloguing the names, functions, and particular compositional structures of the first female skeleton under anatomical science. Even the localization of language under the rubric of physiological sciences already had its manifestation in derivations from Descartes and the birth of “depth psychology”. Of course, the autopsy of language, we should not forget, is as the autopsy of bodies for the purposes of classification. And, indeed, we should also not forget the etymological character of autopsy from the Greek term *autopsia*, meaning “beatific vision.” We will
not speak on behalf of those who find vivisection beatific, but move forward to discuss the mapmaking of language according to the methods of the Port-Royal et al. We will herein consider, obliquely, the “Grammatician Gaze” and the institutional Aopsis (since we cannot say that institutions “see” per se, but that they are altered edifices, appended and renovated according to the Master Vision of the “linguistadors” of the episteme). But this seeing is already culturally encoded perception, and just as Masons perceive according to the Grand Architect, institutions perceive according to an embedded formula of signs, with the vain hope of moving toward pure identity-as-unity. Heterotopias are not repeatable instantiations; the grammatopia is the Sisyphusan effort to ground a system of universal signs that will represent the basic code by which all our concepts are discursively derived, ampliatively and explicatively. The Synergon (synergetic encyclo-pedia) is the synergy of elements, a fractalogue masquerading as a catalogue. It is indeed the invention of a new beast in the field, Homo Pro Grammaticus: The Pro-Grammarchs of the episteme.

The Return OF and TO language

Let us proceed by a few general remarks:

The philology which developed in the 17th century is in fact the posing of the Enlightenment question meant to clandestinely dismantle or deracinate tradition’s Absolute and put in its place a new metastable order. The return of exegesis is not the revelatory variety, but the shrewd project of enlightened disillusionment--and I mean this term in the literal sense as a dis-illusionment, as the revelation behind the object of the revelatory. Why is it that language returns, and not we to it? This re-appearance of language, initially suppressed and exiled by the privilege accorded mechanism and mathesis against the stagnation of scholasticism, signaled the violent rupture of the gridwork of classical knowledge.

Ironically, as Foucault states, the first embroidered stitch that loosed itself or was set into upheaval was the very first stitch that birthed this opulent structure of “universal knowledge”. This renewed violence against a system of knowledge that came to be embodied as the episteme post facto through historical reflection had its constituent cause for dissolution by its most originary institution: discourse itself. But, it was the transition from one kind of discourse to another that truly heralded this dissolution: when discourse’s chanson ceased to be the stagnant rigidity of kingly parole, and instead took on the puissance of critique. The return of language authored both the creative and destructive aspects of its genesis. “Language is the original form of reflection, the primary theme of any critique…It is this ambiguous thing, as broad as knowledge, yet always interior to representation, that general grammar takes as its object.”1 This new grammar is the new exegesis, euphemistically tokenized, as that which attempts to funnel the elements of current language and (re)trace to a point of the pre-Babelian, the genesis point. In fact, the transition marked by discourse to critique recasts the very study of an object of knowledge. To briefly import Sloterdijk, early critique speaks and operates as though behind or in the object of critique in order to perform its task of unmasking and demystification, comparable to what Foucault calls the “always interior
to representation” which functions to reconstitute the elements of the discursive exterior of language, much in the way that a sneeze erupts from within to rattle the body and result in a revelatory discharge and subsequent relief, i.e., order and intelligibility (although, what is discharged in the rhapsody of signs is a special topic unto itself, but what is created is a new economy of signs). We witness the unlocking of the sign as reflective instance, or inner experience. That is, the instauration of a universal language on the basis of a general grammar that could furnish the occluded content of every representation, a kind of pre-Esperanto Rosetta Stone for the de/re-coding of all conceptual knowledge through the barest particularities of graphemes and phonemes common to all languages. If this kind of science sounds ambitious, it was, but it is the very nature of the Classical period’s general grammar and its search for synchronic depths and diachronic relations that authored its own dissolution--akin to Zeus’ unseating of Chronos, the torch of the grand project is passed to critique. The linkages that unite the segmentarity of representation undoes itself at the very site of its establishment.

“At once characteristic and combinative, the universal language does not re-establish the order of days gone by: it invents signs, a syntax, and a grammar.” This invention is itself the principal mechanism that imposes new structure on old, venerable contents; namely, old confusions in prior ordering structures are cleaned up, a fresh set of uncrossed eyes views historical content, and speaks its findings with a tongue no longer twisted by crude immediacy. Far from declaring the unlocking of all knowledge, it provides us with a more credible fiction: the conditions of possibility by which knowledge is connected according to an attentiveness to the universal origo of language. This prefigures the hermeneutic project of defining the possibility and limits of reflection and understanding of universally valid cognition for the human sciences. There is a comfort in this original link tying together all remnants and disjecta membra of knowledge into paediae and curriculum, and it will not be until the full emergence of critique (in the form of Kant who will assign the a priori conditions of all possible knowledge) that problematizes the new paint job will the linkages be shown to be performed at the inadequate site of language.

The puissance of language/discourse is that it functions as the raw element that provides “adequate signs for all representations” and establishes “possible links between them.” The same reason for rejoicing eventually succumbs to the reason for discomfort and despair: the order of things (not the book!) is still too closely bound up in representational thinking. Representational knowledge still exudes its reflective double, much like Calvino’s eyeless snail does its shell--which is to say that it cannot attain the inner experience it seeks to explain by representation.

“There must exist within it at least the possibility of a language that will gather into itself, between its words, the totality of the world, and inversely, the world, as the totality of what is representable, must be able to become in its totality, an Encyclopaedia.” If the “given” of this possibility is thrown into dubiety, as it was so thrown in the age of critique, Kant’s question, “what can we hope for?” gains in considerable hue by orienting intellectual endeavour.

Classification is still combinative according to the presupposition that knowing and speaking vigorously participate in concert within the domain of representation. Thought and word find their common ground
in the sign. But this new sort of encoding by the post-Renaissance *ars critica* (whilst others returned to *de interpretatione*) was not first discovered in its relation by Foucault. As early as 1900, Dilthey, in his *Die Enstehung der Hermeneutik* also identifies this crucial shift in interpretation becoming “grammatical, factual and historical” in its nature of study, reconstituting the kludge of textual monuments according to a new philological rigour. To believe Dilthey’s story, however, this philology passes through critique relatively unharmed to announce a sophistication of a rule-based method of gleaning objective knowledge in the form of the hermeneutic tradition. This leaves the problem of inner experience open for the phenomenological, and later, the Bataillean perspective; *res ipsa loquitur*: “The difference between inner experience and philosophy resides principally in this: that in experience, what is stated is nothing…what counts is no longer the statement of wind, but the wind.” A more moderate approach after Dilthey would be the compromise Gadamer suggests in *The Beginning of Philosophy* where a notion of fresh incipience that will neither prejudicially side with the subjective or objective.

Discourse is representational and explicates the concept, “one of the most primitive breaks with the immediate.” It is the glue that binds ideality, as precursor to Kant: “as a sequence of verbal signs…This sequence is artificial in relation to the simultaneity of representations, and in so far as this is so language must be in opposition to thought.” Languages lack a congruity and complicity in an alleged sequentialism of signs: the synchronic difficulty is always the scene of chasing the origin, the fount from which divers languages emerge, reterritorializing their constituent parts to encode upon and be encoded upon by experiential vicissitudes individually, collectively, historically, and reflectively. The purpose of universal grammar is to level the foundation of language so that an elegant edifice of articulation and order may be built upon it, reflecting the mirror image of an origin with the invention of new signs and presupposing a great deal of *oughtness* in terms of language; i.e., given the conditions of what is known now, we would have articulated our conditions of knowledge much more cohesively, etc. Its aim and object was to attain the pre-Babelian unity, echoing the Borgesian law of the Library of Babel: “for all the books, no matter how diverse they might be, are made up of the same elements: the space, the period, the comma, the twenty-two letters of the alphabet”--where the uniformity of orthographical marks is analogous to the unity of languages at some given point of genesis prior to being scattered. But to attain this point of origin, the grammarchs and encyclopaedists had to begin with the given and work regressively, almost according to the Fibonacci sequence or the Golden Number method of retrograde movement; again, Borges explication services this point: “Someone proposed a regressive method: To locate book A, consult first a book B which indicates A’s position; to locate book B, consult first a book C, and so on to infinity…” It is not difficult to derive the consequences of such an action, which is perhaps why even the formation of an encyclopaedia, in its fidelity to an ordering system, may have to engage in a proscriptive attitude in order to deselect certain elements that will only infinitely regress or monstrously import elements that threaten the secure unity of a system of orderly knowledge. The essential presupposition is always an immediacy of knowledge that must compound itself reflectively through the artifice of language, thereby engaging in a Fibonacci endeavour to encyclopaediate an ordered structure to knowledge.

*[Example 1: Presupposing an instant 1 wherein is contained all knowledge as a unity of multiplicity, and working backward to incorporate the now of instant 1 with an “already-have-been” of an instant 2. The*
sequence is always working back on itself to carve out a sequentialism of historical knowledge that always adds up to the instant 1, but originates in a time that has already passed. The sequence is as follows: \( \alpha = 1 \) as presupposition of static point of unified knowledge as starting point, \( \Omega \) = the totality of all possible knowledge ; \( \alpha, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55... \) \( \Omega \)--This formula attempts to achieve the origin and then inverts the result as a mirror image so that the presupposition becomes certain origin, and the totality of all knowledge manifests in this instant. It is akin to extrapolating backward in time, only then to transpose the origin as reinscribed in the present. Without the presupposition of an alpha point, no omega point can be reached, and so the assignation of an origin cannot begin. Therefore, the omega point cannot switch places with an alpha point without the presupposition being first grounded as axiomatically given.

In order for this project to emancipate itself, it must dissolve the fetters of rhetoric to achieve its goal, to de-ornamentalize and re-instrumentalize language. This is an idealistic hope since arguably the practice of doing away with any rhetorical instantiation would be tantamount to mere mathematical speaking. To do this, it performs no return to the origin of language, but invents a new origin: the ought of an ordered primacy. It must function as a reliable interlinguistic tablature of signs, just as all musical scores are reducible to the level of universal notation. This is not an art brut method of re-sequentializing discourse by force, but a sly placing it in time, pounding out a rhythm to restore order to a perceived rhapsody. Knowledge cleans out its messy closet. We will forever fail to realize the appeal of such a move if we do not understand the tricky logic that undergirds this process. The trick is this: presuppose an origin point, invent signs as a clarification procedure to obtain its veracity, and proceed to piggyback the past by restructuring the contents of historical epochs in order to prove the primacy of both the present and the origin. The antinomianism of this logic would force any who would dispute it to consider the opposite position, which is to deny all origin whatsoever, and to declare that order is impossible—a move that is not made until the emergence of Nietzsche’s genealogical method that chooses a third option; i.e., the origin of value and the value of origin which is the scene of real critique for Nietzsche, thereby avoiding the false problem this logic of forced choice presents.

A grammatical interlude is here necessary to demonstrate the improbability of a universal grammar. I reside on the absolute borders beyond analytic philosophical discourse, yet we must still take care to contend with the somewhat clandestine way that philosophers of “natural language” have obliquely answered Foucault’s analysis of universal grammar—not only in demonstrating the viability of said project, but in revamping the model to work out the proverbial bugs and non-starter analyses that have hitherto problematized the attainment of the Ur-langue. However, let us look at two instantiations of grammar across a few select languages to witness how the universal rules work or cease to hold any cross-linguistic viability. Although Foucault focuses on the verb, let us push the analysis further as a departure point:

[Example 2: The rules governing the usage of definite versus indefinite articles are somewhat standard in all Western languages. The indefinite article, ‘a’ has only one usage: to depict an undetermined concept such as “a dog”, and we utilize it as well to introduce a concept into our discussion, after which we use a definite article once we have satisfied the determination of the concept thereof. The definite article ‘the’ is only employed when the concept is fully determined by means of either explication or that there exists
only one of a particular object or subject by which no confusion can result. For example, The Hague, or the King of England in 1917. The indefinite article operates in such a way as to exist temporally and spatially in undifferentiation, while the definite article cuts across this horizon to create a gridwork or coordinate—an axis of rational determination. This is borne out in other languages as well. In French, ‘un’ or ‘une’ depicts an undetermined concept, just as ‘le’, ‘la’, and ‘les’ are full determinations. In German, the difference is between ‘das’ and ‘die, der’. The only other way of furnishing more determinate content if employing an indefinite article is with the use of demonstratives and indexicals such as ‘here, there, now, then, this, that’. The problem emerges when we consider how these concepts are determined spatially and temporally across languages with the use of other articles.

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<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Italian</th>
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<tr>
<td>IN 2004</td>
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<td>NEL 2004</td>
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<td>ON Nov. 22</td>
<td>(no article)</td>
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<td>AT 3 PM</td>
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--NB: The more specified, in English, the space and time, the more distant the visual representation, showing an incongruity between determination and spatiality.

| IN London | DANS London | IN London |
| ON Western Rd. | SUR la route Western | IN Western Rd. |
| AT the University | à le Universite | al università... |

The traditional method for universal grammar is the creation of taxonomic orders (the super- and subordinations in classical semantics) under which certain words can be inputted. However, such a method can only think in terms of the identical, and not according to a system of affirmative difference. What of those words that cannot be placed comfortably under a particular categorical heading (Foucault points to poetry as the destabilization of categorical systematicity)? Descartes considers this problem in his Meditations, albeit obliquely: the concept of ‘centaur’, although a mythical and aberrant creature, can still be classified under the dual concept of man in conjunction with horse. However, even in the repetition of certain words or propositions, although the syntax and grammar can be identical, their meaning can be altogether different; the famous example is the poem by Robert Frost, ‘Stopping by the Woods on a Snowy Evening’:

The woods are lovely, dark, and deep,
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep.
One of the ways in which Foucault wants to highlight the general failure of general grammar is by way of the quadrilateral of language which has its analogue, oddly enough, in Kant’s own pure physiological table of the universal principles of natural science (and so we can cheekily assume that Foucault plays on two tables of refutation: one against the viability of universal grammar, and the other against Kantian dogmatism, although the latter is not openly acknowledged). I can only provide a brief, and perhaps weak, gloss of this connection, as it would entail a lengthier treatment:

**Proposition**, or the meaning of the sentence, forms the first “corner” and is generally isolatable according to a near-mathematical procedure of parsing out verb-subject, representable through modal logic. The cardinality of the proposition is denumerable, and is as such the application of mathematics to the experiential in language (subsumed under the category of QUANTITY). This is precisely how Kant speaks of the axioms of intuition. Words begin as prepositional-nominals (placeholders with sentential meaning). In essence, these function as the “given” in language; the very starting point by which “speaking” can even begin.

**Articulation** forms the second corner, and it “gives content to the pure and still empty form of the proposition.” It stands in opposition to the proposition. This is the Kantian anticipations of perception insofar as articulation would function as the ordinality of language, and therefore not measurable in the way that the axioms of intuition are. Articulation is outside of space and time, but by sensation assigns degrees of placement in space and time. So, for example, articulation has infinite divisibility according to degrees, such as lightness and darkness, hotness or coldness, etc. In this sense, articulation is relational and ordinal. --Or, what Kant will call the mathesis intensorum. In sum, articulation identifies the sense of the utterance, ushering in the necessity for the invention of analogies, including metaphoric and metonymous use.

**Designation**, which “reveals the point of attachment of all the nominal forms cut out by articulation” resides in opposition to articulation. As such, they are analogously related, or rather that designation presents the possibility for analogous relations between terms. In Kant’s formulation, this is the function of the analogies of experience insofar as these analogies resist dialectical formation in favour of the dynamical, and these analogies are granted veracity if held under the sheaf of a priori principles. Designation and analogy grants the possibility of connecting objects as having real existence represented by words. Without designation, which is always of things, naming would become ridiculously infinite; names would have to be given to every instantiation of the thing, for it is only designation that isolates the thing in accordance to the rule of generality and taxonomic tables for the purpose of linguistic nomenclature.

**Derivation** “indicates the continuous movement of words from their source of origin, but the slipping that occurs on the surface of representation is in opposition to the single stable bond that links one root to one representation” and this inevitably must trace itself back to the proposition without which designation would be mired in mere particularity and dangerous singularity. The comparison to Kant’s discussion of the postulates of empirical thought in general are deserving to be quoted at length: “the cognition of the agreement and connection, not only of appearances among themselves in experience, but of their relation to experience in general, belongs to judgments of experience. This relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions which the understanding cognizes, or their coherence with the material of the
senses and of perception, or combines both into one concept and consequently contains possibility, actuality, and necessity according to universal laws of nature.” Derivation presents the possibility of inventing new propositions insofar as alphabetic writing (combination as the scene of invention and the use of figures) can allow for a multitude of propositions to be formed in order to better classify the unforeseen.

As Foucault points out, there are two diagonal lines that connect these four corners of language, producing the coordinate of the name. The name represents the “success” of a linguistic analysis, and such nomination makes representation possible. However, the vertiginous movement that occurs behind the veil of the name is an imperfect science, for the problem of differentiation in the process of derivation creates the scene of a multiplicitous disharmony of elements, which thereby creates fissures and breaks that render the veracity of the name dubious. If the name is guaranteed by a perfect genealogical descent or analytic redaction, then the name would be able to shine forth in its ultimate legitimacy; unfortunately for the Grammarchs, the very conventions of language’s innate differentiation renders nomination as fraught with either admitting to the impossibility of naming or that the name itself will abolish all discourse and resonate with the figure of representation. The very attempt to reign in all analogical figures and rhetoric under the herald of the name will inevitably fall into the failure of not being able to speak of anything outside the name. If naming is meant to ascribe the name to particular beings, even this ascription must be subject to its own nomination, its own representation that names the being of this ascription. What would follow is a regress where we must name the naming of being, naming the ascription itself, and so on. To force language to rally around the name as the fulfillment of language itself is to identify it with the being of representation.

We could only skirmish here with a few elements of universal grammar; doubtless a fully penetrative study would take us into the deep and chasmic reaches of Rousseauian, encyclopaedist, and Port Royal language analyses, a study even Foucault acknowledges that he avoids in order to trace the trajectory of how language analyses have been performed during a particular episteme. However, what we retain here is that the residual problematic of hiding language behind the name will eventually give way to a focus, in the nineteenth century, on the Word and the emergence of a philology proper.

Notes


2 Ibid., 84.

3 Ibid., 85.

4 Ibid., 85.

6 Foucault. Ibid., 83.

7 Ibid., 83.


9 Ibid., 56

10 Cf. Immanuel Kant. *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. Paul Carus. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977. 49; for the purposes of brevity, we are resigned to only provide a gloss of this intriguing relationship. Whether Foucault himself realized that this quadrilateral of language echoed or perhaps formed a potential point of departure for Kant’s table is uncertain. A full treatment of this relation would, of course, render this connection only analogically, and not by the rigour of a complete or perfect transposition. I retain it here for interest’s sake, and perhaps as a heuristic device for explication.

11 Foucault 115.

12 Ibid., 115

13 Foucault 115; also see p.119.

14 Kant 50-1.
Surviving Neo-Liberalism: NGOs Under the Howard Years

By James Arvanitakis

Introduction

NGOs fulfil a variety of roles in society that, among others, include delivering aid and assistance, monitoring, education, grass-roots political action and service delivery. One of the fundamental roles of NGOs, however, lies beyond the representation of the marginalised and voiceless or the challenging of government policy but is also integral in promoting hope within society. This is a role that is unmeasurable, unquantifiable, and seemingly intangible until it is threatened.

Historically, it has been NGOs and labour unions that have, while promoting progressive change, ensured a counter-balance to both government and corporate influence. Importantly, they play this accountability role by bringing to the public attention conduct that is harmful, immoral or corrupt. That is to say, from the suffragettes and global warming, to third-world debt and the green and pink bands, it is ordinary people that have worked together with organisations as diverse as Aid/Watch, Jubilee Australia and Caritas to raise issues of injustice and sustainability, as well as promoting a heterogenous democracy (Lyons 2001a): one in which conflicting differences fuel progress and creative thought capable of responding to crises. A democracy without independent NGOs would be one that has no formal representation for struggles that give a voice to the marginalised (Edgar 2008).

The role of NGOs in promoting a democratic culture has been well documented. Authors such as Lyons (2001b) argue that NGOs play a vital role in encouraging civil society participation and engagement. Edgar points to another inter-related and key function that is NGO engagement with government by demanding:

…explanations for the reasons behind policy decisions (that) lead and contribute to public debates, helping to ensure that government policy is not implemented upon a passive public (2008, 22).
By engaging with government and bringing their actions to the attention of the public, NGOs help to ensure that policy development and decision-making is less likely to be dominated by particular stake-holders or established interests. In this way, NGOs fulfil the important task of laying out for social judgement whether particular policy developments are fair in the manner that they consider and treat the most vulnerable members of a society. Depending upon how they ‘lay it out’ we are invited, encouraged or demanded to consider who will be gaining from policy decisions to advance economic growth or ‘streamlined’ efficiency: and our response is reflective of where our democratic principles lie.

The neo-liberal and neo-conservative politics of the Howard government (while in power from 1996-2007) recast the idealism of NGO charters’ as socially unfashionable and naïve, while the Howard government’s policies sought to undermine their effectiveness. Reflecting on the Howard years we can see how this demoralisation of the work carried out by NGOs also weakened an important social medium for the channeling of hope in Australian society.

In the following analysis I will draw on my experiences to explore Joan Stapple’s (2008) argument that in a healthy democracy NGOs act as a kind of mirror for social aspirations. In this way, I will suggest that their existence is not only critical because of the tangible work they undertake, but also because they reflect our belief that a better and more just world is possible.

The aim of this paper then, is twofold: the first is to present the strategies that the Howard government used to undertake a sustained attack on independent voices from civil society. Armed with the combination of neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideology, the Howard government forced many progressive NGOs to fight for both their legitimacy and very existence. The second aim of this chapter is to discuss the survival strategies of progressive NGOs during this period and what lessons exist into the future.

A bit of Background

Before becoming an academic I worked in the finance industry. Whilst bankers may not necessarily agree with how NGOs want to ‘save the world’ it is not infrequent to find that their social concerns often contradict their ‘greed is good’ image. Like others in the finance industry around me, I was worried about the emerging evidence of global warming even though many of its implications were yet to be a regular discussion point in the mainstream media. Sure, we all wanted to make money, but we still understood there was a world ‘out there’ – and there were some emerging trends that we should all be worried about. Within the finance sector, my political views were nothing extraordinary and reflected a liberal education: not only economically, but also socially. From my perspective, the role of governments is to ensure the right environment for markets to operate efficiently but slowly retreat from most kinds of service provision. I also believed that governments had a social obligation to ensure that certain essential services were available to all: including health, education and water.
By 1997, neo-liberalism had already cemented itself in the economy and was slowly spreading into other aspects of life. At this time, with my career firmly established, I left the finance industry to travel and due to events well outside the scope of this paper, my perspectives changed. I realised that while the free market might deliver prosperity to the already wealthy, the lives of the poor and vulnerable become increasingly precarious to the vagaries of a market that was supersed ing the role of government.

Leaving the finance sector, I started working with various non-government organisations, eventually accepting the role of Campaign Director at Aid/Watch (1998-2001), an “independent membership-based watchdog on aid, trade and debt, working with communities in the Global South”\(^2\). While based in Australia, it works with partner NGOs and communities internationally, and sees itself as part of a global movement based on solidarity for social and environmental justice. Aid/Watch receives no government or corporate funding and relies on ‘no strings attached’ money from members, donors and foundations.

My dramatic change in career was received by my former colleagues within the finance industry with mix of humour, derision and surprisingly, encouragement. It was, however, the reaction by a senior executive who I had worked with that gave me the important insight into why NGOs are necessary for a truly democratic society. He told me that while he dislikes organisations such as Greenpeace and Aid/Watch, they play a truly important part in our civil society. It is these organisations that, he said, monitor the actions of governments and corporations, making public their misconducts. Paraphrasing his words, “you may not agree with much of what they say or do, but can you imagine who or how we’d keep the bastards in check without them?”

In the twelve years since my departure from the finance industry, we have seen neoliberalism continue to spread with little consideration of alternatives. Democratically elected governments have yielded power and decision-making to the markets, which was supposedly less corrupt than public officials, more equitable and able to operate with greater efficiency. Once a cause for salutation, we are now witness to a global financial crisis that reveals the ‘human elements’ of the market. The crisis is revealing how neoliberal ideology moved beyond the economic sector into areas that were once dominated by institutional commons such childcare, health and education – shaping how we value what have long been considered essentials for a vibrant democracy.

Before proceeding, however, I would like to make a brief methodological note as this paper extends work I have previously undertaken with NGOs including the Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network (AFTINet) and ECA-Watch (see Arvanitakis 2007). I describe my research approach as action-based and participatory. That is, it is one where I take part and help shape events that I also observe. I am inspired and guided by theorists such as Doreen Massey (2008) who described themselves as ‘academic activists’. Likewise, I draw on a long history of ‘feminist research methodologies’, including Mies (1991) and Bergmen (1993) who argue that the role of the researcher is to shape events and confront injustice, not to just sit idly by and observe. Such an approach has a long tradition in researching social movement, with Alberto Melucci (1996) calling for engaged narratives and carefully self-reflexive action research: here the very practice of research can contribute to struggles for justice. Action research, then seeks to connect
A challenge when writing about events in which you participate is the potential for a certain inaccuracy that stems from particular bias. I have attempted to reveal whatever bias I have by basing my analysis within a robust theoretical analysis. The ultimate decision as to the legitimacy of my argument then, will need to be made by the reader – much like civil society must decide their own perspectives on what is just within their democracy. Ultimately, my hope is that the following paper inspires participation in issues of social justice, and also assists activists and academics in formulating new strategies when confronted with hostile government forces.

According to Touraine (1988), scholars occupy an important position in society as they enjoy unique opportunities to take part in and alter social struggles and society. When studying social movements, scholars should:

…enter into a relationship with the social movement itself. We cannot remain contented merely with studying actions or thoughts; we must come face-to-face with the social movement (1981, 142)

While a great deal of this paper draws from my work with Aid/Watch, I will also highlight how these challenges and responses apply to progressive NGOs more generally.

Not all NGOs are the same

Before discussing these issues, I would like to provide some background on Aid/Watch and their position in Australia’s civil society sector. What I am interested in is describing the different relationships that various NGOs have with the Federal Government. For the purposes of this paper, I want to look at NGOs through the following typology. Along the x-axis we see those NGOs that considered service providers. These NGOs provide services to specific sections of the community either on behalf of governments or because they have identified a marginalised community that is under-serviced. The y-axis illustrates NGOs that focus on programs for education and monitoring. These NGOs have more of an advocacy role in society as they focus on educating the public on specific issues that are generally to do with concerns raised from their monitoring of government, inter-government agencies or corporations (see Figure 1 below).
As can be seen, very few NGOs (if any) sit on either extreme. Rather, the typology highlights that most NGOs sit in the middle, illustrating that they perform a broad continuum of functions. Like any typology, there are a number of important limitations, such as the fact that only two dimensions are represented. Moreover, the above typology captures and represents only a single point in time, while the very nature of NGOs means that they are constantly adapting their positions according to necessity. For this paper, however, the typology enables us to see how certain positions made specific organisations more vulnerable to specific strategies employed by the Howard government.

For example, during the Howard years we saw how NGOs focused on service provision became ever more reliant on government funding for their survival. According to Stapples (2008), this is because they were increasingly forced to take on the role of social service delivery – a consequence of Australian governments moving away from direct involvement in service provision. Many NGOs, then, have come to rely on the majority of their financial support from governments rather than dedicating energies to growing their volunteer or member bases, or campaigning for civil society donations. Such NGOs sit in Zones 1 and 2 of the typology and are less likely to be critical of government policy if they feel that their funding may be threatened: a point I discuss in more detail below.

On the other hand, Aid/Watch, which is a small organisation with a membership base which hovers around 500, sits in Zone 4. One of Aid/Watch’s core goals is the promotion of ‘environmentally sustainable principles’ as well as researching the environmental impacts of debt. Like organisations such as Amnesty International – whose aims include the promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights through
education – the work of Aid/Watch also ends up taking the form of advocacy: an important point to which I will also return to.

Aid/Watch is a strident critic of the way government aid is delivered. The criticism is one that aid delivery is increasingly commercialised and delivered primarily to promote Australia’s national interest, often at the expense of programs that would effectively combat poverty or encourage environmental sustainability. As such, Aid/Watch attempts to educate on the complex nature of aid, pointing out that when delivered under poorly designed policies it can actually undermine the ability of communities to determine their own futures, or establishing the basis for alternative development more culturally appropriate for attaining social and environmental justice. Internationally, Aid/Watch has been involved in campaigning to dramatically reform export credit agencies and to raise civil society awareness about the negative impacts that large-scale infrastructure developments, such as dams, can have on the cultural sustainability of local communities. Specific examples include campaigns undertaken with local (Indian) communities against the Narmada dam in India. In Australia, Aid/Watch has been part of the counter-globalisation movement and has helped organize protests against the World Bank and APEC, as well as being part of the organizing committee for the 2000 ‘S11’ protests against the World Economic Forum in Melbourne.

Much like Friends of the Earth (FOE), Aid/Watch classify themselves as ‘independent’ because they do not accept funding from governments or corporations. This independence does not mean they are not political. They labour across party lines and, depending on the specific issue, have worked publicly with the Australian Labor Party, the Greens, Independents, the former Australian Democrats, and have briefed progressive members of the Liberal Party. Their independence, however, also allows them to be openly critical of both major parties when necessary.

Aid/Watch often made headlines criticising the Howard government and its position of using aid money to promote Australian commercial interests, such as the AWB scandal that I discuss in more detail below. This resulted in the organisation becoming a prime target of the Howard federal government. Consequently, Aid/Watch provides an important case study for the study of the survival strategies employed by NGOs under neoliberalism.

**Attacking the legitimacy**

The attack on NGOs undertaken by the Howard government took many forms. For the sake of brevity, it is not possible to list the various strategies employed against progressive NGOs, but I will concentrate on three of the most effective tactics. These overlapping tactics are important because they reflect the broader neoliberal agenda of the Howard government: one that seriously challenged the ability of NGOs to fulfil their functions while also undermining their legitimacy in civil society. In this way, then, the attack on NGOs was one that ‘commodified’ societal hope as governmental policies attempted reduce the mediums through which civil society might express their beliefs that a more just world should be a key objective
of their democracy.

The first two of these strategies can be classified as material attacks on NGOs and have been well documented by the ‘silencing dissent’ thesis presented by Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison – originally published as a report for the Australia Institute (2004) and then re-written as a book (2007). Hamilton and Maddison argue that the Howard Government spent a great deal of energy employing tactics that aimed to silence “its critics in civil society” including “denigration and public criticism … bullying … management of consultation processes … [and] diversionary tactics” (Maddison et al 2004, p. xii).

These tactics were acknowledged by NGOs in various forums. In 2003, Rose Melville and Roberta Perkins (2003) surveyed 142 peak NGO bodies, of which 100 were predominantly funded by different tiers of government. Melville found that:

…the fragility of this situation was made clear by government threats to this funding. More than half of these government-funded peaks claimed to have received such threats and 10 were actually totally de-funded. Nearly 40 percent of the reasons given for these threats or funding loss were due to the peaks’ political activity and changes in funding guidelines (2003, p. iv).

This de-funding had important “ramifications across the NGO sector” (Edgar 2008, 27), because many organisations became hesitant in taking a public position that would criticise the government. This hesitation was apparent in the interviews undertaken by Melville and Perkins. Their findings were reflected by a similar survey undertaken by Maddison et al (2004). In their survey, they approached almost 300 of the largest and best-known NGOs that work in the fields of social justice, welfare, environment, disability, women’s equity, family and youth. Maddison et al revealed that:

In Australia, recent years have seen an unprecedented attack upon NGOs, most particularly upon those organisations that disagree with the current federal government’s views and values. The attacks have come both from government itself and from close allies such as the Institute of Public Affairs. Questions have been raised about NGOs’ representativeness, their accountability, their financing, their charitable status and their standing as policy advocates in a liberal democracy such as Australia (2004: vii).

Hamilton and Maddison concluded that under the Howard government, not only did NGOs feel more or less constrained depending upon the level of government funding they received, but dissenting views were ‘softened’ for fear of repercussions; in this atmosphere, public debate was stifled. David Marr (2007) also reflected on this trend in his Quarterly Essay, noting that dissenting views amongst NGOs (as well as the ABC, public servants and civil society more broadly) had become strangely absent from Australia’s public realm.

The second material strategy employed by the Howard government was a redefinition of the concept of ‘charity’. In 2000, the Howard Government instigated the Charities Definition Inquiry. While the final
report supported NGOs being able to engage in advocacy, a draft Charities Bill released following the Inquiry made it clear that NGOs involved in lobbying on any government policy would be adversely affected through their taxation status. That is, the bill attempted to change the Commonwealth taxation legislation for charities so that it would not apply to a wide range of non-profit organisations including those involved in work related to education, social or community welfare, religion, culture, natural environment, civil and human rights, reconciliation and animal welfare. Such a legislation change would mean that these organisations could not claim concessions such as the ‘tax deductibility status,’ which allows them to fundraise.

The introduction of this Draft Bill was regarded as a direct attack on advocacy NGOs. This led to a backlash against the Draft Bill with Anglican Archbishop Peter Carnley describing the Bill as legislation one might expect from a quasi-totalitarian regime determined to control information and stifle public opinion (quoted in Barnes and Clarke 2003). The backlash meant that the Government initially stepped back from the Bill, but it did not abandon the idea. In 2005 two draft rulings from the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) emerged that restricted the ability of NGOs to receive tax deductibility if they engaged in public advocacy – affecting GST exemption and salary packaging. This meant that organisations like Aid/Watch, which have attempted to build an income base free of government funding, would be less able to fulfil their role as critical voices within civil society.

Aid/Watch was specifically caught in this strategy of the Howard Government as the ATO moved to revoke its charitable status. In an ATO Ruling, Aid/Watch lost its ability to act as a charity for “trying to procure changes in Australia’s aid and development programs” and for being a ‘political’ organisation (quoted from Wade 2007). The decision prompted Tim Costello, the chief executive of World Vision, to draw an important comparison: noting that if anti-slavery campaigner William Wilberforce had been bound to similar rules 200 years ago then Britain would not have abolished slavery (ibid.). He pointed out that these rules would have put Wilberforce in the position of either offering slaves food (and thus just prolonging slavery) or calling for an end to slavery but not helping those individuals currently suffering.

Because Aid/Watch is a small charitable organisation, with an annual income below AU$100,000, the removal of charitable status threatened its very existence: a case that Aid/Watch won on appeal but which the ATO is challenging. At the time of writing, the case was yet to be brought before the High Court, but Aid/Watch was finding it hard to survive because the original decision of the ATO holds until it is overturned. For many NGOs, the ATO ruling established a worrying precedent whereby charities cannot engage in activities whose objectives are to alter laws, policies or Australian government decisions. We can see, then, that these actions taken against one specific NGO had a flow on effect that seriously threatens the advocacy role of all Australian NGOs.

The attitude of the Federal Government was highlighted by then Assistant Treasurer, Peter Dutton, who responded to Aid/Watch’s inquiries about the ATO issue by saying that the fact Aid/Watch raised questions publicly about charitable status speaks for itself. He went on to explain this rather suggestive, yet very vague statement, by saying that Aid/Watch improperly publicised a matter that remains subject to appeal.
Mr Dutton’s implication is then, that if Aid/Watch were a ‘genuine’ charity it would keep silent. That is
to say, charities should not be critical nor look to how structural inequalities might be improved, but just
‘silently’ fill the gaps that ineffective government policy or unfair market rules leave in society.

The third strategy involves the implementation of the political philosophy of ‘public choice theory.’ This
strategy is concerning precisely because its implications go beyond the material. The theory denies the
existence of altruism or long-term perspectives to explain social behaviour. Rather, public choice theory
would have that the individuals of any given society are merely utility-driven economic players motivated
by our short-term self-interest. It represents the idea that NGOs are merely another form of ‘interest group’
and as such are predatory creatures that merely compete with the rest of society for scarce economic
resources. Moreover, this is aggravated by the fact that NGOs behave in a non-accountable way.

Academic-activist, Joan Stapples (2008), uses public choice theory to describe the discursive shift
undertaken by the Howard Government, and how democracy is now represented within the neo-liberal
paradigm. This narrows our understanding of representative democracy to one defined by economic choice
over scarce resources: the government can either respond to the needs of broader society, or as John
Howard stated in his 1996 Menzies lecture, be held to ransom by special interest groups.

The way the Howard Government implemented this paradigmatic shift changed broader public perceptions
of NGOs and civil society activity. No longer did NGOs exist to represent the marginalised or voiceless, or
contest government decisions and provide alternative perspectives, they now had to justify their existence
in terms of their constituency and activities. NGO activity that could be assigned an economic value, such
as tree planting or meal delivery, was to be commended. On the other hand, commentary or analysis on
public policy was to be understood as an unnecessary and unwanted interfering by ‘radical’ leftists who
fundamentally disagreed with government promoting the market mechanism. As such, NGO activities
were blamed on having ‘disruptive effects’ because they created ‘excessive expectations’ on the economy
(Stapples 2008): that is, they pressured governments to allocate scarce resources towards special interests
away from the broader community.

I found the power of this political discourse disconcerting. I saw a dramatic turn-around in the way that
many members of the public came to reflect on organisations like Aid/Watch. No longer did my friends
from finance understand that NGOs provided a counter-balance to establish power structures in our soci-
ety, but instead asked, “who do you represent?” The intrinsic value of NGOs was replaced by an economic
value that solely measured their activities through their ‘output’ or the numbers of their membership base.
Consequently, mainstream groups that do not court controversy, such as the World Wildlife Fund, were
seen to ‘out represent’ and thus have more legitimacy than smaller, more out-spoken organisations like
Aid/Watch simply because their membership base was larger.

In other words, unless an organisation was seen to represent ‘main-stream’ opinions, it was seen to
have a negative impact on the public and economic spheres of Australia. This dismissal of ‘non- main-
stream’ opinion reached a peak with Howard government ministers attacking the legitimacy of both the
reconciliation marches in 2000 and the anti-Iraq war protests in 2003. In 2000, it is estimated that millions marched over bridges for reconciliation: an impressive public showing of support for the movement that the Howard Government ignored. Consequently, Marr (2007) also points out that the reconciliation movement remained stagnant until recently revived by the Rudd apology. Likewise, huge crowds turned out against the invasion of Iraq – an estimated million people in Sydney alone. The then Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, dismissed such mass protests as nothing but ‘a mob’ (cited in Marr 2007). David Marr (2007: 37) also notes that after the World Economic Forum in Melbourne in 2000, the then Treasurer Peter Costello “raged in private against the demonstrators”, while the NSW Premier, Bob Carr, described the demonstrators as “street-fighting” fascists.

Combining these various examples, I believe that a fundamental change was happening within Australian civil society: the commodification of hope. Based on the work of theorists such as Ghassan Hage (2003), I argue that ‘hope’ is at the core of a functioning and authentic community. What I am describing when I use the word hope is the productive process of working towards a better, more equitable and just world, not merely imagining it (Arvanitakis 2007). By dismissing the role of NGOs, the commodification processes of neoliberalism – so adamantly encouraged by the Howard Government – replaced the vision of a better and more just world with one that is dominated by self-interest. In this way, hope is replaced by material aspirations (Arvanitakis 2007).

Before turning to the survival strategies by NGOs at this time, it is important to briefly outline other strategies that were employed by the Howard Government to silence dissent. Marian Sawer (2002) for example, notes that the Howard government undertook a series of ‘forced amalgamations’ that weakened the advocacy of groups that specifically did not fit the Government’s agenda. In addition, there was the emergence of purchaser-provider contracts that were established between the government and NGOs that required the delivery of specific outcomes directly related to government policy and objectives (Stapples 2008). As NGOs became more reliant on such funding for their survival, the less critical they would be of government. Associated with this according to Lyons (2003), was the emergence of strict confidentiality clauses in such contracts that required organisation not deal with the media without departmental or ministerial consent.

A response and survival strategies

Faced with this unrelenting attack, many NGOs employed new and innovative strategies such as moving into online activism, establishing new income streams and changing the way they operated. As Hamilton and Maddison (2007) highlighted in their research, some went to ground to remain small targets. While each of these strategies met with varying success, I believe that the key for NGOs like Aid/Watch, Oxfam and Greenpeace was to continue to pursue their goals without recoiling from the attacks. Their success should be measured because they continued to create ‘spaces of hope’. In other words, they persisted in confronting the neoliberal agenda and in the process maintained their intrinsic value.
A long-term focus of Aid/Watch is changing Australia’s official aid program so that it does not ruinously promote Australia’s national interest ahead of strategies for poverty reduction and sustainability. Aid/Watch highlighted the corruptive tendencies of Australia’s foreign aid policy platform when the AWB scandal broke in 2005. Aid/Watch pointed out that it was this narrow view of ‘national interest’ that had justified spending aid dollars on unaccountable consultancy fees, such as those paid to the former Australian Wheat Board director, Trevor Flugge. In 2003, it was decided to award Mr Flugge an AusAID contract valued at AUS$700,000 to promote Australian wheat exports to Iraq to expand markets and, according to former Prime Minister John Howard, “to stop American wheat growers from getting our markets” (quoted in Doran 2007). This was prioritised ahead of using the funds to provide genuine advice or assistance on life threatening issues such as food security and agricultural reform.5

The case is an important one because it reveals not only the need to rethink how Australia should give aid but also the necessity for civil society ‘watchdogs’ – like my former colleague in finance pointed out – so that close government/corporate relationships do not become corrosively ‘chummy.’ Aid/Watch organised a number of protests at the AWB inquiry – known as the Cole Inquiry – that took place in 2005 in Sydney, including one that had staff and volunteers dressed as Alexander Downer and Trevor Flugge (including masks), freely handing out fake money and brandishing fake guns: a parity of the infamous photo of Trevor Flugge.6

These ‘stunts’, which were complemented by an Aid/Watch report into the scandal received a great deal of media publicity.7 The purpose of these strategies was to raise public attention about the scandal but more importantly, Aid/Watch wanted to raise public consciousness about the broader issue bubbling beneath this explosive case: how should public money should be spent on aid programs? Because this was such a vulnerable issue for government, the then foreign Minister Alexander Downer over-reacted and attempted to discredit Aid/Watch by labelling it as an “extremist organisation”.8

Despite political attempts to silence Aid/Watch, in late 2007 they found that Australian aid money was once again being spent in a highly questionable fashion. Analysing the 2004-2005 AusAID budget, Aid/Watch discovered that the Australian Federal Police were funded to undertake training “for senior officials in the theory of counter terrorism recognition and collaboration for combating terrorism” (ibid.). This lead to Aid/Watch revealing in late 2007 that Australian aid money was being used to train Burmese intelligence officers, including senior police, who were involved in the Burmese Government’s crackdown against pro-democracy demonstrators (Skehan 2007).

Aid/Watch began a public campaign highlighting that since 2004, the Australian Government had funded Burmese intelligence training through the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. Between 2004-08, the Centre received $6 million and in November 2006, the Australian Federal Police trained 20 Burmese senior intelligence officers. While security is an important issue, and having a well-trained police force is essential for any democracy, training Burmese police intelligence directly serves the military regime because the state has no civil command. It was argued by Aid/Watch that such training paid for by Australian taxpayer, “directly implicates the Australian Government” in human rights abuses committed...
by the Burmese forces (Skehan 2007).

As with the AWB scandal, this issue was one that reached beyond the specifics of the case, and as such, it was a cause that formed a network of international solidarity. The Aid/Watch campaign linked up with other human rights groups such as the New York-based Human Rights Watch and the Brussels based International Crisis Group. While working independently, together they undertook an international campaign to draw attention to how police intelligence was being used against pro-democracy groups in Burma, especially since 2004.

Aid/Watch did not back away from these campaigns even when it was informed that it’s charitable taxation status was under review by the ATO and the organisation’s ability to raise funds were threatened. The ATO argued that Aid/Watch behaviour was uncharitable because it attempted to influence government aid programs. The ATO contended that by trying to influence aid programs, Aid/Watch was ‘extending’ its constitutional activities of monitoring aid to the deliverance of aid. One example that the ATO used to highlight Aid/Watch’s non-charitable activities was that it had produced a ‘postcard’ aiming to continue to raise the plight of pro-democracy activist in Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi, amongst the Australian public. According to the ATO, this highlighted that Aid/Watch was an advocacy, not a charitable, organisation.

In response, Aid/Watch continued to campaign, maintaining the position that, for monitoring to be effective, it will always spill over into advocacy. The intrinsic importance of this argument for the role of NGOs in civil society meant that Aid/Watch became a rallying point for a diverse range of organisations: from the Australia Institute and the Environmental Defenders Office, to World Vision. The organisational support received by Aid/Watch illustrates that the specific case bought against Aid/Watch was understood as a deeper neo-liberal affront against the intrinsic nature of NGOs. The fact that there was no back down was an important survival strategy, not only for Aid/Watch as an individual organisation, but also because it made visible the fundamental political attack against the ideals that NGOs seek to represent in societies.

**Concluding thoughts: creating spaces of hope**

International aid has long been a prickly subject and political realists deny that it can ever be altruistic. Rather, Aid/Watch argues that aid is a thin camouflage used by powerful states to influence or impose certain political ideologies on less powerful states. Within international politics, then, while not commendable, it is certainly not unjustifiable to use aid to support a regime from which your particular country is profiting. NGOs like Aid/Watch, however, represent a hope that as a global civil society we will want to act as responsible citizens because we are just as capable of feeling compassion for an unknown family in an unknown country as understanding the logic that a country whose population live in inhuman conditions is more susceptible to be converted to acts of terrorism.

The fact that the survival strategy of Aid/Watch succeeded confirms that NGOs have an intrinsic value...
within civil society. That is to say, despite the substantial political attacks against them, the organisation continued publicly campaigning based on a belief that civil society would support them because hope existed. Hope exists on two interrelated levels – the personal and societal. Hope can be realised through activities that represent a belief in a ‘better’ future such as collective struggles for justice, political activity or individual actions taken with a developed consciousness in regards to social responsibility. In other words, hope is productive: it is produced by action. In secular societies, hope is faith without the certainties and it promotes optimism, renewal and human resilience (Stephens 2003).

According to the most renowned academic on hope, Ghassan Hage (2003), functioning communities experience a “surplus of hope”. In such communities, hope is openly shared and freely distributed. Hage’s position is that key to a decent society is a capacity to distribute hope. That is to say, that by ‘hoping’ we realise that the unique quality of hope within a neo-liberal paradigm is that it cannot be commodified. The more of it we use and share, the more abundant it becomes. In contrast, commodities such as diamonds derive their value from their scarcity. Hope is radically different because its value lies in its abundance.

The message delivered here is clear: although the material activities that NGOs undertake are critically important when it comes to survival, we see that in some ways these are secondary factors. More important is their vocal vision that ‘a better world is possible.’ It was the refusal by organisations such as Aid/Watch and Oxfam to relent on their message of hope that was the most important strategy in confronting the onslaught of neoliberalism.

Aid/Watch as an organisation remains under financial pressure. If it succumbs to this pressure and disappears, the loss to Australia’s political sphere will be much great than can be measured by ‘public choice’ theorists.

References


Notes

1 John Howard served as the Australian Prime Minister from March 1996 to December 2007.

2 In this paper I continually refer to Aid/Watch’s strategic positions and philosophy. All information is available at [www.aidwatch.org.au](http://www.aidwatch.org.au).


6 The photo has become notorious and can be found at: http://www.smh.com.au/ffximage/2006/02/03/trevorflugge_wideweb_470x352_0.jpg

7 For example, the Aid/Watch report into the scandal led the news on the ABC’s PM program: http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1996393.htm


9 Information sourced from correspondence between Aid/Watch and the ATO. (2007 to the present).
Reconstructing Identities Through Resistance in Postcolonial Women’s Writing: A Reading of Ezeigbo’s The Last of the Strong Ones.

By Omolola Ladele

Abstract:

Colonialism and its after-effects of neo-colonialism and postcolonialism pervade the male-dominated literary tradition produced on the African continent. Within the complexities of these realities, the African woman may be said to be “doubly colonized” and her burdens multiple. Imprisoned then, by the authoritative phalluses which define her daily experiences and which seek to negate the authentic image of the African woman, as writer, she is compelled to negotiate new sites in which she articulates more viable and acceptable self-images. Our study here is, specifically, on one such response: that of the Nigerian novelist, Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo, in her important work, The Last of the Strong Ones (TLSO, 1996). This novel is important in that it directs us to a new historicism and cultural critique. Articulated in three parts, the paper, in its introduction, attempts a definition of the indices of identity that circumscribe the lives of African women especially within the present-day postcolonial matrix. The second part demonstrates the novelist’s repudiations of stereotypes and her reconfigurations of women’s identities as part of the needful project to recover the distinctive tradition of African female stories (herstories). In the final part, we draw attention to the areas where women need to further interrogate and construct meaningful identities. Key words: identity, neo/ post- colonialism, authoritative phalluses.

Introduction:

Issues of identity are germane in the present-day dispensations of constantly reconstituting politics, gender
identities, personal, national and international relations, especially as identities are understood relationally. In various fields of interactions, this is further accentuated in the light of changing patterns of reterritorializations and globalizations, as well as personal/gender reassignments. And these possibilities continue to enlarge. But for the “Third World” woman (we use this term very self-consciously) in a postcolonial context, the identity issue is indeed central. Postcolonial women writers from Africa for example, keenly textualize women’s identities through their fictional narratives, dramas and poetry.

In African literature today, including that of Nigeria, there seems to be an identity crisis for women as we perceive a disjuncture between the typical portrayal of women especially in male-authored literatures as weak and inconsequential in the scheme of things and the current emergence of a new breed of women from all over the continent. The first modern-day woman President in Africa has, for instance, emerged in Liberia, and for feminists across the continent, this is a great achievement. Scholars, critics, feminist activists and top-level technocrats in diverse areas of endeavor have also been produced all over this continent and they are demonstrating individually and collectively that they are determined to inspire and create new histories and images for themselves. This is especially remarkable, because African women live within a dominant male culture that oppresses and devalues them. What then accounts for this apparent disjuncture between the lived experiences and the oppressive identities foisted upon women by dominant male cultures? To investigate this problem further it is also needful to ask the following questions: How and why these dislocations occur. And finally, how do the women as writers themselves interrogate their perceived oppressive identities?

In an attempt to engage these issues, we find it necessary to turn to the limitless resources of history, a powerful force for the reconstruction of our present realities. What we are here suggesting is that African women need to be placed within a specific time framework within which to conceptualize and analyze their roles, images, identities and statuses. To this end, we identify a time frame that is contemporaneous and located within the postcolonial context deriving from a sense of history that is not anachronistic. However, Abiola Irele (2005) as well as Emenyonu (2000), both eminent scholars of African literature, would rather some form of closure to this historical phenomenon of colonialism that has such incalculable resonances on our present-day realities. The issuing Africanist argument here is that we continually and actively re-invest and privilege the former colonial/imperial empires, with the intellectual and cultural power and authority with which they continue to control and subjugate the post-colonies. This, they argue, is especially because it forces us to continually define ourselves in exclusively, relational and colonial terms. But we posit that our histories, including the events of colonialism and the processes of decolonization that we have engaged in as Africans and which continue to irrevocably resonate in our present neo/postcolonialisms need to be properly interrogated in order for us to redefine new and acceptable identities for ourselves. No doubt, colonialism affects the colonizer and the colonized and its legacies establish certain orders of relationships as well as producing structures of inclusion and exclusion. An instantiation will suffice here: new symbolic orders of experiencing, speaking, feeling or other behavioural patterns are created. These “historical upheavals and changes” reverberate in African social realities politically, economically, educationally psychologically and culturally (Larsen, 2005:24). The predicament of our self-definition then becomes even more monumental as we are confronted in these modern times by the...
collapse of familiar categories and the consequent physiological and psychological problems of a fast developing borderless globalization.

However, human societies and civilizations continually seek to redefine, regenerate and advance themselves making progress in this regard with varying degrees of achievement, leading to what may loosely be described as modernisation. And, as we have seen, the most dangerously extreme end of such modernisation is capitalist imperialism (McClintock, 1995:5; Loomba, 1998:4). However, the invention of self is an important index in the process of identity formation. Stated differently, identity is a dynamic and continually changing process; it is not static, as it continues to be modified and finally becomes generally accepted with time. Identities of people, societies, and even nations, may be defined along sexual lines; that is, male/female, or in gender terms; masculine/feminine, which include all their spiritual, historical, emotional and social configurations. In recent times, however, people are crossing basic categories, in all manner of gender reassignments and are forging new, even “queer” identities such as bisexual, homosexual, gay, lesbian, transvestite and others. In a recent work, that ultimately problematizes the question of identity within the framework of culture, Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) suggests that culture: “is whatever people make and invest with significance through the exercise of their human creativity” (118). In other words, beyond biological and socio-cultural determinisms, human beings are actively involved in defining their own identities. But whatever the confusions of these postmodernist fabrications, there are certain traditional African concepts of identity which are by no means simplistic in their extrapolations, especially, as they are not merely dichotomized in oppositional terms (Oyewumi, 1997:31). The affirmation of one’s identity, individual, group, or national expectedly, includes an establishment of value for, recognition and acceptance of it. This affirmation or rejection would consequently have far reaching effects on the sense of self at both the personal and social levels. Still on the matter of identity, Connolly (2002) avers that an identity is established in “relation to a series of differences” and that it “converts differences to otherness in order to be; in order to secure its own self-certainty” (64). This would then imply that identity embodies some degree of oppositional relativism in which there some points of inclusion and others of elision, leading to ascendency or subordination.

Also of interest is that nations, even continents, have identities which can be conceived of in gender terms. For instance, Ogunyemi (1987) declares that Nigeria is male; on the other hand, Africa is conceptualized differently having as it were two sides, but in all Africa is feminine. To the “outsiders”, Africa is like the body of the woman. She is often highly eroticized, having such exhilarating jouissances; they (“outsiders”) feel a dire phallocratic need to missionize, dominate and exploit her “dark” territories. This missionizing principle brought along with it its own mythological inventions; the differential and hierarchical construction of race and racism to legitimize its superiority (Susan Arndt, 2006). But to the “insiders”, Africa is the idealized, earthy Mother, placed on such a “pedestal”, and objectified. These typical illustrations of Africa show that identities are differently construed; the dialectics of inclusion/exclusion and white/black therefore foster conflicting models of understanding cultural identities. Such trajectories could lead to oppressions which easily occur especially, when people do not conform to the dominant social hegemonic expectations. Undoubtedly, the African woman does experience these oppressions in various forms and in various spheres of life. But, as cultural institutions that very clearly capture superiority or subordination,
as the case may be, literature becomes the critical sites for discursive interactions and conversations where issues of cultural identities may be addressed. To follow Appiah’s thoughts again, these conversations or “imaginative engagements” do not necessarily lead to a “consensus about anything” but at least, “it’s enough that it helps people get used to one another’ (85). Unfortunately, though, this consensual experience seems to elude women.

Mary Helen Specht, (2006) shows that [from its earliest] contact with this continent the West has tried to come to terms with Africa by exploring, exploiting, enslaving, colonizing, Christianizing and mythologizing (42). In this process of degradation, it is women who now exist in specific historical, geo-political, class, spaces and locations which are neocolonial post-colonies that are the worst hit. We would make clear, presently, the implications of all this for the woman. Ania Loomba (1998) argues that “race, gender and sexuality are not just additive to one another in the colonial arena; they do not just provide metaphors and images for each other, but work together and develop in each other’s crucible” (172). Therefore, it is the externalities, the network of social relations that underpin identity formations. In this regard, it is the woman who always needs to be constructed because on this continent the man is taken as the given, the norm. We must therefore seek to examine the woman especially in terms of the psychological consequences of these hegemonic patterns, but not with the aim of vilifying African men or the colonizers. This is because for women in particular, silencing and subordination has been the bane of their lives (Wisker.2000:3).

Moreover, continued male dominance and sexism is legitimized only to the extent that people refuse to dismantle such oppressive constructs in our current conceptualizations of identity having accepted at the beginning of this paper that culture is alterable. Transforming society would then be possible when we generate new narratives, narrative techniques, and new myths to yield new meanings where African women are no longer “de-womanised” and tyrannized by a paternalistic Eurocentric hegemony as well as patriarchal African traditions. Without any doubts, some women writers have already gained high visibility as a result of the kind of critical attention they have gained so far from textualizing the oppressions of women on the continent. Here we can easily point to such Anglophone writers as Ama Ata Aidoo, Buchi Emecheta, Nawal el Sadaawi, Nobel laureate-Nardine Gordimer, Flora Nwapa, Bessie Head, but lesser known yet no less important writers like Seffi Attah, Chimamanda Adiche and Akachi Adimora Ezeigbo from Nigeria need to be critically engaged to find out the specific contributions of their creative writings in this regard.

Akachi* is the first woman writer in Nigeria and possibly in Africa to complete a conventional trilogy - *The Last of the Strong Ones* (1996), *House of Symbols* (2000) and *Children of the Eagle* (2002). She has also recently completed another important novel, *Trafficked* (2008). As a trilogist, Akachi is immediately set in the company of Achebe, doyen of the African classic, *Things Fall Apart* (1958), who was himself first to establish this tradition on the continent. Promise Okeke, Nigerian poet and novelist, has also done another type of trilogy, which is more of a serialization. But, as we note, Akachi’s text is literarily separated from Achebe’s not only because of the generational divide; the one belongs no doubt to the “first world” of the “establishment school” of Nigerian literature, or African literature in general. The other’s
marginality is circumscribed essentially by the femaleness of its author; yet it is critical to continually engage in inter-textual interrogations in order to revise our literary canons. But the lack of adequate critical attention may well be an indication of the sexual/textual politics which is the bane of women’s lives and writing in Africa, a reflection of their present statuses and identities. But so far, at least, Osofisan (2004: 7) has with such subtle candour declared that “Akachi has come to challenge Achebe and stand Achebeans on their head!” But Osofisan’s seemingly mild critique cannot be missed here especially when it is properly recontextualized. Achebe’s stature as the pace-setter of African literature especially with the publication, of his first novel, *Things Fall Apart*, half a century ago has for long been and is still being celebrated as a “defining” factor in modern African literature (Emenyonu, ibid: ix). It is our purpose here then to strip Akachi’s text of the layers of stereotypes and misconceptions that patriarchal ‘eclectics’ have piled on women writers in Africa. Such eclectics mainly see such writing as some “subculture” of “mainstream” writing, or again as the inevitable “other” that is marginalized. An engaging paradox arises here; that is, at the risk of possible self-erasure, should we continue to conceptualize women’s literatures and discourses on them only in relational terms and therein perpetuate sexist accretion?

Of the four adult novels produced to date by Akachi we have deliberately selected to study *The Last of the Strong Ones (TLSO)* here because of its critical engagement with colonialism and its after-effects of neocolonialism. And when placed contiguously with Achebe’s novel here, we find that Akachi is not complicit: rather she challenges Achebe’s “master script” or “master-narrative, to use Charles Maier’s term, that dominant hegemonic narrative, producing a counter-narrative which leads to emergent new identities for African women.

With a writing career that began with an apprenticeship in writing children’s stories for the broadcast media culminating in the publication of *Buried Treasure* (1992), Akachi has demonstrated in the sheer numerical output of her works as well as in the various genres she straddles, her seriousness as a creative artist. Her imaginative fecundity is displayed in the four volumes of short stories she has so far produced. Writing also for young readers and children, Akachi has reeled out at least eight other stories in *The Prize* (1994), *Alani the Trouble Maker and other stories* (2003), *Whisker the Brave Cat* (2005), *Red One and the Wizard of Mula* (2005), *Snake Child and Star Baby* (2006), *Ezezemale and the Tree Spirit* (2006), *Sunshine, the Miracle Child* (2006) as well as *My Cousin Sammy* (2007)

With all these and much more in terms of the acclaim and exposure some of these works have received, some have received local and international awards, two volumes of the short stories have been translated into two African languages(Swahili and Xhosa), Akachi’s works remain relatively little known. For instance, whereas Emecheta, Nwapa and even Alkali have already gained high visibility in terms of critical attention on their works, only recently did the first full length study of Akachi’s works appear. Osofisan (2004:23) as well as Patrick Oloko, in recent times, (2008:2), have separately decried this inattention given to Akachi so far. Given this context, our work seeks to be part of the ongoing Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo symposia so that her works can be properly evaluated and appropriately placed within the matrix of Nigerian and African literatures.
The critical paradigms of this work stem from the postcolonial conditions that define African women’s lives today. By postcolonial we mean the historical, psychological, economic, and political complexities that result from the colonial experience. In its historical sense we appropriate what Bill Ashcroft and others have quite simply described as “all the cultures affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present (Ashcroft et al, 1989:2). The complexity of tensions and conflicts that have etched themselves into the psyche of the colonized and which continue to emerge from that experience underpins the psychological framework we describe here. The economies of unequal power relations which privilege the imperial centre to use all its might to exploit, deplete and devalue the resources of their hosts are pertinent here. But more specifically, it is the textualization of the subjectification of the African woman in a postcolonial state that is of primary concern here. Politically, African women are not traditionally visible in the political landscape of the continent. However, there is now a little improvement and Akachi textualises this reality.

In her work, Akachi espouses an integrative and accommodationist brand of feminism: what she has articulated as “complementarity”, firmly located within the socio-political structures of an African realism. This is what she relentlessly pursues in her TLSO in order to create authentic identities of the African woman. As Mary E Modupe Kolawole notes, the search for self-recreation is predicated on self-identity which starts with self-naming (1998:5). Similarly, Nana Wilson-Tagoe has called for a “feminist framework” that enables the critic to see representations in texts as mediated by “sexual difference” and the imaginative and ideological conceptions that surround gender (1997:14).

In TLSO, Akachi draws on the material of the conflicts ensuing from the colonialist invasion of the Nigerian space, psyche, traditions, mores and societies and so she takes her place in the company of those other Nigerian writers who have either used this same material or the more recent tragic event of the Nigerian Civil War as the backdrop for their fictional discourse. As Chidi Amata (1988) notes, “the age-long relationship between literature and war not only produces a rich literary harvest [it] offers the greatest literary opportunity for the display of heroism as well …” (86). But beyond its mere use as thematic material or the mere rehashing of the theme of “culture conflict”, Akachi participates in a visceral way, in the on-going criticism on the injustices of racism and sexism ensuing from that encounter. The novelist quite clearly depicts a nation (Umuga) caught in the throes of a Fanonist process of violent decolonization and liberationist movement. Akachi enters the colonial discourse but very deliberately, writes against the grain of Western imperialism as she engages that experience with the insights of a woman. But this is no mere feminization for Akachi and for the reader: rather, the novelist “de-authorizes” the chauvinistic “versions of history and identity politics” that male authors with their imperialist overlords have ‘regaled’ the Nigerian readership with. Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, with Joyce Cary’s Mister Johnson, remain the “archetexts” in this regard.

At another level, and when we percolate TLSO through the literary antecedents of Soyinkas’s intense pessimism in The Strong Breed (1964) as well as through Osofisan’s more revolutionary and optimistic ethos in No More The Wasted Breed (1982), we encounter a novelist in search of the heroines of our traditional past, the strong ones the: “carriers” of the community’s burdens that we can identify as the enduring
embodiments of the legends of the people. Fortunately, for posterity, certain strong women are located. Therefore, her work is valued materially and politically as she empowers her women through pro-active, pro-women perspectives to “decontaminate” Umuga and its environs and influence society positively by altering the republic of Nigerian literatures that has for long historically and critically neglected and marginalized women. This needs further elucidation here. Akachi creates female characters whose identities are continually modified as they each relate to their respective husbands as wives and mothers or when they each gain freedom from their respective marriages and join the alutaradi (association of wives), obuofo (inner council committee), umuada (association of daughters) or oluada (top women representatives). This is most typically stated when after the death of her husband, Umeozo, Onyekozuru tells of how she began to pay more attention to the activities pertaining to her and the village. She starts to attend umuada and alutaradi meetings regularly and even take care of her body! (TLSO: 44). Similarly too, when Chieme is rejected by her husband she goes through a process of self incarnation and later joins the organization of umuada, spearheading and effecting changes that have far reaching consequences for the village and for the whole town.

From the outset, Akachi sets for herself the task of extracting “truths from our myths, our history and our folktales so that the youths could be properly instructed” (TLSO: 2). This singular focus by the author immediately throws up certain complexities that need careful examination here. First is Akachi’s return to the use of myth in this novel. For Akachi, myths are not the primitive relics of mystical and archaic formulations of a now irrelevant, naïve and superstitious past over-taken by a highly technologized world; rather they are the timeless culture-bound yet not moribund philosophical, psychological and ideological repertoires used to authorize and encode society’s values, norms, aesthetics, sensibilities, codes of conduct, gender socializations and perhaps more importantly the embodiment of the society’s sense of identity. If this crucial mythic system of signifying is then eroded, corrupted or misappropriated then that social collective is doomed. Therefore, it is crucial for Akachi as well as other African women writers to specifically engage actively in the process of retrieval and reconstruction of the mythic kernel of their respective communities since they form the bedrock of the community’s valuational system of self-definition and consequent stability. For Akachi, the return to the use of myth in this novel is a spring-board for questioning received truths from a “westernized center”; as the Umuga saying goes: “when a commoner wishes to criticize the king, he must wear the disguise of a masquerade (TLSO: 60). Moreover, she is not an apologist for the so-called pristine, pure traditionalisms of the pre-colonial era. Rather, myths, traditional cultural expressions, are a veritable site for the systematic recovery of discursive privileges for the woman and this is what Akachi does here. The novelist returns to Umuga and retrieves from communal history the authentic and precise roles Umuga woman play in the encounter with the “Kosiri” (white invasionists) and their attempts to foil the degradation of their community. As Kolawole further posits, “When derogatory mythic conceptualizations of women are internalized over a period, certain negative self-perceptions emerge which are then taken for granted as natural and African” (7). Erudite feminist theorist and scholar, Molara Ogundipe Leslie’s (1994:229-230) call for the transformation for Africa through the active participation of women in national polity driven by STIWANISM (acronym for Social Transformations Including Women In Africa) is apposite here.
Beyond the morality of the novelist’s position on behalf of the youths, the future of our generation, Akachi also becomes in this novel, the raconteur par excellence of racial memory/history, the neighbourhood spokeswoman or scribe of sorts. Her strategy here is to quickly establish an authentic counter-narrative, a veritable alternative, to prevent the “contamination with the distorted account that “kosiri” and his agents were bound to present at some future date” (TLSO: 2). In a strategic repositioning of the facts of their ethnic histories and realities, Akachi, an erudite scholar, teacher and critic herself, is anxious to set the records straight especially for the future generations. She inflects the narrator’s voice with an unmistakably authorial eloquence and impact, resulting in a formidable combination that tackles the centre and its comprador accomplices in the outposts. Akachi evinces a humanism that is proletarian, one in which the human(woman) factor is indispensable as she elucidates in her own inaugural lecture “ for a people properly educated and socialized drive development as a matter of course and that literature is the most efficacious subject/discipline to provide humanistic education” (2008:16). This she accomplishes as she aligns with the men, women, sons and daughters of Umuga to reconstruct the reality of their lives in the problematic colonial condition. Being acutely sensitive to the emotional and material complexities that particularly negate the subjected lives of these women, Akachi joins forces with the vulnerable women of Umuga to resist the historical and intellectual failure that would have been the fate of these women once they refused to assert themselves. The suspicion or question of her acculturation does not arise here as the women themselves expressly and passionately implore her to be their memory. In TLSO, Akachi structures her narrative such that the personal or otherwise private lives of the major protagonists intersect the communal aspirations of Umuga. In turn, their self-narratives which structure their identities and their interactions in the various community groups become mutually defining and this is crucial in the novelist’s postmodern feminist’s rejection of an essentialist nature of women. The non-linear varieties of these self-narratives or biographies create a pluralism or multi-foci reading that allows us to re-read the underlying assumptions of traditional African societies which these women seek to transcend in order to foster a more humane society. Yvonne Vera, quite perceptively, writes about the efforts of other African women understanding their acts of courage and the “intense risk a woman takes in the sheer effort of writing placing herself beyond the accepted margin, abandoning the securities of less daunting, much more approved paths”. (1999:3). Through their narratives in Akachi’s TLSO, we see women who are not mere appendages, whose hitherto stereotypical image of passivity is here contested from the structured margins of a dominant ideology. More than this, the women become determining factors in society as they form socio-political pressure groups or what we may here call endogenous spaces to work for the survival and greater good of Umuga. Finding or replicating such relevant endogenous spaces is of critical importance for the articulation and participation of African women in influencing and transforming their diverse communities and societies.

In a manner that somewhat recalls the women in Sembane Ousmane’s epic narrative in God’s Bits of Wood, Akachi, captures the saga of the colonial imperialist invasion and subjugation of Igbo land in Nigeria. Through the eyes of the strong women, Ejimnaka, Onyekozuru, Chieme, and Chibuka or the representatives of women in the “sisterhoods” of daughters in the “umuada” or of the wives in the “alutaradi” or even in the “Obuofo”, we encounter our own correlates of Sojourner Truth, Rosa Parks, Amanda Berry Smith and Anna Cooper. In each of their well-articulated stories, the author captures graphically the pains,
the joys, the travails and challenges of these women from the vantage point of one whose personal life has been affected by the larger communal struggles against the “kosiri”. Of particular epistemological significance is the fact that Akachi creates a feminine locale that is psychologically outside and beyond the patriarchal universe and expectation of the image of meek, subordinate women. Through their participation in these associations we see the collapse of the boundaries of male/female, domestic/public dichotomies which hitherto hindered the cause of women. Each of these women emerges from her highly subjectified space and seize-hold of the apparatuses of resistance discourse in such an unprecedented manner and begins to re-inscribe herself into the center of things, skillful and subtly subversive in the reticent telling of their personal life stories. Perhaps theirs is an unconscious answer to the Spivak question: Yes indeed, the subaltern speaks from a position of power! They take the center stage and perform roles powerfully influential and transformative as they are committed to the survival of Umuga, their homeland. They violently wrest for themselves the tools of communication and empowering their voices, they each record and articulate their individual stories flowing with the sheer force, lucidity and directness of lived experiences into “the rhythms of each others lives like the confluent streams of the Agwazi and the Ebizi. Our two rivers of ideas and commitment joined and mingled their waters of harmony that was always at high tide” (TLSO: 19).

Akachi uses language dexterously to signify difference. Deploying lexical items, cadences of cultural idioms and Umuga speech rhythms and proverbs with which she abrogates the privileged centrality of English (and without losing meaning), the novelist creates nuanced identities of strong women who “are great survivors who find their way out of crippling situations” (102). But Nigerian, indeed, African women have significantly been involved in the political histories of their communities either as individuals or as collectives, as we witness in the heroisms of radicalized fore-runners such as Moremi, Idia, Mary Ekpo, Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, Amina, as well as in the radical collective actions of the Lagos women’s protest against the introduction of water rate in 1909, the Aba women’s riot of 1929 against tax and the Abeokuta women’s protest against colonial taxation in 1949. The East African Mau Mau guerilla wars and the struggles against the Apartheid regimes of South Africa all evidence women’s participation in political activism in the development of new ethno/national identities. How come then, that the monumental and phenomenal “heroism”, to use the coinage of Ellen Moers (1977), of all these women have consistently suffered immolation at such a critically defining moments by many male writers? How can we explain the transition of these stories from prominence in their lived contexts to negation and systematic denial in their afterlives? Is there a purpose to this omission? Perhaps even more disturbing is whether almost all male writers simultaneously suffered this same form of amnesia. Or is it that these women icons are so dangerously provocative that the men are terrified in a Freudian sense? Could this projection of male xenophobia or possible complicity be collusion with the dominant discourse of imperialists with all their identity-destroying power to destroy the “other”? Taken in totality, what has resulted is the suppression, near erasure of women’s vital sources of creativity. But writing as a self–conscious male critic, Biodun Jeyifo (1993), in a significantly germane discourse, has as a matter of urgency, called on women writers and critics to “delegitimize the under-textualization” of the stories of these foremothers of women’s creativity by male writers and critics. This should then lead us to question and revise the processes of canonization of African literatures.
As their stories in *TLSO* unfold, we see Akachi resist the capacious use of cultural memory against the women. It is in this regard that Akachi’s work is compelling. Women in African literatures have for long been unheard and unsung but in this novel, the writer gives each one of the leading women the creative space in which to assert herself. In describing themselves, the women follow the same pattern; a description of their homesteads; the home of their nativity, the (mis)adventure of marriage, the escape into the women’s associations where they find fulfillment and complete self-expression and at the end of each story, the author gives a short eulogy remarking the strength of each character. Of Chieme it is written, for instance, “Oluada who showed the world that a woman’s reputation does not depend on a husband. You defied Agwu, the spirit of disorder and deformity. You wrestled with adversity and took the bull of life by the horns….Your triumph is enviable….Woman mountain, seeded in tradition…..” (*TLSO*: 85). Ejimnaka says that as a mature woman who had now overstayed her welcome in the home of her “nativity”, her life was now “like a lone boat plowing down the river. I could not think of a way to steer my life well. My soul was yearning to return to land, to firm, dry land” (*TLSO*: 20). After the collapse of her first marriage, we see Ejimnaka search for the meaning of her existence and in this process/search she finds a lover and friend in Obiatu. In very idyllic terms they express love even in the face of the harsh realities and mundanities of their existence.

In the intricate tales of their lives, these women realize the limitations of a devalued sense of self and so begin to question their oppressed identity. When Chieme is declared as being neither male nor female by her husband after four years of marriage, she consults with her “chi”/“divine mother” through Idemmiri, the only goddess in Umuga who had a husband. At this point, it is useful to Ogonyemi for further illumination on this “chi”/“ori” trope. She postulates in her important vernacular theory that “women’s power is predicated on the belief that, openly acknowledged or not, a feminine force determines the important phases of each individual’s life” (35). By extension then, and as a metaphor for social equilibrium that Akachi consistently espouses, African societies must reconnect to this feminine principle to attain wholeness and wellbeing.

Faced with the crisis of identity, Chieme pays a visit to her maternal uncle in her attempt to find a solution to her personal predicament. But Chieme’s personal crisis of identity is also connected to the crisis of a community in transition, in her quest for self-preservation. Chieme’s life dramatically changes as she resolutely determines to live life to the full; “she lives in full becoming impervious to gossip and deaf to the derision of the world” (*TLSO*: 81). Importantly too, her profession changes; she combines superhuman attributes of chanter, performer and artiste. Therefore, the end of her marriage saw the emergence of a triumphant and successful woman.

We see the group of women completely fearless and un-put-down-able, who not only take affirmative action against the stooges like Okwara and other “treacherous warrant chiefs” but who also dare to march against the “metropole” in Awka in their search for redress from the trespass of the “travelers/wayfarers” who as it were “are no longer standing on one foot” (17): reconstructing a world where the cultural and historical assumptions of the invasionists about them are challenged. Their stories, as we see, are frontal attacks against imperialist discourse. Thus the women constitute for themselves a counter-discourse that
answers back to the “empire” in a retrieval programme of women’s self-image and histories from their despotic use against them.

Importantly too, Akachi’s women in this novel are not constrained by their poverty or illiteracy. What they lack in material wealth they make-up for in strength of character, resilience and integrity, such attributes of subversive resistance, in spite of being always at the risk of great personal loss and physical injury. Akachi does not construct women who are passive, docile or voiceless for such constructs would inadvertently continue to perpetuate sexist prejudices which phenomenally exclude women from political discourses. Whereas other African women writers including Grace Ogot and Flora Nwapa “appropriate and valorize female experiences and in the process subvert certain fixed definitions of the female subject, Nana Wilson-Tagoe (1997:14), Akachi’s women relentlessly forge for themselves a new identity in the face of the two-fold tyranny of colonialism and traditional patriarchy. Each of her women enters marriage only as a necessity of tradition and so they gain entrance into the wo/man discourse through which they surreptitiously “argue with the phallus”; as it were entering into the “symbolic-order-of-the-fathers” and subvert that order that endues the men with such power and authority but which conversely categorizes women as weak, trivial and merely sentimental. Even when they appear docile as Chibuka in her relationship with Iheme, her cruel husband, we note her suppressed resistance. This is indeed a resistance strategy, a feminine mystic, designed to first ensure survival of these women at the domestic (psychological) level and then empower them to take-over at the public (social) arena and take center stage joining the alutaradi, the Oluada or the Obuofo as they give their strength, wealth and wisdom to the commonwealth of Umuga collectively taking on the “kosiri” with all its humiliating indignities against the land and people. Akachi concludes in another place thus:

It is not an easy matter being a woman in a society like ours where women are expected to do two-thirds of the chores. Women cannot escape many of the responsibilities thrust upon them by culture and tradition, but they can at least control their destiny to a large extent, and structure and take pride in every aspect of their lives (1996b, 7).

As we have seen here, Akachi creates women not smarting under the burdens of Western imperialism or the traditionalisms of Umuga, rather, we see great women empowered not by a male society but by themselves to create a society where they are valued for who they are. Akachi’s recommendation in TLSO is that women must participate more intensely in the political processes of their societies or face the consequence of erasure that a negative complacency would bring upon them. Finally, it is our submission in this work that we must interrogate the political and imaginative control or authority over women’s lives in the present postcolonial condition. By reconfiguring and challenging dominant narratives women are able to de-scribe themselves from the periphery. It then becomes apparent that identity is foundational as it reinforces the possibilities of resistance in the literatures of women.
Note

* In this paper I deliberately deploy a feminist style of using the female author’s first name.

Works Cited


Beyond the Studio: The Impact of Home Recording Technologies on Music Creation and Consumption.

By Matthew Homer

In December 2008, the music company EMI announced the closure of its Olympic Studios in West London. Following this news, these comments were left on the Music Week website:

Recorded there on and off for 15 years. Know all the staff very well. Is still the best studio in the UK and it will be very sad to see it go. It’s a shame that the music in the UK all sounds like it is coming out of a game-boy and there is not enough demand to keep proper live studios open anymore.

(personal communication, December, 2008).

I am happy to see studios like these closing. They run out dated business models in an industry that has changed rapidly. The past has gone!! Long live the new producers and engineers who work from computer based set ups creating great material and at a price that is appealing.

(personal communication, December, 2008).

The forum where these comments were posted included similar contributions either lamenting Olympic’s demise or applauding EMI’s decision to close the studio. One poster on the site ended her contribution by stating: ‘My heart will skip a beat now every time I pass that place – the end of an era’ (personal communication, December, 2008). As one of four British studios closing in 2008 alone, the death of Olympic is indeed indicative of a wider problem facing traditional music recording (Coleman, 2009, para.17). For instance, Chris Gibson traces the pressures that have either caused established studios to disappear completely or adapt themselves for other markets (2005, p.193). As indicated by the statements at the beginning of this paper, Gibson partially attributes this situation to the rise of home recording technologies which enable artists to record their music without hiring a studio.
This paper will focus on the popularity of home recording technologies and their affects upon the ways in which music is created. I will investigate how artists are using software and hardware in the production of their music and whether the use of this technology represents new freedoms in artistic innovation. The case of Olympic captures this moment of transition. In an article for *The Independent* newspaper’s website, journalist Nick Coleman seems to have found a middle ground between the studio’s detractors and its enthusiasts:

Olympic will not be taking its roster of former alumni with it – it is only a building. Jimi Hendrix…is long gone. And the Spice Girls…and Led Zeppelin …ought to be further gone than they appear to be…So we won’t be losing any music when Olympic goes, only a small part of music’s historical hinterland. Nevertheless, there is something unquestionably sad about the news. There is more to a great studio than machinery. There is what “the studio” means to musicians; what it means to the very sound of music; and what a studio brings to the story of music, as a component in a narrative shaped as much by myth as it is by reality (Coleman, 2009, para.19).

This statement introduces the key elements that are integral to the debate surrounding the traditional studio’s demise and home recording’s growth. To illustrate, in his references to Hendrix and Led Zeppelin, Coleman draws attention to the nostalgia that seems to cover up the overwhelming difficulties faced by older models of recording in the 21st Century. Such changes include technological, economic and social developments which seem to have provided conditions more favourable to the home studio than its predecessor. However, what the extract also highlights is that there are certain musical and extra-musical factors that are unique to studios such as Olympic. Such factors provide a welcome complication to the argument and it is an area that I will draw upon over the course of this work.

Having attended a three-day conference as part of Brighton’s Great Escape music festival, I found that there was a consensus that home recording technologies were having an impact on the ways in which music is created and consumed. For example, Jakes, a vocalist and respected figure within the Bristol Dubstep scene, explained to me that the rise of home recording technologies has enabled more people to create music (personal communication, May, 2009). However the artist was quick to emphasise that while new technologies have encouraged a greater accessibility to creativity, home recording has always had an influence on the music industry. This point was stated to me on a number of occasions at the Festival and is one that can be seen in the history of music making from the latter half of the 20th Century (Berk, 2000, p.200; Negus, 1999, pp.495-497). In his seminal text *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*, Dick Hebdige outlines the ‘do-it-yourself philosophy’ that helped to define 1970s punk against the ‘mainstream pop and rock’ of the period (Hebdige, 1979, pp.110-112). This is explained when the author refers to punk fanzine *Sniffin Glue*:

*Sniffin Glue*, the first fanzine and the one which achieved the highest circulation, contained perhaps the single most inspired item of propaganda produced by the subculture – the definitive statement of punk’s do-it-yourself philosophy – a diagram showing three finger positions...
on the neck of a guitar over the caption: ‘Here’s one chord, here’s two more, now form your own band’ (1979, p.112).

The music derived from this principle was distinguished by a celebration of amateurism and being at odds with accepted notions of music making, a point that Hebdige also outlines in the following:

In the early days at least, these ‘garage bands’ could dispense with musical pretensions and substitute, in the traditional romantic terminology, ‘passion’ for ‘technique’, the language of the common man for the arcane posturings of the existing élite, the now familiar armoury of frontal attacks for the bourgeois notion of entertainment or the classical concept of ‘high art’ (1979, p.110).

In the same decade, a similar ‘do-it-yourself philosophy’ could also be found in the New York hip hop scene (Toop, 2000, p.91; Rosen, 2006, para. 3). As accounted by David Toop, this genre grew from the Bronx and made use of existing music that ‘was then edited on record turntables in real time’ (Toop, 2000, pp.92-93). Accompanied by MCs who would provide lyrics to the tracks, this music broke away from established genres such as jazz and rock and opened up music making to a whole range of new artists (Blake, 2007, pp.ix-x). Through its extensive use of the turntable, the genre is notorious for its use of samples and has since inspired a range of musical styles (Blake, 2007, pp.ix-x; Marclay and Tone, 2004, p.343). This subject is discussed by artists Christian Marclay and Yasunao Tone who examine the possibility that hip hop’s DIY ethos actually influenced the design of subsequent digital technologies:

MARCLAY: But when they started making their sampling keyboards and stuff, I think maybe there was already that understanding that it was useful to sample because HipHop [sic] DJs were doing it.

TONE: Well, the clientele [sic] was expected to be not just musicians, but the general public.


Both artists concur that the music of hip hop has subsequently affected the industry to the point where new music technologies are manufactured to recreate the techniques of acts such as Grandmaster Flash and Afrika Bambaataa. In this way, the cases of punk and hip hop demonstrate how music can grow from the garage and the streets to influence the ways in which the music industry and technology companies think about the art. In their discussion, Marclay and Tone also hit upon the important subject of music technologies and user agency. To expand, the artists agree that the statement ‘anybody can become a musician’ was a philosophy shared, not only by punk and hip hop, but also by preceding art movements such as Fluxus and the musique concrète experiments of Schaeffer, Stockhausen and Varèse (Cox and Warner, 2004, pp.5-6; Marclay and Tone, 2004, p.343; Schaeffer, 2004, pp.76-81; Varese, 2004, pp.17-21). What these movements shared was the desire to interact with established technologies and artworks in new and innovative ways. As I will now discuss, such novel engagement with existing tools has created new
possibilities not only for art and music making, but also for the music industry as a whole.

At this stage, I have introduced how punk and hip hop musicians opened up new possibilities in music making through their novel approaches to established genres and technologies. Like the experimentalists of musique concrète before them, their achievements were met by pushing the boundaries of the technology at their disposal (Berk, 2000, p.191; Cox and Warner, 2004, pp.5-6). With the proliferation of new home recording technologies, it would seem that this trend shows no sign of changing as the creative genius of new artists continues to be measured through the innovative ways in which they apply their tools. While I will analyse the relationship between home recording tools and creativity later within this article, it is necessary to focus first on the new technologies and their promises for the future creation of music. In the text *Sound Unbound*, minimalist composer Steve Reich introduces the subject of music and technology by referring to his audio-visual shows of the 1990s (2008, pp.1-4). Discussing his ‘video opera’ titled “Three Tales”, Reich explains how he featured tapes of prominent scientists talking about their disciplines (2008, p.3). Amongst these was the robotics expert Rodney Brooks, who argues that

> We’ve always thought of our brains in terms of our latest technology. At one point our brains were steam engines. When I was a kid, they were telephone-switching networks. Then they became digital computers. Then, massively parallel digital computers. Probably, out there now, there are kids’ books which say our brain is the World Wide Web. We probably haven’t got it right yet.

(Brooks, 1997, cited by Reich, 2008, p.3).

Building on Brooks’ observation, it seems that all parts of the music industry are now thinking in relation to digital technologies and the Internet. Focusing specifically on the creation of music, Ken Jordan and Paul D. Miller, the latter otherwise known as ‘DJ Spooky that Subliminal Kid’, trace the impact that digital technologies have had on the musical process:

> Today that ease of access and malleability [granted by digital technologies] is transforming the way musicians conceive of and make music. It is now simple to convert sound into digital streams, so it can flow anywhere across the computer network, to be manipulated by a continuing growing array of software.

(2008, p.100).

As the authors subsequently explain, one of the effects caused by these new technological developments is an erosion of the established boundaries between “‘artist” and “audience’” (2008, p.102). While Jordan and Miller analyse this erosion mainly in relation to the Internet, this blurring of boundaries can also be seen in that many more people now create music simply because of the greater accessibility to digital tools. An indication of the extent to which home recording technologies are now available can be gauged from guides such as those on BBC Radio One’s web page. As part of their ‘One Music’ scheme, which informs
its young audience about working in the music industry, the website provides a step by step guide for buying and using home recording tools. In a similar way that Sniffin Glue represented the punk approach to music, sites such as Radio One’s can be seen to represent the philosophy of the digital musician (Hebdige, 1979, p.112). With over seven pages of instructions on home recording, the information presented on the One Music site is far more detailed than that in Hebdige’s example. However, what both of these texts demonstrate is an impetus to encourage young people to make music. Like the DIY ethos that informed Sniffin Glue’s ‘now form your own band’ statement, One Music offers the following advice on beginning a session using home recording technologies:

First of all, let’s look at how to set the correct level for the signal you’re recording. Think of the signal chain like a door frame. When you’re setting up the signal chain, you want to keep the signal as far as possible from scraping its feet on the floor, without it banging its head [on] the top of the door frame (BBC, n.d., para.2).

While the BBC’s site is more pedagogic in its approach than Hebdige’s punk fanzine, both examples present their young audiences with ways to create and record music outside the traditional studio.

In its efforts to make the creation of music more accessible, the One Music site presents the argument that digital technologies offer a greater democratisation of the music making process. This is a view expressed in Daphne Keller’s article, “The Musician as Thief” (2008, pp.135-147). Writing specifically about the process of sampling in music creation, Keller compares ‘the sonic collage[s]’ of John Cage and William Burroughs ‘in the analog [sic] era’, with the possibilities opened up by digital equipment:

It took John Cage a year to make his four-minute-long Williams Mix. William Burroughs spent untold hours constructing cut-ups with razor blades and tape...Digital recording technology revolutionizes and democratizes this recycling process, making complex manipulation of recorded fragments easy and relatively affordable (2008, p.135).

Keller relates the democratisation that digital technologies bring to music creation through their ‘relatively affordable’ price and ease of use. I found these factors to be highly significant in the home recording-traditional studio debate. To take the first of these two points, Mark Kelly, keyboardist and co-songwriter for the band Marillion, explained to me that cost was a big attraction for new artists to use such technologies (personal communication, May, 2009). Taking into account the purchase of the necessary hardware and software, Kelly stated that musicians are able to make ‘high quality records for £2000’ (personal communication, May, 2009), a figure that was also cited on the BBC’s guide to home recording (BBC, n.d., para.3). This is in contrast to the £800-£1500 per day fees that studios such as Olympic had to charge to stay alive in the business (Coleman, 2009, para.17). This observation was also emphasised in an interview that Red Hot Chili Pepper’s guitarist John Frusciante gave to the Electronic Musician website (Tingen, 2005). In the article, he compares his experience of recording his studio album Shadows Collide with People (2005), against his six follow up releases which were produced at his home:
for the amount of money that I spent on *Shadows Collide with People*, I could have bought lots of studio equipment and had it forever. And I love the idea of being able to create music all the time without having to book studio time. A lot of the time the best studios in town are already booked, while in other cases, studios you like may close (Tingen, 2005, para. 26).

Although Frusciante’s home studio is a far cry from the basic bedroom set-up depicted in sources such as the One Music site, the artist does draw attention to the point that home recording has economic benefits over the traditional studio. I put this point to Chief Economist at PRS for Music Will Page, who invited me to consider the problems faced by the traditional studio in relation to William Baumol’s cost disease theory (personal communication, May, 2009). As Page details in a paper for the PRS, this model ‘examines the phenomenon of areas of the economy that have experienced no increase of labour productivity in response to rising salaries’ (2008, para.19). To illustrate, the author gives the following example:

if the music industry pays its musicians 19th century style salaries, the musicians may decide to quit and get a job at an automobile factory where salaries are commensurate to high labour productivity. Hence, musicians’ salaries are increased not due to labour productivity increases in the music industry, but rather due to productivity and wage increases in other industries (2008, para.20).

In terms of the focus of this essay, Baumol’s theory seems to go more in the favour of home recording technologies than their studio counterpart. For instance, Coleman stated that, to survive, ‘a large studio has to charge at least £1,500 a day’ (2009, para.17). As I discussed with Page, it could be argued that as much, or greater, productivity is possible through home recording technologies. The artists may rather refer to these cheaper tools then than the more expensive fees requested by the studios (personal communication, May, 2009).

While there seems to be significant economic advantages for artists to record at home, it is important to draw attention to what exactly is lost when the musician dispenses with the professional studio. For instance, with the loss of venues such as Olympic, there is also the loss of the experienced engineers and producers who have been extensively trained to make high quality records (Jenkins, 2003, para.36). In dispensing with such expertise, the home recording artist seems to have thrown the established hierarchy of music making into question and redefined notions of what skills are needed to create outstanding tracks. With sound editing software such as Pro Tools now being used by both professionals and home recording artists (Levine, 2007, para.3), there remains the question as to how far a strong literacy for such packages can in itself go towards making good music or whether there is still a place for industry expertise and equipment. I will return to this issue of sonic literacy and whether the musician can make innovative records without the professional studio and its experts.

With home recording technologies potentially providing a democratisation of the music making process through their affordability, it is important to explore what this greater access means for the creation of music. Through its ease of use, the proliferation of digital technologies has arguably enabled greater
experimentation in the music making process. In doing so, such developments offer the potential for further innovation for the artist. This is recognised by Michael Berk who details the influence of ‘the desktop studio’ against a history of technological developments in the music industry:

the future of music technology is likely to be centered [sic] on the desktop. Advances in desktop processor speeds and hard disk capacity have made it possible to run all the elements of a virtual electronic studio - multitrack recorder, signal processors, and sound sources - on a single machine. This makes it likely that the electronic music of the future will conflate composition, recording, sound design, and rhythm programming in new and baffling ways (2000, p.201).

A prime factor behind the seemingly endless possibilities of digital technologies comes from the invention of the Musical Instrument Digital Interface in 1981 (Berk, 2000, p.196; Blake, 2007, p.68; Pinch and Trocco, 2002, p.317). Commonly referred to as MIDI, this phenomenon is a communication protocol that enables one computer to control many other compatible devices such as a synthesizer or sequencer (Berk, 2002, p.196; Simoni, 2006, p.282; Blake, 2007, p.68). As Andrew Blake summarises, ‘one keyboard could control another’, enabling a single device to create a variety of sounds and techniques for ‘recording, or... live performance’ (2007, p.68).

Compared to previous methods of making music, such as those demonstrated by Cage and Burroughs, the introduction of MIDI opened up new ways to manipulate and experiment with sound. It also gave rise to fresh approaches in creating and playing music. This observation is most apparent in the move away from the “live” event recording of the traditional studio to the seemingly endless editing and sampling possibilities of digital technologies (Mallinder, personal communication, July, 2009). For Berk, one feature of MIDI that revolutionised music creation was its interface that ‘brought a visual dimension to audio editing’ (2000, p.196). As he explains:

Previously, trimming rhythmic loops had involved a fair amount of foresight and calculation: Graphical editing let producers make decisions on the fly and brought on, for better or worse, a period of increasingly radical (or outlandish) editorial experimentation (2000, p.196).

While this feature speeds up the composing process and enables greater experimentation, it also heightens tendencies for the artist to become obsessive about their work as the majority of audio tools can isolate and zoom in on minute details in a composition (Cascone, 2004, p.393). In this way, home recording equipment enables many more artists to create music in the same way that musician and producer Brian Eno advocates in his article “The Studio as Compositional Tool” (2004, pp.127-130). Writing about the increased possibilities that ‘tape’ and ‘three-track recording’ brought to music making through the studio, Eno states that

It puts the composer in the identical position of the painter – he’s working directly with a material, working directly onto a substance, and he always retains the options to chop and change,
to paint a bit out, add a piece, etc (2004, p.129).

With advances in home recording technology, it can be argued that music software such as Cakewalk and Pro Tools magnifies these possibilities for the artist. This is recognised by composer and performer Ben Neill who contemplates the changes that developments in computer technology will have on electronic music:

I would submit that because of these technological advances, this is a unique moment in history in which music is also leading the visual arts. Electronic-music composers can work in a way very similar to that of painters and sculptors; being self-contained and not relying on others to perform one’s art speeds up the process greatly (2004, p.390).

The digital technologies Neill writes about further jeopardises the position of the traditional studio in so far that it potentially eliminates the need for third parties such as engineers and expert producers. Musicians who have gone down this route include Richard Hall, otherwise known as Moby. Describing himself as ‘a little bald guy...who makes music in his bedroom’ (2008, p.156), Moby’s multi-million selling album Play (1999) was recorded at his home using Cubase software and a traditional studio mixing desk (Sound on Sound, 2000, para.3; Bozza, 2001, para.5). Similarly, DJ Shadow’s Endtroducing album (1996) was made outside the studio using ‘an Akai MPC 6011 sampling workstation’ and ‘a Technics turntable’ (Berk, 2000, p.196).

The successful experiences that Moby has had with home recording technologies have led him to be very positive about the possibilities of these tools. For example, in an interview with rollingstone.com, he explains that

There will be a time...when you will be able to use a laptop to create a song that sounds as if it were recorded by a band in a studio, and no one will be able to tell the difference. In the next few years, I wouldn’t be surprised if they invent singing programs. You will type in a phrase and tell the program to have it sung by a Caucasian woman, eighteen years old, with whatever inflection you choose. Whoever invents that will make a lot of money (Bozza, 2001, para.9).

In lauding the potential of home recording technologies, Moby seems to have inadvertently highlighted factors that have often been used to criticise the phenomenon. In predicting that one day home recording technologies will be able ‘to create a song that sounds as if it were recorded by a band in a studio’, the artist draws attention to the point that such equipment cannot meet all the achievements of venues such as Olympic or Abbey Road. While it is important to emphasise that this interview with Moby was written in 2001, similar criticisms have since been levelled at home recording technology towards the latter half of the decade. For instance, Paul Tingen explains why John Frusciante ‘vowed’ not ‘to record anything on digital anymore’ (2005, para.21):

he far prefers analog [sic] recording “for the vibe that I feel my music should have, in terms
of sonic warmth. I want my recordings to fill the room and be comforting, even if it’s a really distorted, loud f----d-up sound. I’m probably one of the few people that go into a mastering place and insist that no computers are used (2005, para.20).

Frusciante’s preference for analogue technologies is echoed by fellow artist Brian Eno who likewise states that analogue synthesizers had ‘a personality’ unlike the perfect sounds of the digital models (Pinch and Trocco, 2002, p.318).

Such is the esteem that Frusciante has for analogue technologies he has, as Tingen details, ‘taken to buying up the old studio gear that’s on the market as digital workstations become the norm and established studios close’ (2005, para.22). In purchasing studio equipment for his home, John Frusciante raises an important point that home recording and the traditional studio are not necessarily exclusive from one another. Instead, by bringing the areas together in this way, Frusciante introduces the argument that home recording and traditional studio techniques can complement each other to produce innovative music. Similar points were put to me at the Dubstep talk at the Great Escape where the speakers explained that many musicians who use home recording technologies send them off to professional studios for mastering (personal communication, May, 2009). This is recognised by Chris Gibson who explains that, despite the struggles of big studios,

High-level mastering and post-production facilities will survive, but are likely to remain rare, and centralized [sic] in urban areas, and they will probably not acquire the notoriety or fame of their predecessors (2005, p.205).

In dispensing with much of the creative process that established their reputation and by relegating professional input to post-production, digital and home technologies have no doubt caused significant damage to the authority of the traditional studio set-up. As Gibson points out, such changes have seen a number of high profile studios disappear completely (2005, pp.192-207). However, the fact that services such as professional mastering are being used by home recording artists does reintroduce the question of how far a high literacy for sonic packages such as Pro Tools can go towards making successful records. On one level, the skills required for mastering a record are so specialised that it is highly difficult for musicians to take on this duty successfully. For instance, in a feature for *Electronic Musician*, mastering engineer Stephen Marcussen explains:

Mastering is an interesting profession, because there’s no substitute for experience...You can be a mastering engineer with 18 months of experience, but you’re really still a babe in the woods...There is indeed a lot to learn, especially considering that mastering engineers typically must be able to handle projects in different genres of music that have diverse sonic requirements (Jenkins, 2003, para.9).

From this perspective, the mastering process would seem to be far too complicated to delegate to a non-professional, a point that is emphasised through the disaster stories told by engineers such as Paul
Elliot. In the same article, Elliot accounts how he often has to salvage tracks that have been damaged by artists trying to master their own records at home:

They go out and get an all-in-one type of box and feel they can master music for themselves... When it gets to us, sometimes the damage is already done, and they’re hoping we can improve it. We sometimes are trying to undo what’s been done (Jenkins, 2003, para.48).

By highlighting the shortcomings of ‘all-in-one’ mastering software, Elliot draws attention to an apparent gulf that exists between the standard of home recording technologies and professional studio equipment. In this way, it would seem that not only do techniques such as mastering require greater skill and sonic literacy than typical home studio tools, but they are also performed using facilities that are unobtainable to the upcoming musician. This is emphasised by Bob Ludwig, mastering engineer and ‘president of Gateway Mastering and DVD’, who outlines the equipment he needs to successfully master records:

We have six different kinds of analog [sic] play back electronics...We have Studer electronics, Ampex electronics, ATR-Services tube electronics, Cello Class A electronics, Tim da Paravicini’s Esoteric Audio Research tube amps, and most recently the famous Aria pure discrete Class A electronics that were used in the Rolling Stones hybrid-SACD reissues (Jenkins, 2003, para.25).

Combined with the fact that such equipment is used in rooms with specialised acoustics (Jenkins, 2003, para.37), it becomes clear that successfully mastering tracks is not necessarily something that can be done in the average home. This is not to say that home recording does not require significant skill in itself. On the contrary, engineers such as Paul Elliot and musicians including Jakes do stress that if the initial composition is of a poor standard then there is not much that mastering can do to improve it (Jenkins, 2003, para.52; personal communication, May, 2009). Considering such points, perhaps the most helpful way to understand the relevance of the studio in a world of home recording is to refer to established singer-songwriter Roger McGuinn. As detailed in Tara Brabazon’s text Thinking Popular Culture (2008), the man behind the Byrds asserts that with home recording tools,

You don’t have to sell out to the record company. You don’t have to get five hundred thousand dollars, or whatever, and pay them back for the rest of your life to record a record. Now, you can just get a laptop, get some software, put a microphone on it and make a record. You have to know how to do it. It does help if you’ve had 35 or 40 years of experience in the studio. But, it still levels the playing field so artists can record their own stuff (Brabazon, 2008, p.233).

In this statement, McGuinn emphasises the importance of knowledge in both traditional recording techniques and those possible from home technologies. By doing so, he presents the argument that the potentialities for recording high-quality and innovative music are greatly expanded when the musician has strong literacies of both the professional and home recording studio.
It appears then that the traditional studio still has a significant role to play in the future creation of music. This is emphasised by the case of the Yellow Fish Music Group, a business that lets out a large recording studio near Lewes in East Sussex. Speaking to the company’s director Ross McCracken, he explained that the advent of home recording has actually provided surprising benefits. For instance, McCracken stated that he is now receiving many clients who will begin recordings using their own equipment at home and then use the studio and its resources to improve it (personal communication, May, 2009). Instead of charging the larger sums that the likes of Olympic studios required to complete a record, Yellow Fish is able to offer various different services, such as mastering, rehearsing and recording, that artists can use to enhance their home recorded tracks (Yellow Fish, 2009, para.1-6). Other examples that demonstrate the continuing relevance of the studio in the 21st Century include Jack Kingslake’s Hi-Road studio which aims to inspire young people in deprived areas of Bristol (Reeves, 2009, pp.78-80).

Like a number of studios across the world, the demise of Olympic in London is symbolic of a number of changes facing the modern day music industry. While developments in digital technology and the increased accessibility to home recording tools have eroded the dominance of these institutions, it would be an exaggeration to state that they have killed them off completely. Instead, it is more helpful to see the rise of these new technologies as one of many factors that are changing the role of the traditional studio in the 21st Century. Such factors also include the studio’s economic viability which seems set to be increasingly uncertain in the current global recession. Despite this, it does seem premature to state that the traditional studio is now irrelevant. As musicians John Frusciante and Moby have pointed out, while digital and home recording technologies have enabled more people to make music, they cannot completely emulate all the benefits of the studio. Accordingly, there are now many artists who use the professional studio in conjunction with their home recording tools to create high-quality records. While this negotiation between the two arenas has seen the professional studio lose much of its influence in the making of music, it does still have an important role to play in the industry.

Notes

1. PRS for Music is the recently re-branded name for ‘the two royalty collection societies’ MCPS (Mechanical Copyright Protection Society) and the PRS (Performing Rights Society) (PRS for Music, 2009, para.1).

2. The importance of training for studio staff is emphasised by mastering engineer Bob Ludwig who states: ‘For me, it’s essential for an engineer to be a musician as well...All of our engineers...play an instrument and have at least a four-year degree from a school that specializes [sic] in making music as well as recording and producing...’ (Jenkins, 2003, para.36).

3. To define this term, it is helpful to refer to Comstock and Hocks who explain sonic literacies as ‘the ability to identify, define, situate, construct, manipulate, and communicate our personal and cultural
soundscapes’ (n.d., para.2). Sonic literacies then covers how we comprehend and interact with various forms of sound and the sources that create it. This includes an understanding of how sound can be used and manipulated through different sonic media such as radio, podcasts and, in the case of this study, home recording technologies (Comstock and Hocks, n.d., para.2-3; Brabazon, 2007, pp.103-129).

4. Mastering is most commonly understood as the process where recordings are transferred to their final medium for distribution (BBC, n.d., para.1). This will often involve the expertise of a mastering engineer who, through techniques such as ‘balancing, equalizing’ and ‘compressing’, will attempt to improve the audio and musical quality of a song (Jenkins, 2003, para.7).

5. In outlining the extensive equipment available to the professional mastering engineer, it is important to note that changes are taking place in this area too. As put to me by musician and academic Stephen Mallinder, digital technologies are replacing analogue tools and in doing so are introducing new skills and literacies that must be learnt by engineers and producers (personal communication, July, 2009). This is a fascinating subject and one that I am keen to explore in future work.

6. Another point of contention in the home recording - professional studio debate is found in the ways in which music in now being listened to in the 21st Century. For instance, Stephen Mallinder explained to me that traditional features of recorded music such as ‘warmth’ and ‘perceptions of frequency range are lost on consumers who will listen through mini-headphones, lap top speakers etc’ (personal communication, May, 2009). Similarly, in an article tracing the decline of standards in production and mastering, Robert Levine also draws attention to the point that producers are changing the ways they mix records ‘to compensate for the limitations of MP3 sound’ (2007, para.15). As Stephen explained to me, such developments make high-quality recordings part of ‘a niche market like many other traditional areas of cultural production’ (personal communication, May, 2009). With 110 million singles being downloaded in 2008 alone (BPI, 2009, para.2), the question of whether effective mastering is now necessary is one that requires further research.

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Is Nothing Sacred?
Privatization and the Person.

By John O’Carroll and Chris Fleming

Abstract

This essay develops a hypothesis concerning both privatization itself and its relation to modernity. Privatization-in-general (as opposed to the 1980s manifestations we still call privatization) had its genesis in the sixteenth century Reformation and counter-Reformation. From this theological space, it unfolded in a distinctively moral way through a variety of theatres, and as it did so, it found in each of these a new articulation. Arising in what was then becoming “the West,” it had a determined character, in that in an anthropological sense it was closely linked to the Judaean-Christian notion of the sacredness of the person. As a result, as privatization carved – and carves – its ongoing paths through these theatres – philosophical, economic, legal, educational, aesthetic, political – it threatens existing orders, even as it holds out the promise of ever-new versions of the private (and its opposites, the public, the social, and so on). The authors contend that this view of privatization proffers a new way of grasping and defining modernity itself (although it is beyond the purview of the essay to do more than indicate the shape of such definition). The account offered limits itself to showing the moral nature and genesis of privatization, and explores examples of its emergence in selected fields. It does so in a spirit of hypothesis and illustration, rather than of demonstration or exhaustiveness.

Privatization-in-General

This essay offers a revision of privatization, situates it anew, and suggests a certain re-valuation of its values. Once, not so very long ago, what was called “privatization” was seen as a shocking thing, something that many considered as cheapening the things most “sacred” in our emphatically secular society. Now, though, the immediacy of that threat (or promise) has receded, supplanted by dismay at the excesses of what is widely diagnosed to be corporate greed. In taking stock of privatization, we seek to make sense not just of late twentieth century public asset sales, but of a wider privatizing logic. Strangely enough, the advent of the global financial crisis allows us to do this, as the collapse in equity prices from 2006-2009 has done rather more than make it seem pointless – it has brought a little more of the wider logic into public view – and made our own analytic task a little easier.
Privatization, we have long been told, is the process of selling public assets to the private sector – and so it is. More precisely, there is a limited historical truth in the narrow Thatcherite formulation, and the process of transferring public assets to the private sector must at least be included in the wider account we ourselves intend to give of the matter. But before this idea ever existed in the minds of economists and protestors, there had already been many waves of other kinds of privatization – some unremarked, others sites of great anguish. In drawing these varieties together, we can see that privatization is one of the long-standing engines of modernity itself; it drives much change that can be called “modern” and affects all areas of “modern society.”

Where the kind of privatization that leads to electricity companies or airlines being sold by government agencies to private bidders is a narrow form of it, we are principally interested in a deeper and more general logic. Privatization, for us, is a qualified general process with many specific, local, and particular dimensions. It is qualified because it has not existed since time immemorial; rather, it emerges as a definable and yet only partially visible – moral and epistemic – logic from the sixteenth century. Some sociologists call it “privatism,” and some such dictionaries enjoin us not to confuse the words (Marshall 1994: 417-18). The nuance is understandable, as it distinguishes a narrow economic derivation from a wider social process. But the nuance is not just pedantic; it is wrong, for (at risk of repetition) privatization-the-economic-policy is a derivative of privatization-in-general. To rename it is actually to neglect one of its important variants. Other sociologists who do use the term say that it refers to the way “people live their lives less in public and more in private or with the family. For example, religion is said to be now less a matter of public acts of worship and more a question of private prayer or privately held beliefs” (Abercrombie et al. 1988: 195). We believe it essential that this shift is included in the purview of the term as it is part and parcel of the wider process we will hereafter call privatization-in-general. Tracing privatization-in-general entails interpreting it in terms of the sacred, an anthropological structure that manifests itself in the cultural and moral order of the society.

The vistas we survey and some of the claims we make may seem sweeping – our essay, though, has the quality of hypothesis, and of an effort to render existing long-standing conceptions of key terms – privatization, modernity, society, individualism, and the public – consistent with one another. In particular, we are concerned to speculate on an alignment between different orders of privatization on the one hand, and of modernity on the other. This involves thinking about the genesis of both – and this is sometimes as much a matter of clarifying the object of discourse, as it is of making some new historical discovery. The need is self-evident – as there really is a lack of clarity concerning the objects of discussion. The case of “modernity” is starkest of all. For many, perhaps most, historians, modernity is self-evidently associated with capitalism and the industrial revolutions in the eighteenth century. Others would see it as arising even later, when distinctive political states take shape and “modern” political movements arise. Without denying the importance of the events that took place at these times, we propose an earlier date. We do so knowing that the date we propose only holds for certain purposes, and that at least part of the value of any inquiry like this one lies in the alignments it establishes.

A further difficulty concerns articulating the essential character and the connections between the general
forms of modernity and of privatization. This is so because the natures of both modernity and privatization are often elusive, appearing as things other than themselves. To use Charles Taylor’s apt term, their “sources” are difficult to see. Modernity seems to be a matter of polity and of technology, but is not only that. Privatisation, similarly, appears to concern either a limited sociological issue (the rise of a notion of private as opposed to public life) or a business practice (privatisation in the narrow sense), but it is something far wider. Yet while such dimensions are almost always partially hidden, we can nonetheless point to their presence. This is because, usually by negation, privatization reveals ever-new versions of the sacred, both in the new possibilities for personhood that it throws up, and in the way it casts aside redundant forms. In so doing, it reveals the sacred itself in a new light, one not to be found in cathedrals or supposedly holy books. Instead, it lies in the deep value Western societies in the Judaeo-Christian tradition attach to personhood and to freedom.

In this respect, the sacred lives on in secular society, and has the same terrifying potential it always had. As Casáreo Bandera’s perceptive book, the Sacred Game notes in passing, secular visions of the world operate in farcical naivety of the reasons for their fictions, and they “march confidently in one direction while thinking they are going in exactly the opposite one” (32). The modern sacred, indeed, reveals itself in the searing waves of privatization-in-general, as over and over again the curved and bloodied knife of individuation carves and re-carves the very fabric of the theatres of the world – economic, political, legal – and does so in the name of our freedom, and thereby, our personhood.

Sacred Shock: the Site of the Person

Our enabling hypothesis is simple enough – the basis of all privatization lies in challenges to the sanctity – or sacrality – of the person. When the narrow policy of privatization broke on the world stage in the 1980s, in the form of Thatcherism (Britain), Reagonomics (the US) and Rogernomics (New Zealand), many were inclined to pose the keynote question that signifies the relationship of privatization in general to the person: is nothing sacred? Would they one day sell their grandmothers along with the family silver? This, a response structure, is already an indication of the moral dimension of privatization in the narrow sense; many forget, however, that privatization’s strongest political advocates also had “moral” agenda – something manifested in the shockwave it created. The shock of privatization was the shock to human dignity affronted by the “sale of the public” to the “private.” Equally, for its proponents, it held out a moral promise.

Calling “privatization” moral entails rethinking what kind of “thing” it is – and seeing this “thing” at work in the already-accepted forms of the term. An Australian writer commenting on Thatcherism in 1980s Britain remarked that privatization “entailed curtailing of spending on welfare to promote a return to family-based responsibility, and encouragement of popular capitalism through maximizing share ownership in the community as well as ownership of land and housing” (Wiltshire, 1987: ix). Sketching this context, Wiltshire goes on to remark that this was a government that had links with the then “New Right” position...
in the United States, especially with its “strong stance on moral issues and on a hankering for the free
interplay of market forces and the issues of economics— laissez faire” (1987: 5). We find the same nexus
in other, more pragmatically-oriented economics accounts too:

The rise of Thatcherism and Reaganomics succeeded in advocating the virtues of
private enterprise, private initiative and private motive. It emphasized rolling back the fron-
tiers of the state in order to promote an efficient and free society. The ethics of privatization is
based on the validity of private as opposed to state property rights; as such, the emphasis on
privatization did not occur in an intellectual vacuum. (Gupta, 2000: 22)

In both accounts, an “ideological” variant or basis is identified, but this only quarantines us from seeing
that privatization of this kind is also primarily (and before it is anything else), a moral activity. Such then
is our enabling hypothesis: in order to delineate what kind of thing privatization of the Thatcher variety is,
we contend that it is primarily a moral process concerning the sacred nature of the person. For us, therefore,
Thatcherite privatization is at least as much akin to activities associated with the Reformation as it
ever has been to “the government” – let alone imagined “privatization” policies like we find on taxation
or the environment. Its bases are not efficiency, except insofar as that is a moral virtue; the return to “family-based responsibility” cited above provides a moral, not merely political, basis.

The Moral and the Sacred

If privatization has an insistent moral aspect, we need now to pause to emphasize what this means: put
bluntly, the moral always touches upon the sacred – even in those societies that imagine themselves to be
entirely secular\textsuperscript{iv} in nature. Indeed, in the sphere of human aggregation that characterizes modernity, we
can place less trust in words like “social” or “society” or even “public” as strongly as we can upon the
logic of privatization itself. In short, privatization of the Thatcherite kind was just another wave of privat
\textit{ization-in-general}. Later, when we consider the work of Richard Sennett, we return to the significance of
the reference to the family. But already, we see in this moral discourse, a “social” location. The location
is the jagged and always constitutive split between private and public (the division itself constitutes the
two domains). As Mark Kingwell puts it in his \textit{A Civil Tongue}:

\begin{quote}
No public/private distinction is a neutral property, nor are its limits fixed or perma-
nent, nor again is control of its placement a trivial issue. Yet such a distinction does exist, and
we make this clear every single day of our social lives: the gap between person and citizen is
the gap between the perfection of the moral vision each of us (or each group of us) is commit-
ted to pursuing, and the limitations and compromise that result from sharing social space with
others of divergent commitment. (1995: 47)
\end{quote}

If we do not endorse Kingwell’s contention that difference is \textit{the} engine that explains all this (for there are
symmetries that are just as generative), there is real value in his attempt to define the distinction between a person and a citizen. In his hands, the former has private and the latter social bases; but, as he also recognizes in the above lines, these two are historically contingent, and the line between public and private roles can and does change.

In relation to the case of privatization in the narrow sense of economic policy, what is most telling about its moral basis is its affective structure. Privatization in this sense was experienced by many people in Thatcher’s Britain as a deeply shocking, even traumatic, structure. But this is ambivalent, as we must expect with moral formations. Others who went through this time did not so much endure as profit by it. Moreover, they found the experience bracing and exciting, as it afforded new and hitherto unthought vistas and possibilities. Like all waves of privatization, then, narrow privatization affected the person personally. The unsettling affect, the sense on the one hand of limitless promise, and on the other, of old world views fading, or being contumaciously cast aside – all these things are features of true privatization.

How, though, can the sacred dimension we see so far only in its dimension of negation, be grounded? We contend that privatization is not just a matter of economic (eg. Thatcherite) subjects, but of persons, and we contend that this conception of the person as sacred did – and must have – pre-existed the rise of the modernity on which we can now retrospectively say that same modernity was founded. The Judaeo-Christian nature and vintage of personhood is explored by Linda Zagzebski in her history of that structure. She cites Kant’s differentiation in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* between things that have dignity and things that have price: a thing that has a price is exchangeable; something which has no equivalent has a dignity (2001: 402). The Kantian schema continues to have relevance, but in a problematic way. Zagzebski suggests that without something like the Christian basis it emerged from to ground it, schemas like Kant’s are swept away by the advancing regime of price. In our view, of course, she is correct. Privatization is framed by a moral discourse, and our hypothesis is that this is most certainly not something that starts with Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan.

### Genesis

We now begin a three-part sketch of historical dimensions of the early unfolding of privatization-in-general. In this first section, we deal with the founding sacred aspect, the “moral” genesis of privatization. In the next, we deal with its articulation, what we have called its “philosophical” genesis. Then we turn (briefly) to the inauguration of legal/economic conceptions of the private. Only then will our contentions be robust enough to articulate the “social” dimension, and the issues of individual crisis (anomie) that afflict us today.

By the time of the English civil wars, privatization was in its true and most general sense, already well under way. We need to begin a little earlier than this, to see its departure points in theological contestation. Let us begin by establishing a few limits, if only to clarify what it is that we are suggesting. Obviously,
Jesus Christ’s imperative to “render unto Caesar” could be said to inaugurate – or at least express – a certain kind of privatization of religion; and Epictetus’s stoic philosophy of ataraxia, predicated as it is on a personal detachment from what lies outside the individual’s control, relies on an interior will. Our choice of the Reformation as a point of focus here is partly pragmatic, partly analytically derived. Surely, all the abovementioned lines of inquiry are relevant to a full consideration of privatization, one whose brief is broader than what we’ve delimited here. Here we restrict ourselves to examining the logics of privatization and their genesis – their institutional and theoretical corollaries in modernity – in order to contribute to broader debates about the emergence of modernity and its links with privatization.

We are certainly not the first to seek to understand when or how modernity begins. Theodore Rabb, for instance, seeks to identify the endpoint of the Renaissance which, in his view, is also the dawn of modernity. In his excellent little history, The Last Days of the Renaissance, he contends that Luther’s work marks the end of the Renaissance, and that his was in its inception an inherently Renaissance project (2006: 112). We endorse his attempt to push the genesis of modernity back beyond where most historians (especially Marxist or economically oriented ones) are prepared to contend. We would add, though, that there is a further need to speculate that the devastating effects of Luther’s project might themselves be the first wave of privatization – and it is to these dimensions that we now turn.

Theological Genesis

We begin our account of the moral transformation of privatization in the first wave, which is most visible in philosophy and the politics of the subject. We do this in full awareness that for many in the field of politics and other such social sciences, modernity comes much later. Yet the historical priority of the moral transformation of the early Reformation manifests itself within a century in legal – and “political philosophy” – discourses.

Of all our arguments concerning privatization, the one the basis of which is already established is the series of theological controversies that devastated Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. We call this entire process theological privatization. Theological privatization did not remain confined to the Protestant religions, but inflected mimetically the Catholic Church too, especially in the reactive counter-reformation that followed. The crucial shift lay in the emphasis on the personal relationship to God. From the point of view of this analysis, this relationship as actualized in the first of many ways in the Reformation, and Martin Luther’s ultimate break with the Roman Catholic Church.

What caused the shift? As to what led to this to take place, Charles Taylor writes perceptively of the early stirring of “reform” well before the onset of the Reformation itself:

The Reformation is the ultimate fruit of the Reform spirit, producing for the first time a true uniformity of believers, a leveling up which left no further room for different speeds.
If salvation by faith had been the issue of ultimate importance, co-existence might have been conceivable. But where the driving force was reform, a split in Christendom was inevitable. It was reform, further inflamed by a hatred of idolatry, which animated the grim-faced worshippers Erasmus saw emerging from the Church in Basel. (Taylor, 2007: 77).

The grim-faced worshippers, of course, were the earliest privatizers, the ones whose campaign changed everything. Taylor’s observation that far from producing heterogeneity, that this was a leveling of belief is entirely consistent with what we might expect in the dawn of modernity and of the privatizing moral order. Accompanying the change, as Taylor has pointed out in many places (including both books in our reference list), is the “inward turn”: the new Protestant, and then Counter-Reformation forces all shared in the intensification of belief, in the development of an inner sensibility, and indeed, of responsibility, to God and to self. The inward turn provides the very space for other later topographies of the subject, as the self gains shape and depth in succeeding centuries (especially in the nineteenth century).

If we see fully fledged privatization at work in the seventeenth century, we can rightly say that the process was “born” in the early Reformation. To be sure, it can sometimes be a mistake to trace the origin to the point at which the “idea” becomes thinkable, because this is to apply retrospective force to a history that was not realized or evident. The climate of reform in the Middle Ages, that Taylor alludes to (2007: 77), do no more than afford potentialities that need external realization. The nuance is important, because, as John Milbank insists, to see the origin as coinciding with the first moments of potentiality is to make a category error of sorts with history:

If Christianity ushers in the modern world, then, right from the start, Christianity must be understood in these terms. Thus Troeltsch and Weber fail to see individualism, voluntarism, fideism, and Kantian ethicization as contingent changes in Christian doctrine and ethos, but project these things back into the beginnings of Christianity and even the Old Testament. The history of the West is turned into the always-coming-to-be of liberal Protestantism or its secular aftermath. (1994: 93)

There is a difference between the claim that privatization is a potential structure of early Christianity, and seeing this as a destiny. Further we should avoid being tempted to conclude that early Christian theological structures map without residue onto contemporary problematics and social realities (thus mirroring the mistake fundamentalists invariably make – of reading Genesis as though it were an incipient counter-Darwinism, a sacred text lying in wait for the historical appearance of its adversary), and seeing those contemporary problematics and realities as relatively novel iterations of older struggles.

Equally, as to Taylor’s notion that the reform movement in much earlier Christendom is foundational, we can ourselves point to other causal factors. Certeau, for instance, points to the shock of discovery of the New World, the realization of plural belief, and an entirely new need to rethink alterity (218-19). We could also, as many have done, point to the McLuhanesque “Gutenberg galaxy” that arises with the invention of printing presses. These are co-occurring factors, all with their contribution. What arises, however, is a
space of astonishing plurality, unprecedented in history. In this respect, Certeau’s observations in the same book are extremely important. He argues that plural belief itself leads to a new and radical uncertainty, as doctrinal criteria are discredited by the very fact of their opposition...The antimony (indeed the aggressivity) among groups wins over the disputes concerning truth; it involves a scepticism that can be observed everywhere; it also prepares (and already sketches) a nonreligious type of certitude – that is, participation in civil society. Because of its fragmentation into coexisting and mutually warring churches, the values once invested in the Church appear directed toward political or national unity....Thus the nation is born. (1988: 127)

In these profound lines, we see the very genesis of the things we are seeking to establish (and even some, like nation, that we are not). The nonreligious certitude at stake for Certeau is the one that emerges after the wars of Reformation, and it is the one that is determinedly plural, and pluralizing. Once these wars had wrought their damage, the plural space of secular society gains new and modern force, with each individual entitled to his or her own “private” belief – and this is the basis of the unfolding of privatization in all the other spheres which followed. In each of these domains, we find a morally imperative dimension to the version of the private being advocated or imposed. We turn next to the philosophical articulation of private space in general (philosophy), and then in the philosophical underpinning of a morally privatized law and economics.

**Philosophical Genesis**

We use the word “philosophical” cautiously – and likewise the positioning of some of the figures we trace: Descartes and Locke in particular do not accord with the familiar picture aficionados of “politics” have long ascribed to them. What is at stake for us, though, is the articulation of key ideas – and at risk of disciplinary offence, we proceed.

In *Modernity’s Wager*, Adam Seligman suggests that “modern” culture and politics have embarked on a certain wager. Citing the late Renaissance wager by the philosopher Pascal that reason would vindicate faith, he suggests a modern equivalent: a transcendental reason founding an “authoritative loss of sacral-ity” would need for its basis a new sceptical idiom to give “modernity’s wager” any chance of success (2000: 12). In place of an apparently crumbling Christian order, he offers a new basis for a tolerant society, posing “the beginnings of a very different type of argument for tolerance and for pluralism, based not on a privatized conscience but on a sceptical one” (2000: 13). Privatization, for Seligman, refers to the retreat of religion from the public domain, becoming “more and more of the congregant’s internal value disposition” (2000: 13). The trouble, he acknowledges at the outset of his book, is that “pluralism and tolerance seem to hold only as long as religion is privatized” (2000: 13).

In seeking to name the foundations of his alternative, he does not mention Descartes, but rather the scene
of the Reformation on the one hand, and its uptake of Pyrrhonism on the other (2000: 137). The latter tradition held that “the reasons in favour of a belief are never better than those against” (Honderich, 1995: 733). But Descartes’ role in all this cannot be downplayed. His brilliant contestation and redeployment of classical scepticism, is after all, one of the reasons we recall this conjunction of periods at all (cf. Williams, 1978: 27). Seligman finds this appropriation problematic almost for this reason: it is as if he (somewhat like Rousseau in The Natural Contract) would like to play Dr Who momentarily, go back, and throw the switch in a different direction. For Seligman, the promise of a true scepticism that might be both modest and respectful involves overcoming a history of this Cartesian variety:

Historically, the emergence in the West of the argument for a tolerance based on scepticism was overtaken by three developments: (1) the liberal argument for autonomy and (2) the process of secularization itself, which obviated the very need for a religious tolerance. To this we must add (3) the Cartesian revolution, which reoriented the whole issue of certitude as well as the position of the knowing subject. The contingency of history aside, a principled tolerance is indeed a difficult position to maintain, as it would seem that people have a marked preference for some sort of certitude. (2000: 138)

And that is putting it mildly: the contingency of history—350 years worth cannot easily be set aside—nor can the desire for certitudes be ignored. While Seligman’s is an engaging thesis, it itself depends on the earlier Cartesian innovation (or something like it) to make sense, even today. For this reason, we must put our emphasis on what has actually happened, on the historical turn that launched not just an idea of tolerance, but the logic of privatization itself. If the latter is not understood, a refigured tolerance or scepticism would stand no chance whatsoever.

Yet, as Seligman seems to realize, this era, and the figure of Descartes in particular, are highly suggestive. Descartes’ solitary—and he claims unremarkable—thinker in the Discourse on Method writes his account as a “tale” of a search for truth: “In the end, I allowed myself the liberty of taking my own predicament as universal, and of concluding that nowhere in the world was there any knowledge of the kind I had been encouraged to expect” (1960: 38). In this exploration, he reasons the place of his subjectivity, as well as the possible terms of the self, and the methods appropriate to disclosing it. In particular, he takes care (‘like a man who walks along in the darkness, to go forward so slowly…that I should avoid a fall’) (1960: 48) devising rules that he can follow to effect this (1960: 50); he seeks a starting point that is “sufficiently secure” (1960: 60); thus:

I resolved to pretend that everything that had ever entered my mind was as false as the figments of my dreams. But then, immediately, as I strove to think of everything as false, I was aware of myself as something real; and observing that the truth: I think, therefore I am was so firm and so assured that the most extravagant arguments of the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I concluded that I might have no scruple in taking it as that first principle of philosophy for which I was looking. (1960: 61)
I was aware of myself as something real: with these extraordinary lines, and a refined version of scepticism to guide the inner empiricism, Descartes turns the floodlights onto the newly constituted territories of the self, territories hitherto unknown and unexplored. What is at stake as the decisive engine of this process is, of course, foundational privatization, the work of the years just before the philosopher’s birth. But the brilliance of Descartes’ insight lies in the depiction of this already-constituted terrain in a way that made it able to be thought even before the “legal” and propertied implications of the new private domain had been instantiated. From now on, he tells us (and we can very well still believe it), we can talk about knowing in a new way. What can I know for sure? Not that which I’m told, not that which I read. No: what I know is that I am here because I am aware of myself thinking about or feeling such things. Certitude is to be found within.

And what is Descartes doing in these extraordinary lines? Even as he describes his thought processes as a chain of reasoning (what would be known as rationalism), he discloses a method to us, and he teaches us that method in the process. In revealing himself as a finite person confronting the problem of his own reality, he makes us aware of ourselves as finite persons with the same problem as he has. This is the beginning of the extension from theological and philosophical terrains of the seventeenth century to a wider field of participation – one that involves teachers. Once constituted, privatization is not confined to the theological (and then Cartesian) scenes of generation or description. The private self we have just witnessed, as well as the private self generated in the Reformation’s earliest years, is transferable to the private person that reasons, and in the centuries that follow, to the legal person, to the economic person, to the voting person, to the psychological patient, and so on. Each such shift is another moment in an ongoing logic, yet each can be related to all the others. Such is the paradox of privatization: it is at once a single engine of modernity, yet each time it arises, as with these breath-taking pages from the Discourse on Method, there is a sense of palpable excitement, a situation indeed, as Descartes put it, that up until that point, “nowhere in the world” was to be found its antecedent. In turning to theatres of application, we need to see, then, that even Descartes’ analysis is itself already-applied, the first perhaps once privatization passed beyond the domain of theology.

**Genesis: Economics, Law, Morality**

Let us, in turning to the fields of economics and law, see how the moral dimension of the private impinges upon the conception in each case, and does so in a way relevant to us today. In the field of “economics” (if we remember these are also the dying days of kingship), values and equivalences were differently ordered and conceived, and philosophers themselves often dealt with economic matters. vi

At stake is a new order of private ownership, with legal and economic dimensions. The idea of *habeas corpus* had circulated for many years (it is a phrase in Latin in the subjunctive mood meaning “you may have the body”). The act, however, had the very particular effect of insisting that a person be brought forth rather than being held indefinitely. Passed as it was in England in 1679, it legalized a new conception of
the subject. The modest idea that there might be some legal right to “the body” is less modest if we recall the fact that the right to our control of our own belief is also, at the same time, being won.

The effect of *habeas corpus* itself was not just legal. It had many ramifications, and is itself part of a wider rethinking of the order of things and of subjects. Witness Locke in the late seventeenth century: “Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself” (1966: 15). What is at stake is both the basis of one’s right to one’s own self, and the need to say that this right in inalienable. Locke goes on to elaborate some consequences:

> The labour of his body and the work of his hand we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. (1966: 15)

The reasoning process is crucial: the fact it is possible to think this way shows how far privatization has already developed. Not only am I my own private person, I am so because I own myself. (Locke’s “I” that owns is retrospectively and circularly, albeit in a social context, confirmed in and by the fact of ownership-capacity, as a subject). Then, because I own myself, the things this “myself” makes are also mine, because they are made with my labour, which I also own. Moreover, even if the materials I take are to start with, publicly owned, the act of “annexing” to these materials my labor also makes whatever I produce mine, and mine alone. Already fully formed in this contention is an idea of private (versus “common”) property, an idea of the discrete self that is (we are told elsewhere and by implication here) free, as well as the possibility that by my owning something, I might trade it for something someone else, by the same process, has made (1966: 25).

Locke’s argument – and those like it – are fundamental to a variety of moral and legal debates, as well as to ongoing cultural anxieties. These surface and resurface unpredictably in terrains beyond economics. Sometimes, indeed, they re-emerge in surprising forms, on moral terrain. Take, for instance, the “pro life” and “pro choice” debate in the United States. The 1973 Roe v. Wade decision declared unconstitutional the Texas statute outlawing all abortions (except where the life of the mother was threatened). “Jane Roe’s” challenge to the Supreme Court was upheld on the basis that a woman possesses an inalienable right to act in her own self-interest, as determined the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This clause “protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.” With twenty-six mentions of “privacy” in its ruling – and other linguistic permutations like “private” – the Supreme Court concluded: “Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision.” In turn, the argument of the Roe v. Wade decision itself relied on a legal precedent established by the 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut decision. This determined that the state had no right to proscribe the taking of contraceptive pills by married women – an assertion guaranteed by the right of couples to self-determination. And this
claim was itself underwritten by – and now we shouldn’t even feign surprise – the “constitutional right to privacy.”

In Locke and in Hobbes, we see that privatization is producing a new conception of the public sphere. Hence perhaps another dimension to our compound hypothesis on privatization: the public is an effect of privatization, not a site of foundational significance as it once had been. It exists still as a spectral domain, an echo of its former self (and it is significant that the word “common” is used where we would often now say public; these terms were not yet quite aligned). As privatization proceeds in its new work of micrological reconfiguration, it throws up ever-new conceptual aggregations. These heaps are always constituted by abstractions, but they are not devoid of meaning – and what they name is not abstract. They include such things as “families,” “society,” “classes,” “community,” “workplace cultures,” “generations” and so on. These terms, and ideas, represent a base lingua franca of privatization, and we cannot understand a phase of privatization without them. What is important though is that these ideas (even including as we will see later the idea of the public itself) make no sense on their own terms, and this is especially so when we find manifesto-style declarations of their significance. But they are important in one sense: they are a powerful diagnostic corollary, a symptomatology of the person under privatisation. Privatization is an iterated logic, not a single thing, and while we must understand its gathering force, we need also to understand the power and shock of its always-local manifestations. Nowhere is the shock greater than in the rise, and then the destruction, of various forms of the social and of the public domain – and it is to these issues that we now must direct our attention.

“Social” and “Economic” Genesis: Milton to Sennett

We now take up the question of the public. What, after all, is the public? Posed in this form, it is tempting to reply, why it is nothing at all. But the question is wrongly cast. Even if one accepted the power of privatization over what is called the “social,” a critic should ask, what of the public arena? This, surely, predates the era of privatization, and indeed, of the social. We need to ask rather, how does the public domain come to be in this era? Put like this, we can answer very plainly: the public, whatever its antiquity, is in the modern era always a subordinated effect of privatization. This is true also of other agglomerative formations: the social, the community, the polity. But the effect is more shocking in the case of the public, as this is a field in which its very historical legacy deceives us into thinking it exists as it always did.

Some will look askance at such a claim. Others will recognize that great aggregative abstractions like “society” did not even exist in the modern sense prior to the nineteenth century, something Margaret Thatcher realized, even without reading, when she announced that there was simply “no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families” (Thatcher 426). Other fields, like the polity, are creatures of the Leviathan, seventeenth century augmentations of older formations that very quickly occlude earlier versions. This makes them all very derivative structures. But, one could very validly reply, what about the public? That surely has a very old sense, one dating back to antiquity, and is
not to be discounted.

Let us think about the public in terms of what its function was. We do not need to look back to antiquity to find what we mean: witness these lines from the seventeenth century poet, John Milton. Milton, like Locke, at once modern and somehow also caught in the weft of earlier idioms, offers a strong insight into what the ancient idea of fame may have meant. Witness these lines from “Lycidas,” his poem lamenting the death of a friend, and reflecting on the significance of human endeavour: “Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise (That last infirmity of Noble mind)” (1938: 58). What do these lines mean? In the poem, Milton is wondering why anyone would bother with art when we could all lie around on the grass. Then the above lines suggest that “fame” might be a motivation for a clear mind. A clear mind? The point is that “fame” was seen as something worth striving for by people of higher talent and character. To be sure, the following line qualifies it as an “infirmity,” but it is the last one, before we get to the religious motives. The pattern is repeated everywhere in pre-seventeenth century society. Fame implied the public, and thereby, a kind of immortality on earth.

We now think of the public as a space. This is a modern and stripped back version of what it used to be. As Milton well remembered (though it was by then already a fading star), the public domain used also to imply a kind of time—immortal time. In Milton’s age, these were rather more recent memories, and his own quasi-heretical understanding of Christianity leant back into many earlier (including classical) traditions. Milton is a hinge between eras in that he reminds us of the grandness of fame, and thereby of the classical and postclassical conception of the public. In this space-time, there is radical continuity between the here and now and the hereafter. The proof, if such were needed, lay in the fact that the greats of the ancient world were still read, and in the original languages. Yet the grinding of privatization was already under way, and with it came a re-carved public, its temporality initially simply peeled away, to become ossified tradition. By the twentieth century, the site of the public was an utterly ephemeral one, in which fame was a temporary thing, in a gallery of equally banal arts whose chief merit lay not in the temporal conception (which was only the meteoric moment of youthful success), but in its existence as a space.

We use this term as the media theorist, Harold Innis intended it (and we do so in keeping with our footnote reference to Benedict Anderson above). For him, media are either ways of binding people across time (be it the genealogies of families or the inscription of pyramids) or across space (like the newspaper, something read in a defined space but not over a long period of time). Innis’s argument, with which we very much concur, is that given social orders have a bias one way or the other (towards space, towards time). It is certainly an easily deployable idea. Celebrity culture as a whole is a convenient index of just how far the bias in favour of space has strengthened in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Be it the travails of Paris Hilton or Britney Spears, fame-seventeenth century style is no longer the key. Where many commentators are concerned about its unearned nature, so busy are they in passing moral judgement, they miss its essential ingredient. Celebrity differs from fame of Milton’s kind in that it is ephemeral and ubiquitous. In one sense, this reflects shifts in media of transmission. Time-binding media – like pyramids (or epics by Homer, Virgil, and Milton) – endure over eras, finding audiences in generations always still to come. Space-binding media on the other hand are disseminated to everyone immediately, and then
forgotten tomorrow.

Yet beyond the purely structural determinism of Innis or McLuhan, we can also point to the moralizing energies at stake in all these celebrities: Hilton and Spears are moral privateers – and our fickle fascination with them hinges on the clash between their public personas and their private struggles and frailties; like the victims of myth, communal perception and representations of them waver between reverence and loathing (Cf. Fleming 52, 59-60). So too are all the true celebrities, who are such not because of their artistic or sporting talent etc, but rather, because of the potential moral transformations they exert on all of us. When interviewed, successful sportsmen and women talk only of work, diligence, and sacrifice – never of genetics, happenstance, or ambivalence; and none would dare admit, after winning, that it’s “only a game”; only “losers” can respectably articulate this view. In other words, the celebrity always promises to offer us some lesson – positive or negative – in virtue.

Understandably, perhaps, many have voiced their concern about how increasing “celebritization” changes the public arena negatively – or perhaps even spells the end of the public arena. Some have offered their laments, and it is easy to become dismissive. Concerning this, however, it is precisely now that we should not be glib or inattentive. Rather, we need to explore existing conceptions of the public, to offer further analysis of “where it has gone,” or indeed, to see whether it ever was. In our view, no one has written of this demise with more perspicacity and care than Richard Sennett. His *Fall of Public Man* addresses the issue of the private directly and in ways that approach the terms we need to understand privatization. Because he sees the process of privatization as driven purely by what he calls the “impact” of capitalism on public life, he interprets all privatizing switches in terms of division and breakdown. In this respect, he does not see that his reified category—public life—has become as spectral as the other aggregates he goes on to condemn (community, in particular). The categories Sennett uses are largely sociological; we recognize Weber, Simmel, Tönnies in his nuanced accounts of charisma, social personality, and Gemeinschaft. Yet he shows that the private/public configuration has a distinctly modern structure.

In the process of showing this, Sennett’s brilliant anthropological insight is to grasp the link between the sundering of natural and cultural domains on the one hand, and private and public domains on the other. In terms that resonate profoundly with Charles Taylor’s accounts of the history of human rights, and also with the work of Benedict Anderson, Sennett suggests that the private itself has a genesis. It was not, he contends, “born full-grown”:  

The geography of the capital city served its citizens as one way to think about nature and culture, by identifying the natural with the private, culture with the public. By interpreting certain psychic processes as in expressible in public terms, as transcendent, quasi-religious phenomena…they crystallized for themselves one way…in which natural rights could transcend the entitlements of any particular society. The more the opposition of nature and culture through the contrast of private and public became tangible, the more the family was viewed as a natural phenomenon. (1977: 90)
Prior to the advent of the private in this sense, public and private were “not so much contraries as alternatives” (1977: 98). The split in this “molecule” (as he calls it) he traces from the eighteenth century. We see now that Thatcher’s reference to the family is no quirk of personality or history; it is at the root of the reconfiguration of the public that Sennett describes, and is to be linked to privatization-in-general.

Sennett dates the transformation from the eighteenth century. To do this, he has to set aside a number of obvious—and in our view, definitive—objections. Surely, we object, the shift occurs much earlier, in the failed revolutionary projects of English Puritanism (and republicanism), or in the legal constitution of the subject-as-individual, or at least Locke. Sennett cannot avoid the latter since the crucial catalyst in his view is the rise of a notion of liberty. This, then, is how he deals with Locke:

What would happen, then, is an idea of rights in society took hold….When people in the 18th century began to toy with the notion of liberty, they began to experiment with an idea outside this context [the natural order of moderation]. Liberty as a principle, a structure of social relations, could be encompassed neither by the idea of convention nor by the idea of natural sympathy. To be sure, earlier social-contract theorists like John Locke preached an idea of natural liberty, but it could not be practised easily. When such an idea was introduced into ordinary social life, the molecule of public and private could be broken. (1977: 99)

We view this a little differently. The “molecule” is itself a misleading metaphor, even if the picture Sennett wants to paint of the society where individual and private were not yet aligned in opposition to public is perfectly valid. The point is, as he says himself, that in the earlier state of things, private and public were not contraries; they were different facets of the same thing.

This is why our line of questioning is different from Sennett’s. Instead of asking how “the social broke in two,” into the domains of private and public, we ask how the process of privatization began, and when the idea of the private emerges as a descriptor for a distinct domain of transacted reality. In response to this question, we are actually able to be guided by Sennett’s own assertion that the private was not “born full-grown.” That is to say, in the spirit of anthropological hypothesis, we say both that it was “born” (had an origin) and it was not fully formed at the moment of that origin. In this respect, the seventeenth century is a far more suggestive place to look that Sennett thinks, and even it turns out to be a staging post in the process of privatization which is “born” in the preceding century, and has its ancestry in the post-Renaissance onset of modernity itself.

Capitalism and Privatization: The Moral Significance of Anomie

We have seen, throughout this essay, the way in which the narrow privatizations of the 1980s can be related to privatization-in-general. We have also argued that privatization has occurred in a range of sometimes apparently unrelated spheres. This is why we have spoken of the logic of privatization. It would be
easy, as we have done so far, to say no more about the relationship of economic conditions to privatization to privatization-in-general than we have pointed out in our analysis of Thatcherism. Yet in the spirit of an open and compound hypothesis, we see value in tracing the return of the private to the very sense of self, and in our times at least, of the self in crisis.

Emile Durkheim’s powerful study of suicide appeared at the turn of the twentieth century and offers a profound thesis about the relationship between the order of society, economic conditions, and the sense of self. This turns on his idea of *anomie*, which is the word he uses for the existential malaise which envelops the modern subject where and when social norms become blurred and unclear. Anomie, our readers will recognize swiftly, is a symptom of privatization: it is the name for the shock that happens in any given wave of privatization, in any field. In Durkheim’s hands, though, he has concentrated his interest in this phenomenon in the field of economic change.

His two volume work outlines a succession of usually-advanced theses on suicide (from psychological and cosmic factors to mimetic contagion), but treats all of these as inadequate on their own. He then, in the second volume, advances four varieties of suicide: the egoistic, the altruistic, the anomic, and the regulatory. These four are in fact two pairs. The egoistic suicide is a result of breakdown in established socio-theological order, as we find in the privatization of spirit. His example is Protestantism, in which he locates far higher suicide rates than in Catholic countries and locations. His formulation that the “Protestant is far more the author of his faith” is a description of pure and *originary* privatization (1950: 158). Moreover, as people have to “think through” their own solutions, there can also be found a higher rate of suicide among more educated people than those living in dire poverty. The altruistic suicide—an ongoing example of which is the Indian bride who commits suicide after her husband’s death—is to be opposed in a binary sense to the suicide of ego. Where the former is caused by the breakdown of community, the community’s norms themselves cause the latter. What we see in the first pairing, then, is that these are linked to the original forms of privatization, the first as its process, the second as what it breaks down.

The other pair are examples of derived privatization, and work in exactly the same way. Anomie is result of the breakdown in norms that results from economic or political change:

> Man’s characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts is not physical but moral; that is, social. He is governed not by a material environment brutally imposed on him, but by a conscience superior to his own, the superiority of which he feels. Because the greater, better part of his existence transcends the body, he escapes the body’s yoke, but is subject to that of society. But when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transitions; thence comes the sudden rises in the curve of suicides which we have pointed out. (1950: 252)

Note how Durkheim’s self is itself already privatized in the scenario he outlines – with both the body and society both floating free of the self, and impinging upon its agency. The shocks Durkheim alludes to are precisely those we have sought to evoke in this essay. Strictly speaking, both poles of what Durkheim
identifies as powerfully suicide-inducing—egoism and anomie—are derivatives of privatization in general (but egoistic patterns are also, as we have said, part of the first variety that took place in the privatization of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century). What is really powerful in Durkheim’s account is the palpable sense of shock that privatization brings when massive economic or political change takes place, even when this change is for the best.

Durkheim then goes on to suggest something even more profound: change in society of the anomic kind happens from time to time and triggers an upsurge in suicides. But in the field of what he calls “trade and industry” alone, anomie is “actually in a chronic state” (1950: 254). In this respect, those who see even economic deregulation and privatization as a complete novelty would do well to pay attention to these lines: “For a whole century [1800-1900], economic progress has mainly consisted in freeing industrial relations from all regulation. Until very recently, it was the function of a whole system of moral forces to exert this discipline” (1950: 254). The religious bridle Durkheim saw as withering before the force of privatizing deregulation was, we know, succeeded by legislative frameworks. These, however, also collapsed under the weight of privatization, with very much the same effect pattern that Durkheim described. To repeat, privatization throws up many new aggregates—such as the regulatory pattern that happened after the second world war in many societies—but it can also cast these aside, and do so on the same moral basis that led to their erection in the first place.

Hypothesizing Privatization-in-General

Readers who have persisted to this point of the essay are now in a position to grasp both the nature of the hypothesis concerning privatization-in-general as well as its compound nature. For this reason, for reasons of clarity, as well as of recapitulation, we restate it on its own terms.

1. Privatization is a general process, in that it motivates and applies to many more derivative processes.

2. Privatization-in-general is a qualified process, since it has not existed since time immemorial. It had a genesis in a particular place and time, and within a particular cultural formation.

3. Privatization-in-general is an anthropologically significant process, as it describes the workings of an entire culture and belief system. The fact that this “culture” happens to be the West and that the “belief system” is a distinctively sacred-atheism (see below) does not detract from this fact. It bears noting that the fact it is part of a human group, and that it is disseminated by such groups does not make even more derivative ideas (“society” and the “public”) prevail over it.

4. Privatization-in-general is part of the sacred structure of the West, and is centred on the belief in the sacrality of personhood (a Christian notion).
5. Notwithstanding the qualifications pertaining to its genesis, privatization-in-general is in our time an almost universal process, pertaining to almost all cultures in the world today, and to all that can be called “modern” (see below).

6. Privatization-in-general and modernity in the true sense are coterminous. The former is the engine of the latter; the latter is not exhausted by the former (modernity is oriented by belief systems: hence, on the one hand, we do not discount technological innovations as having occasional motivating force in their own right; on the other hand, we would severely qualify – though not completely deny – economic determinisms).

7. Privatization-in-general motivates a series of particular orders of the private, even if these sometimes (almost always) travel under other names.

8. A particular early historical sequence is visible in the unfolding of privatization-in-general. It began exigently in the domain of the sacred – theology – in the early Reformation tracts (and responses to these tracts) of Luther. From these limited beginnings, it gained articulation – in philosophy, for want of a better word – in the resurgence of Pyrrhonism as a possibility in the late sixteenth century, and given articulation by Descartes. Within a further century, the definition of self in innovations like *habeas corpus* (law), and then in economics became possible. While we have not had space to trace it, similar profound shifts took place within the arts, and most startlingly of all, in educational pedagogy. By the end of the seventeenth century, privatization-in-general gains full force of generality in the West.

9. Privatization’s appurtenances with the sacred have peculiar force and complexity in that motivates an apparent paradox. This is the sacred nature of secularity itself in the West. We have not traced this argument in detail, but rather have given references to those who have (Zagzebski, Milbank and Bandera). The apparent secularity of the West is largely illusory in an anthropological sense, as the sacred nature of personhood remains intact.

Notes

i Like modernity itself, it is as much a logic as it is an ensemble of technologies or structure. In a related argument, we will suggest that modernity itself is most usefully viewed as an ensemble of practices that are governed principally by cultural or even, to delineate our contention, moral, logics.

ii The moral order, and not technology or economics (and so on), is the privileged domain in any exploration of the emergence of modernity. Even in sociological definitions, we find an in-eliminable moral dimension that needs explaining. Privatization-in-general drives modernity – and we need to be able to identify and to describe it wherever it appears.
Indeed, as we shall see later, some historians (like Theodore Rabb) have taken the seventeenth century itself as the dawn of modernity. For us, modernity is transformed by waves of privatization. The points of origin that we signal – the declaration of Martin Luther, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and Thatcherism – are all important in this account because for us, unlike for some others, modernity is a process and is culture-bound.

The origin of the word “secular” lies in the Christian theological distinction between the saeculum (historical time) and the eschaton (the end times)(Milbank 9).

This could be read in one of two ways: that pluralism and tolerance only hold if religion does not exert theocratic power in the public domain––or that pluralism and tolerance only hold if religion is maintained, but privately held and expressed. We’re sure that Seligman means the former – but we are also obliged to consider the second as a genuine theoretical possibility, whether Seligman intends it or not.

This, we should emphasise, is a very quick sketch.

We followed many others in saying that that privatization-in-general emerges in the sixteenth century Reformation. In its wake, we see an always nascent modernity. To repeat, this is also the first privatization in the modern sense, from which all others follow. Contract theory, like that of Locke of Hobbes is a derivative of this, but applied now to the secular domain. The contract, as others have noted, is the profane version of the covenant; the foundational link between property and the private is a transposition of terms from the sacred to the profane.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).1

References


An Interface of the Old and the New: Creating the Conscious Nigerian via an Interrogation of Sophocles’ *Antigone* in Osofisan’s *Tegonni*.

By Emmanuel Folorunso Taiwo

Abstract

Postcolonial dramatists from Nigeria betray an affection for classical drama. Many classical plays have been adapted by some of the most renowned African playwrights such as Soyinka, Walcott and Aidoo among others. Some argue that there is some kind of affinity in the two traditions especially in the role of supernatural forces/gods in the affairs of men; as well as courts and kings in both traditions. Femi Osofisan, whose play this paper explores, has also been attracted to classical drama; but he seems to critique the two worlds – of classical Athens and traditional Africa – which many African adaptations have previously embraced. In his adaptation of Sophocles’ *Antigone* (titled *Tegonni*) Osofisan subverts the Athenian world of Greek mythology to make complex arguments about the relations between colonial and postcolonial, British and Yoruba on one hand, and the military jackboots of Abacha’s era and the citizenry on the other. This essay seeks to explore the playwright’s use of the existing complexities and contradictions in his cultural environment in creating an awakening of the consciousness of the average Nigerian during the period in question.

I

Critical study of ancient dramatic texts aims at educing among other things, possible cultural kinship between the world of antiquity and the modern. Such studies draw attention to the way in which antiquity can function as agent and catalyst in the process of cultural change and exchange. In line with the above,
Greek tragedy has been adapted and interpreted in several forms globally. Indeed, African dramatists have found an affinity between Europe and the continent, in terms of cultural diversity and specificity, prompting Hardwick\(^1\) (2003) to observe that “Greek drama in performance… acts as an agent of transformation enabling us to experience simultaneously and in tension, different cultural perspectives and aspects of being. This capacity is partly a function of Greek drama’s creation of critical distance between ancient and modern, early modern, modern and post modern traditions.” This transformation by the way is a manifestation of the ways in which modern performance is structured, especially in the adaptation and staging of Greek tragedy by African dramatists, and in this case Femi Osofisan’s *Tegonni*. There is a parallel between Greek theater and the so called ‘sacred spaces’ of performance. Osofisan’s adaptation of the Greek text interacts with the dramatist’s own cultural and mythic backdrop, and his performance culture. This aptly situates his works as ‘intercultural’\(^2\) (Allain.2002.9).

Osofisan employs such performance tactics as cross-cultural casting, multilingual performance and international collaboration in realization of his ‘parody of difference.’ (Coco ferguson.2007.1). His technique of casting blurs both cultural and temporal boundaries; (this is particularly evident in *Tegonni* where *Antigone* and her retinue, raced through time and space to be part of Tegonni’s marriage procession) integrating traditional consciousness into modern sensibilities, continuing and re-inventing historical traces. In *Tegonni*, Osofisan navigates between ‘sameness and difference’\(^3\). The success of his adaptation is based on dialectics between his performance and modern audience, as they interact with the text being adapted. Okoye (2008:10) posits that Osofisan’s dramaturgy does two things at the same time, in one fell swoop, accepting and rejecting/ subverting an existing myth; in this case the myth of *Antigone* in his ‘parody of difference’ in *Tegonni*. As Hardwick (2004:219-42) further observes, “classical referents are a sign of a double consciousness which recognises both the assimilationist impact of classical texts on colonised peoples … and also the capacity of writers to use the texts and referents to create new works.” Their impact transforms “double consciousness into a more pluralistic and multi layered awareness.”

II

Every age produces its own dramatists, writers, and every practicing playwright works from a basis of some sort of practicality; especially when the audience’s preconceptions are known to the playwright and whose responses are sometimes predictable. Osofisan arguably one of the frontliners in the world of Nigerian dramatic arts, is known for his progressive stance against oppression and tyranny. His works have also betrayed sympathy for an advocacy of social change.

The fabric of his plays and other writings is usually critical of the disequilibrium in the social structure, thus always creating a conflict between the old and the new; an alternative tradition in popular literature, he says should be a model for a new society. Incidentally, most critics are hard put to determine his philosophical bent. Some writers like Niyi Osundare, see his works as having tendencies ranging from liberal through the radical to the revolutionary. But others dismiss this reading of ambiguity, perceiving rather a
Marxist leaning in the conflicts that characterize his plays.

As ideological aesthete, Osofisan constantly experiments with forms and enduring artistry to embody humanistic social, philosophy. It is this search for forms that has taken him to the primordial sources of African indigenous performative provenance.” (210)

This revolutionary tendency in Osofisan, and his advocacy for social transformation has in the words of Olu Obafemi, led the playwright to search for forms in the primal roots of African traditional mores and lore. However, his search for form is not only limited to the African traditional provenance, but also extends to the Greek world of Antiquity.

Osofisan thus exhibits his creative ingenuity in the reconstruction of history, myth and consensus opinion in an attempt to create a more acceptable paradigm for the society.

In general, adaptations of Sophocles’s *Antigone* have always brought to the fore the problems of political freedom and Human rights. This is more so, since Sophocles’s original work is steeped in political controversies. Mirroring the tragedy and politics of 5th century Athens, *Antigone* brings to the fore the issues of political despotism and possible ways of resistance. The two sons of Oedipus, Polyneices and Eteocles, kill each other in battle, one in defense of, while the latter against the state. However, Creon, the current king decrees against burying the traitor, an order that draws the ire of Antigone their sister, who vows to intern the corpse of Polyneices her brother.

Antigone’s rather brazen defiance of the tyrannical decree of Creon appears a protest by Sophocles of the abrasiveness of the gods. Torrance (1965.300) sees *Antigone* as concealing vast potentialities of unreason and chaos. This tendency in sophoclean tragedies has influenced Osofisan’s subversion of existing myth and history.

The playwright is very much at home with his audience’s preconceptions, especially their socio-cultural and political nuances. There is a preconception with the fate of humanity in the universe, especially the downtrodden. Most critics of his works, have identified in the playwright an unrelenting concern for the improvement of man and his environment through knowledge, freedom from oppression whether divinely conceived or man made.

III

Sophocles was a believer in supernatural forces, which was the traditional in Greek thought. And in his
characterization and plot he makes use of the ambiguities of religious language to express his deepest insights. In most of his plays, Sophocles paints powerful scenes of forces outside man’s control:

Sophocles’s men and women believe in
gods who are the source of everything
in life, evil as well as good. The universe
controlled by these gods is involved in a
constant process of rhythmic change, but
they themselves are outside time. (Easterling.1997: 305)

Sophocles raises fundamental issues in the relationship of man and the gods; man and his society: men worship the gods, yet cannot expect unmixed blessings; both pain and happiness. The only sure event in any human future is death; ‘tomorrow does not exist until today is safely past’ (trach.943ff.)⁷. Being pious must include respecting divine laws which are the basis for the human society; right behaviour towards others and proper worship of the gods.

For her defiance, Creon imprisons her in a rocky tomb and leaves her to die. Later when Creon decides to release her at the prompting of the seer-Teiresias, he finds she has hanged herself. The play is not simply a conflict between Creon and Antigone. But in actual fact, it is more like a classical statement on the struggle between the law of individual consciences and the central power of the state. In the fifth century Greece, such display of familial commitment is more than a private code of conduct; such challenge to constituted authority had serious political undertones. But some commentators like Webster (1936) perceive Antigone as a drama of the individual conscience, inspired with the categorical moral imperative in rebellion against the arbitrary, hence, immoral dictum of the despotic state, represented by Creon. Antigone is the standard bearer of the human conscience against the cruelty and inhumanity of established authority. But this kind of statement apparently betrays a post-renaissance view of the state and the individual; of signing a ‘social contract’. How consistent is this view with Sophocles’s disposition and perception of the state and the individual? For instance, was the polis and all it embodied in Creon’s kingship so simplistic in the view of his audience at the great Dionysia in 441B.C? Was it just a matter of bowing to ancient customs and traditions presumed to have been set down by the gods?

Perhaps, it is necessary to peer a little more into the mindset of the Athenians and by extension Sophocles.’ Athens of the fifth century saw the individual as a political animal, and so his highest good, i.e. *sommum bonum*, was tied up with that of the good of the polis. This is the pervasive theme in Plato’s uncompromising idealism in the *Republic* and Aristotle’s’ pragmatic perception of the state in the *Politics*. It becomes for the individual the first principle and point of departure in any of his dealings with the state. “The worst sin he could commit is that which introduces disruption, disharmony and corruption into the sacred precincts of the Polis” (Ferguson: 1975.43) And the penalty for this kind of sin, as recommended by both Plato and Aristotle, is not even death, but “Statelessness”, i.e. exile. This is what we perceive repeatedly in his seven extant tragedies; whose plots hinge on a tripartite principle that all men seek justice/dike: harmony and proportionality in human relations; obedience to the harmonious and proportionate laws of the gods; and
harmony and proportion in the relations of the self with the self. However, the focus of this paper is not just the ethical and moral issues of Sophocles’ world, or the question of individual ‘conscience,’ whether in private or public matters, per se, nevertheless, there is a need to examine to what extent the individual’s psyche has been awakened by the dramaturgy of Osofisan.

IV

It takes a measure of ingenuity to transmute a fifth century long Greek myth into the 19th century Nigerian socio-political atmosphere, at the dawn of imperialism. Osofisan has a peculiar conception of form, stylistic innovations and manner of organizing his plays that intrigues the reader. In his words, “I am always experimenting with form. I am discovering forms, some of which are already in use….I pay great attention to form, to manner… these have been my guiding principles in all my works”. (The drama of Osofisan.201:5).

In his treatment of Tegonni, the playwright brings to bear on the form of Antigone, his principle of reconstructing history and mythology, using to the fullest the African dramatic mode of Song and Dance, not by any less costuming. At all events, the structure of Osofisan’s plays manifests his artistic goals and the desired effect on the audience. And in this particular instance, (that of the Tegonni) his goal is a subversion/re-invention of history and myth of the Greek Antigone by Sophocles; in order “to re-examine the issue of race relations and personal courage”; and in particular, a look at political freedom against the backdrop of military jackboots in governance (Osofisan.1999:11); at the end of which he expects an improved conscious renewal of the individual and the society as a whole.

The story of Tegonni, reads just like Antigone’s; a strong-willed, fire-spitting princess of the royal house of Oke-Osun, a town in south-western Nigeria; whose brothers hacked each other to death over their father’s vacant throne. One of the brothers is given an honorable burial by the authorities, while the eldest prince Oyekunle, the dissident is left unburied, on the orders of Lt. Gen. Carter- Ross, the British governor of the colony of Nigeria. Tegonni goes ahead and buries her brother in flagrant disregard for the orders of the white Governor.

This incidentally, is where the similarity with Antigone ends. The remainder of the play betrays Osofisan’s ingenious contrivance to satisfy his goal, referred to earlier; a deliberate configuration of conflicts, occasioned through a clashing of the binary opposites—a cultural interface. While Antigone’s clash with Creon in Sophocles merely lends itself to ethico-religious hermeneutics; in which both characters functioned within the Athenian divinely ordained cultural and philosophical playing field; for Osofisan in Tegonni, the conflict/clash reveals an underlying fundamentalism: that of racial and cultural supremacy, thus bringing to the fore, the struggle for power between the individual and the state on one hand and much closer home, considering the time and circumstance of writing, the power struggle between the recalcitrant jackboots and the ‘pro-democracy movements.’ Several arguments have been proffered as Osofisan’s reason for Tegonni; nonetheless, it is obvious that the repressive political atmosphere in Nigeria at the time...
was foremost on the playwright’s mind– the crisis precipitated by military dictatorship and of annulled elections. (Raji.2005:143)

Under the circumstances, it was apparent that whatever treatment and style to be adopted for such crucial dramaturgy would be that which takes into cognizance the situation of his audience. Indeed there was need for them to be alienated from the action on stage in order to see the events in a new and more relevant light. Hence the traditional African theatrical mode, which blends with the Brechtian epic theatre, would serve his purpose. And throughout the play, one finds elements of both genres generously deployed. This can even be seen from the improvisation of the opening scene which aptly portrays an African atmosphere, where Osofisan makes a skillful use of Song and Dance, the Drum and Miming. The atmosphere is one that reinforces the ritualistic and festive aesthetics of the African theatre (Ogundeji.2000:12). Yemoja, the water goddess, is decked out in resplendent regalia, in a decorated boat, and her female attendants are also richly dressed, with mirrors; “They and the boatmen swing and sway to a song which, however, we do not hear at first”.

Eki Orekelewa
-Yemoja lau erebe!  -Honour to Yemoja!
Ileke fomo olola  Beads for the child of the rich
Yemoja lau erebe!  Honour to Yemoja! (17)

An atmosphere of informality pervades the play, right from the prologue where the director of the play engages the none-ethnic cast in finalizing the role-playing, before the already seated audience:

D: I need white actors. For the roles of Governor, his ADC, and D.O.
A: well how about me?...
A: A house of dreams! So, just a little make up, I announce my role to the audience, and we are set to go!
D: And you think that will work?
A: of course! All is illusion here, and everyone in the audience has come to play his or her own part in a dream. And dreams are where anything can happen. So give me a costume, anything to mark me out from the others, and this evening’s dream begins(13-14)

This informality tends to give away, as it were, the trade secret, baring all out in the open. But then it is a technique that is refreshing to the audience, as it captures and confers on them a feeling of being part and parcel of the action on stage. The audience is made to see the atmosphere of traditional African moonlight
folklore where every one is a participant. There is nothing of the remoteness of action which one finds in Sophocles, where a major part of the action is narrated to audience by the Chorus or Messenger. The unique style of introducing Antigone, a relic of Greek history and myth from the past, through a flashback, further enhances the flow of the theme:

A: Antigone (coming forward) Greetings.
   Has the play started?
F: Who are you, and where
do you come from?
A: My name is Antigone… it is a very long
way, through the channels of history.
The road at many points is unsafe. (25)

Yemoja was really Antigone and vice-versa! She is apotheosized—African goddess. The informality and freshness of this technique, leaves the audience/ first time reader of the work agape! It is like in the movies where anything can happen in a photo-trick. Besides, Osofisan here attempts to bring to light some hidden issues about the ancient Greek myth of Antigone. There is simultaneity in the establishment of the realism and surrealistic effect of the play on the audience through the use of this technique. The audience hears for the first time the prospect of Tegonnis’ death from Antigone; but it is a dramatic irony, at once tragic as it is anti-climactic, that the heroine is preparing for her wedding and her death. “A: Tegonni! Where’s she?
/ Y: Back in the compound there. Preparing for her wedding. / A: And for her death?” (26) This treatment is uniquely vintage Osofisan, where there is a heightening of the tragic note and combining it with the festive. In the third scene, where Greek myth meets its Yoruba/African counterpart, the conversation that ensues is interesting, because it not only reveals the playwright’s skilful treatment of the plot, but also brings before the reader/audience certain useful information concerning the play:

A: Antigone belongs to several incarnations
K: But you... you’re black!
A: And so? What colour is mythology? (26-27)

Osofisan reveals Sophocles’ Antigone for what it is— a ‘metaphor’. Thus she represents the struggle over the ages against Tyranny. And this theme is quite aptly woven into the plot of Tegonni: “we are metaphors. We always come in the colour and the shape of your imagination.” (27) The playwright here combines metaphor with symbolism; ‘colour and shape’ of the reader’s/ audience imagination. Since mythology has no ‘colour and shape,’ per se, it behooves the audience to bring meaning to bear, via its own interpretation of respective myths. However, in this instance, the audience may see Tegonni purely in terms of the struggle against the tyrannical forces of the black military jackboots, who replaced the racial bigot, Carter-Ross of the British colonial office and his men.

Every ritual festival performance has a mythological narrative. In order to do this with success, the ritual performance must be rooted in the culture of the people and their musical art. (Ogundeji: 2000:5). This
perhaps informs the copuity of Song and Dance in Osofisan’s *Tegonni*. Indeed this was the condition for extending an invitation to Antigone and her crew, to join Tegonni’s bridal procession; “well, join us. As long as you can sing and dance.” (27) Right from the prologue as indicated above, Osofisan uses his traditional African dramatic device, of songs and dance, even riddles and proverbs; “as comments on the action on stage and to involve the audience emotionally, so that they can appreciate the views being expressed (The drama of Osofisan: 215:8). For instance, the elders who met Gomina, on behalf of Tegonni use parables among other oral devices; in communicating with him : “well *Gomina*, as our people say, it is because it rains that the roof is placed above the house” (84ff) . This is somewhat similar to the role of the chorus in Sophocles.

There is a blending of the gloomy and the merry; before scene (6), which featured merry making by Tegonni and her bridal procession, there was the gloomy scene (5) where the soldiers are guarding the corpse of Prince Oyekunle. But this is over shadowed by the heralding drums and songs of the group of richly dressed young women, in high spirits, led by the talking drum- a uniquely African performative device, as the Drum Chorus. The melodious tune goes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jigi ati pauda</th>
<th>mirror and powder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ni mo ko rode o</td>
<td>i’m carrying with me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awure oja Osun</td>
<td>the magic wrap of fertility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ni mo ro waye!</td>
<td>Came to the world with me!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegonni d’adelebo</td>
<td>tegonni becomes a wife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O foko saso</td>
<td>clothed herself with a husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyawo ni pauda</td>
<td>for wives are like make up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oko ni jigi!</td>
<td>and husbands are the glass! (35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is a long scene of merry-making– songs and dancing, with songs highlighting Tegonni’s royal antecedent, and the story of how she met her husband to-be, Captain Allan Jones. The Masquerade, an important aspect of traditional African dramatic performance, is effectively used in *Tegonni* to bolster the confidence of the audience and show cultural superiority, while getting the better of the intruders. These masquerades supposedly spirits of ancestors and are used in ritual celebration. According to Ogundeji (2000:7) masquerades may be used for purposes other than sacred or cultic. They may be used for political, judicial and entertainment purposes. Thus the presence of masquerades in the scene (20), would appear to fulfill some of the functions mentioned above. The playwright is in effect making a political statement about the superiority of the masks or *egungun*–representatives of the gods/goddesses, and are possibly stronger than the Whiteman’s guns.

1st sol. *Egungun!* Na juju, Serge!  
They want take juju fight us!  
3rd Sol: they no fit! They know say we get gun!  
Chief…take your guns!  

It is a native charm, Sergent  
They intend to fight with it.  
They can’t! They know we have guns  
Chief… take hold of your guns
2nd Sol. Guns! Look as forest dey come with dem! Guns! The forest is filled with them.
Make we dey go Serge! Lets go Sergent
Ist Sol. Yes! Make we run quick-quick! Yes! Lets make haste!
Guns no go fit fight juju, Serge! You can’t fight a man with charms with a gun (109)

Eventually even the ‘Serge’ that had a semblance of courage had to abandon his gun and run for dear life-
(alas! it was only three women in masks) But the technique worked, and the message is put across through
Faderera:…. “These soldiers think they’re tough, but we too, we have our ways!” (110)

Also of interest is Osofisan’s style of demystification of the theatre mentioned earlier in the discussion on
the prologue. He also tries to stripe history of some of its embellishments; the use of the masquerade scene
in which women are seen in masks, is an abomination in African theatre, but then, even chief Ishokun the
custodian of culture, helplessly acquiesces in this development and also agrees to hide the women in the
“sacred grove of Egungun”. Perhaps as observed by Obafemi (215) the playwright, intends to eliminate
stage illusions in order to distance his audience emotionally, thereby making them better able to view the
core of the drama as mainly education through entertainment. But then, the use of this style in Tegonni,
appears pragmatic and gratuitous to the intentions of the writer; to the extent that women are made to put
on masks and admitted into the “sacred grove of egungun”, the message is passed on.

The story-telling device is yet another Osofisan’s attempt to indigenize the story of Antigone. The view
is held that the playwright aims at achieving what Brecht terms the alienation effect in epic theatre (211).
As shown in (scene.17) the story of the tiger and the frog—which aptly fits the major theme of Tegonni—
apparently elicits audience participation in both plot and dramatic action. Tegonni who becomes the spirit
of stories, and agrees to retail it, does it in such a way as to create in the minds of both her listeners and
the audience a ‘second thought,’ to recreate meaning as it were, in line with the on-going play. This is an
effective technique which Osofisan makes use of in most of his plays. It is difficult to attempt separating
Osofisan’s language as treatment technique and his theme, even when the focus is not on the latter. And
so to establish the shades of dialectical confrontation between his characters, and the pervasive theme of
Tegonni, one cannot but recognize his variation in the use of language. The language is basically simple
and easy to comprehend; it is everyday vocabulary and syntax, among others. Yet his language is func-
tional; as it separates the different class of his characterization, thus the audience is able to tune in to
particular scene and its linguistic features. The Soldiers in scenes 5 and 20, for instance, speak the popular
pidgin English:

3rd Sol. Shut your mouth! I blame you at all?
Private soldier, third class,
see how you talk to sergeant!
Because de war don finish, not so?
Shut your mouth! It’s not your fault.
you are a mere Private and third class soldier
How dare you insult the Sergent!
is it because the war is over?

These carry on conversation on mundane issues, everyday life issues that bother individuals in their class.
But there is the ruling class characters who make use of standard, formal English; the gods and religious
personages who use the elevated style, marked by a distinctive syntax and use of idioms, imagery and proverbs (Obafemi: 216). Indeed there is a convergence towards the playwright’s thematic goals embedded in his deliberate linguistic variations; the language of the soldiers mirror a militarized society, one that aptly situates his contemporary Nigeria. The same can be said of the other levels of language and their personages.

After a long and arduous dialectics, a truce is brokered between Gomina and Tegonni. In contriving the cataclysmic events of the play’s finale, Osofisan ingeniously distances it from the Greek original. The different forces at play are gathered at the village square, under the watchful eyes of the audience; whereas in Antigone we are served the outcome of the events of the finale, through the messenger’s response to the leader of the Chorus.

Osofisan deliberately makes all take place before our eyes; the spontaneity of the incidence and outcome leaves the audience spellbound.

In the chaos and cacophony of voices a shot is heard and Allan Jones falls; the women suddenly bare their chests, “all smeared with ashes”. Chanting:

Eni bosi! It can’t happen!
-ele sele! No it won’t!
Wele dide! You can’t stand!
Woo tii jedo you’ve swallowed trouble!
Wele bere you can’t bend!
Woo tii jedo you’ve swallowed trouble!(139)

In the somewhat anti-climactic melee that heralds the end of the play, the audience is left wondering and yet hoping to hear/see Tegonni’s voice again. There is a momentary triumph, as the women bearing Tegonni on their shoulders chant in a frenzy:

Eba wa yo rejoice with us
Eba wa yo sese rejoice heartily with us
Amunisin the tyrant
Afikapase who gives wicked orders
Atisegun re o… we have conquered him!(140)

This is short-lived: ‘suddenly there are gun shots Tegonni tumbles from her side. More shorts and more women fall”. But then, she did ‘resurrect,’ into history; another version of the Greek Antigone, with whom she leaves the stage.
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it is apparent that Osofisan’s ingenious dramaturgy, has not just Africanized the Greek myth, but has opened up whole vistas for this once ‘closed’ plot. In reconstructing the history and myth of Antigone in Tegonni, he has stretched its hermeneutical possibilities to the 20th century Nigerian/African environment. What with his rather ingenious use of dramatic devices; especially those of the African traditional theatre and the Brechtian epic theatre, both of which share a lot of things in common, to help the audience see the play in its proper perspective.

Particularly, it is against the twin background of racism and authoritarianism’ that the dramatist wants us to assess Carter Ross’s stance in the crisis in the town. He exhibits all the demeanor of a dictator, all that matters to him is her majesty’s authority, and all he believes in are instruments of force, of cohesion. (147). The fate of Oyekunle is instructive of that of a people struggling to determine their own affairs. He was the people’s choice, but when this was annulled with impunity, Oyekunle took a decision to fight the injustice. Referring to his action, Tegonni says ironically:

My brother Oyekunle was foolish.
He was not as clever as Adetoro,
who had read the times right.
Otherwise he would have
accepted to collaborate meekly with
our masters, and made the most
for himself, as many among us are doing.(135)

Raji suggests, rather aptly too that these words are at the roots of the crises plaguing contemporary African societies, that of betrayal, of a lack of commitment on the part of the leadership, and an absence of freedom.

Through his demystification technique, he has shown that, we do not need religious or extra-human explanation for our problems; rather with the use of the Brechtian aesthetic technique of demystifying the gods, he is saying that human destiny is man’s own responsibility: “He is essentially interested in the liberation of the down-trodden from the shackles of exploitation, plunder, greed and avarice of the elite class in Nigeria” (Obafemi: 1999:5).

Osofisan’s dramatic hermeneutics further assumes a universal perspicuity in the story of Tegonni, and establishes a cultural interface between the European/ancient Greece and the African Continent. For the latter, this becomes a springboard to combat alienation, and create ‘an ideology of relevance.’(Irele.1982:2)

There is an urgent need to understand our alienation, and in agreement with Abiola Irele, justifiably explore all forms of scholarship devoted to European culture and western civilization in totality. Alienation, in this view, especially, its positive aspect, is the generative principle of culture, the condition of human development. This would mean that cultures maintain their dynamism, while benefiting from the transforming
values of contact with other civilizations and the consequent attainment of the much desired African regional integration. (35)

Notes

1 Femi Osofisan,” The alternative Tradition: A survey of Nigerian Literature after the war” 1982.

2 Ibid. op. cit.

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The 1987 British Expedition in Historical Perspective: its Lessons and Challenges.

By Dr. Victor Osaro Edo

Introduction

The year 1897 marked the end of an era in Benin history, and is arguably the year that marked the downfall of the kingdom. In that year, the British terminated the indigenous monarchical rule in Benin in response to the assassination of certain British officials under the command of Acting Consul-General Phillips. The Benin monarch at the time, Oba Ovonramwen (1888-1897) was arrested, tried at the Palava House and exiled to Calabar where he died in 1914. Benin, therefore, entered an era of interregnum between 1897 and 1914. The monarchy was, however, restored in 1914 after the death of Oba Ovonramwen.

As a result of the British invasion and conquest in February, 1897, Benin which was the dominant kingdom in the Bight of Benin and Biafra became subjected to British rule and thus started the gradual and progressive adaptation of the institution of the monarchy with colonialism as the primary agency of change.

The British Expedition and the Fall of the Benin Kingdom

It is significant that the fall of Benin and its monarch should not be associated only with the British expedition of 1897. The Benin kingdom, like many other West African kingdoms in the nineteenth century, was a victim of the nineteenth century European imperialism launched at the Berlin West African conference of 1884-1885. It is significant that Benin had had a long commercial contact with the Europeans. After the Berlin conference, the fall of the Benin kingdom was inevitable. It would be wrong to say, as it is often asserted, that the massacre of the Phillip’s party was the cause per excellence of the fall of Benin in 1897.

By 1884, Consul Hewett, representing the British imperial interests had signed spurious treaties with chiefs in the whole of the Niger Delta in which they (chiefs) promised to place their countries under the
protection of the British Queen. As a result of these treaties, protectorate government was set up with its headquarters at Calabar. The Benin area fell within the province of the protectorate government even though the *Oba* of Benin did not sign any of these treaties.\(^2\)

By 1886, the activities of the Royal Niger Company had spread all over the areas surrounding the Benin kingdom. The various expeditions of the company must have created some feelings of apprehension in the Benin authorities. The cold reception accorded treaty agents and the attack on Phillip’s party (at the time of the great Igbe festival when the Oba was to receive no visitors)\(^3\) were by tradition stimulated by the suspicion aroused by the fear of a possible invasion by the protectorate government agents. The fall of Benin from 1885 onwards, became inevitable and the attack on Phillip’s party in 1897 merely provided the excuse and the occasion for the invasion and conquest of the Benin kingdom.

Following the capture of Benin and the suspension of the institution of the monarchy, the indigenous administration headed by the *Oba* was replaced by an alien administration. The year 1897 thus represented a landmark in the history of Benin. Indeed, sad enough, the Benin heritage typified by her arts and crafts were carted away. They now adorn the museums in Britain and other western European countries. Efforts to have them returned yielded no dividends; not even in 1977 during the Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC 77) that took place in Lagos, Nigeria. From 1897, forces were set in motion, which progressively challenged the traditional powers and influence of the Benin monarchical institution. With the consolidation of British authority, the Benin chiefs were compelled to adjust and adapt themselves to the changing political environment. Rather than defend tradition, some of them decided to find a place in the new dispensation and were used as “warrant chiefs”\(^4\) by the British.

After the infamous British expedition, a consequence of the attack on and killings of some members of the British party earlier in January 1897, and the subsequent deportation of Oba Ovonramwen to Calabar, the British had to find an alternative system of ruling Benin. They found an answer in the establishment of a Native Council. Having decided to set up the Native Council, the British were faced with the problem of the redistribution of power in Benin because they needed administrative assistants. They found a solution in the selection of some chiefs as members of the Benin Native Council (B.N.C.). The selection was, however, not determined by the existing tradition, but was based on chiefs who made an easy submission to the British officials.

The Native Council set up in 1897 consisted of the following chiefs: the *Iyase*, *Osodin*, *Obaseki*, *Ine*, *Uwangue*, *Ihaza*, *Ima*, *Obahiagbon*, *Osague*, *Ezomo*, *Ehonlor*, *Ero*, and *AyObahan*. This Council was different in composition from the *Oba’s* council of the pre-British era. Not all those who sat on the *Oba’s* council were now appointed to the Native Council\(^5\). The traditional order of seniority of those chiefs appointed to the council was not respected. For instance, Chief *Osague* who was the head of the *Oba’s* council was not regarded as such by the British officers. Instead, the *Obaseki*, a junior chief, was made the vice-president of the Native Council. According to Igbafe, it would appear that each chief was selected because he was reckoned potentially useful to the administration\(^7\).
This Native Council formed the main instrument of government during the interregnum. It represented a few chiefs of the nobility class in Benin. It combined judicial functions with legislation and was directly controlled and presided over by the political officers, who were responsible for most of its administrative decisions. The Native Council represented a centralisation of power in the extreme, totally at variance with Benin traditional practices. Unlike the Native Council, the pre-British central council in Benin left much of the local issues to the villages under their Enigie and Edionwere.

The deportation of Oba Ovonramwen as we have seen is significant in evaluating the changing fortune of the Benin chiefs in the new administrative structure. The exit of the Oba created a vacuum in the pre-British hierarchical political system for the institution of the monarchy. It turned the chiefs to stooges of the British as they easily succumbed to alien rule and undermined their positions and traditions of Benin. It became clear to the chiefs that their roles in the traditional political structure had been distorted by the incursion of alien values and system of government, and that they were to adjust themselves to the changing situation. Even before the deportation of the Oba, the realities of the situation were made known to the chiefs.

Before Oba Ovonramwen and the chiefs who were assembled at the consular court on the 7th of September, 1897, the Consul-General, Sir Ralph Moor, made the following public declaration:

...now this is the Whiteman’s country, there is only one king in the country and that is the Whiteman... Overami is no longer king of this country – the Whiteman is the only man who is king in this country and to him only service is due...9

With this pronouncement, Moor defined in very clear terms the position of the traditional authority in Benin vis-a-vis the new British officers who represented the conquering power.

At this juncture, the question arises, what are the challenges and lessons that can be learnt from the British Expedition of 1987 to Benin. The next section will now focus on this.

**Challenges and lessons from the 1897 British Expedition**

There was a period of interregnum, which lasted for seventeen years (1897-1914). During this period, the paramount chiefs created by the British administrators occupied the hitherto cherished position of Eghaevbo n’Ogbe (palace chiefs). Tributes were no longer going to the Oba who was now in Calabar, but to the British. There were no more pages to go to the districts for the purpose of getting supplies of food to the Oba. The Oba’s farm, which was manned by free labour and supervised by the Eghaevbo n’Ore (town chiefs) was now left only to be plundered by the people.

Many of the chiefs became poor as the sources of extra wealth were now blocked by the British. Even the
daily *Eguatematon* (court) was cancelled. In its place, the Native Council was created. Only the paramount chiefs were allowed to attend the Native Council. The British took over the control of the affairs of Benin and abused the traditions by the change in power structure and administration. The selected or chosen chiefs became wealthy and power drunk as they became popular before the British administrators, but very unpopular before the majority of the people.

Since the British administrators did not consider the laid down institutions of title-groups and grades in Benin, those who would serve them faithfully and loyally struggled to be seen in order that they might be promoted. Hence, the privileged paramount chiefs devoted their lives to the services of the Whitemen in order that they might be seen and honoured: one of such hardworking chiefs was Agho Obaseki, who was made a paramount chief, among several others, in the created institution of paramount chiefs during the interregnum. This was the time Chief Agho Obaseki came to the notice of the British.

The new structure of administration typified by the Native Council and the policy of paramountcy culminated in the rise and elevation of Chief Agho Obaseki. The role played by Agho Obaseki was a great challenge to the institution of monarchy in Benin. It was also one in which great lessons were learnt. But even more important was the fact that the force of tradition withstood the storm and the monarchy was restored with time. Herein lies the trust of this paper as we shall see later.

It is worthy of note that Chief Agho Obaseki, given the new dispensation, dominated the Benin Native Council. By sheer strength of character, sterling qualities of leadership, outstanding ability to control men and willingness to carry out the wishes of British officers, Chief Agho Obaseki rose to the position of being the ‘mouthpiece’ of the other chiefs. However, he was to become a stumbling block to the restoration of the monarchy.

Indeed, by 1914, the British officials realised that the government in Benin had become isolated and could not really identify itself with the people. Therefore, they decided to reinstate the monarchy for a number of reasons. First, the substitute of a Native Council to replace the *Oba* and perform his duties had not worked. Second, the Warrant Chiefs so created did not receive the favour of the people. Third, the British were faced with the difficulty of making the newly favoured chiefs acceptable to the people. This political reality, posits Igbafe, in many ways compelled a change in the administrative structure in Benin. The people demanded for a change of administration basically because the paramount chiefs were corrupt. For instance, some of the chiefs were accused of illegal exaction of tributes, financial mismanagement, abduction of women and the organisation of unauthorised courts, which was hitherto not the case in the pre-British era where the *Oba* exercised traditional restraint. The absence of such a check by the *Oba* during the interregnum encouraged corruption, which characterised the administration of the paramount chiefs in their districts.

However, the British were in the process of reinstating the monarchy when the deposed *Oba* Ovonramwen died in exile on 13\(^{th}\) January, 1914. Given these developments and the popular demand for the restoration of the monarchy by the people, the British immediately restored the institution that year. In fact, popular
opinion in Benin (with the exception of a few chiefs) clamoured for the Oba’s son, AiguObasinwin, to succeed his father. This was in accordance with the events of 1906 when AiguObasinwin led other chiefs in a movement to remove Chief Agho Obaseki and restored Oba Ovonramwen. Thus, with Ovonramwen’s death, AiguObasinwin was to Benin chiefs and people, the only logical and traditional successor to his father. AiguObasinwin did not, however, find it easy to regain his father’s throne, for the British nearly planted Chief Agho Obaseki as the Oba.

Before the installation of Prince AiguObasinwin (the Edaiken of Uselu and heir apparent to the throne of Benin) as the Oba of Benin, the British administrator, Captain Moor, had to face the challenge of an Uzama chief, the Ero of Urubi. The British wanted to put into practice the ‘Indirect Rule’ as practiced in the Northern part of Nigeria. The only trusted man who could do the administrative work for them was Chief Agho Obaseki. Encouraged by the British and compelled with his own ambition, the Obaseki made efforts to become the Oba of Benin. According to Pa Oghagbon Aiguedowan, Chief Obaseki carved his front door to look like that of the Oba. All other Uzama Nihiron (kingmakers) except Chief Izedomwen, the Ero of Urubi, agreed to serve under Chief Agho Obaseki if made the Oba of Benin. The Ezomo, Chief Osarogiagbon, was a relation of Chief Agho Obaseki. It seems that this relationship between Chief Agho and the Ezomo influenced the support, which the Obaseki had from other chiefs.

According to Pa Aiguedowan, the Ezomo, in giving support to the Obaseki said that he would serve under anybody as long as the British had sanctioned that person as Oba. Chief Izedomwen, the Ero of Urubi, was said to have vehemently opposed the Ezomo and others who supported Chief Agho, the Obaseki. Izedomwen told the British officer, Captain Moor, that in the tradition of Benin, it is the same rule that governs the succession to the office of every Uzama chief and the Oba. As the Uzama chieftaincy is hereditary, so also is the Obaship in Benin. According to Bradbury, dynastic continuity was the first axion of Edo political values, and there was almost universal agreement that AiguObasinwin was the only acceptable candidate. The views of Chief Izedomwen were taken by Captain Moor who instructed Prince AiguObasinwin to perform all the traditional rites of his father and become the Oba of Benin.

It is worth noting that the issue involved in the succession of Prince AiguObasinwin to the throne of his ancestors highlighted the extent to which the British had influenced the political structure of Benin during the years of interregnum. Traditionally, the Edaiken of Uselu succeeded to the throne at the death of an Oba. The Edaieke of Uselu was (and is still) the official title of the heir apparent to the Benin throne and was bestowed on an incumbent’s first son. It was, therefore, surprising that Chief Agho, the Obaseki of Benin, who had become a very powerful and influential chief collaborated with the British to oppose the custom of the land. Besides, he was backed by some senior chiefs who, contrary to tradition, connived to get him installed as the Oba of Benin, but failed. Those chiefs tried to convince the British officer that the Obaseki would be a good Oba of Benin, because he had been an integral part of the colonial government. The reason for the support of some of the senior chiefs might not be unconnected with the recognition the British had given to Chief Agho Obaseki for his role in the British conquest of Benin and his continued relevance in the British administration since 1897.
In fact, the Obaseki would not have turned down the opportunity of founding a new dynasty. Indeed, James Watt, then Resident of the Benin Area would certainly have welcomed the accession of the government’s most trusted agent had there been any chance of legitimising it. However, it was soon made clear to him that any move to install the Obaseki as Oba would be strongly resisted by the chiefs and the people.20

Prince AiguObasinwin was later crowned the Oba of Benin on 22nd July, 1914 with the title of Eweka II. From this time on, the relationship between Eweka II and Chief Agho Obaseki became strained. Also, at this crucial time, according to Chief Omo Osagie, the late Iyase of Benin, Chief Okizi21, the Iyase of Benin then, died and the post of Iyase became vacant. As the Iyase (Prime Minister) is the next to the Oba, the British administrator influenced the Oba, Eweka II, to bestow the chieftaincy of Iyase on Chief Agho Obaseki22, which was immediately carried out. Although the Bini (Edo), like the Baganda of Buganda23, cherished their monarchical institution and were happy at the restoration of the monarchy, they did not like the post of the Iyase given to Agho Obaseki24, but there was nothing they could do under the circumstances. The position of the Iyase is the second highest office in the Benin political hierarchy. Chief Agho Obaseki, elevated to the post of the Iyase, thus became the second highest office in the Benin political structure or administrative setting.

Thus, with the restoration of the monarchy, the British introduced the indirect rule system into Benin, making use of the Oba and his chiefs as their agents in exploiting the kingdom. However, the implication of this new development is tremendous. First, the Oba ceased being the sovereign ruler of Benin. Second, the Benin Native Council as constituted became executors of the orders of the colonial agents posted to the area by the British Native Council as well as the areas covered by their authorities did not conform strictly with the traditional political arrangement of the pre-colonial period. For instance, Igbafe indicates that contrary to tradition, Agho Obaseki, a junior chief in Benin was appointed paramount chief for Benin25. Forth, the roles of the paramount chiefs that became elevated as a result of the political development of 1897 changed considerably as examined above. They had to execute order from the District Officers or Residents who were their political superiors. This political situation prevailed in Benin until 1914 when monarchy was restored.

It should be noted that the British did not want to restore the Oba to his former status. The authority of the Oba was severely curtailed. In Igbafe’s assessment, the most important aspect of the restoration is to be found in what was not restored26. What was restored was a caricature of the traditional monarchy. There were strict limitations on the powers of the Oba and his chiefs. The Oba was stripped of his ancient power and in the letter of his appointment, it was stipulated that, “except as conceded by the Resident, the (restored) Oba lost all rights and authority over the land of his ancestors, these rights being vested in the English monarch and his representatives. Similarly, the Oba lost the power to collect and impose taxes, the power of appointment and selection of his chiefs, the power to make and change the laws of his people27 without the consent of the Governor or his representative, namely, the Commissioner appointed to his territory by the Governor-General28. As it were, the British expedition of 1897 thus opened a new vista of modern administration in Benin in which the Oba and his chiefs became instruments of governance. Hence, all through the colonial period and even up till now, the monarchy was never to recover from the
shock of February 1897 and had never been independent ever since.

**Conclusion**

From the afore-stated, it could be seen that the *Oba* had been divested of his traditional powers. This means that the powers of the chiefs were also limited considering the erosion in the powers of the *Oba*, but a few of them, especially the *Iyase* gained more powers and influence during this period. Yet, the whole people in Benin were happy at the restored monarchy, the symbol of their society, customs and tradition. It was at the coronation of *Oba* Eweka II that the *Uzama Nihiron* performed their duty of crowning the *Oba*. The head of the *Uzama* chiefs, the *Oliha*, did the crowning. All the chiefs, except Chief Agho, paid their homage to the *Oba* in the traditional way. Chief Agho Obaseki did not pay homage to the *Oba* because he considered himself equally fit for the position, especially given the fact that he too had unsuccessfully contested for it.

As it were, from 1897, the control of power by the *Oba* shifted to the British and certain selected chiefs led by Chief Agho Obaseki. Hence, there was a change in the Benin political structure between 1897 and 1914, until the institution of the monarchy was restored with certain limitations. We can then see that the monarchy was restored under a new dispensation, which superseded traditional administration. Thus, the monarchy under the new dispensation must exercise powers allowed by the colonial masters. In the process, the monarchy was faced with new challenges as a result of the administrative changes that had taken place.

**Notes**

2. Ibid. P. 32
3. See J. U. Egharevba, *A Short History of Benin*, 3rd edition (Ibadan: I.U.P., 1960), P. 49. It was during the Igue festival that the *Oba*, by tradition, was not to receive any visitors or strangers. The Bini (Edo) people regarded this festival and still do, as one of great importance. It was supposed to mark a time of rededication by the Bini people to their king. The festival also marks the end of the year and the beginning of a new one.
5. J. M. Simpson, Intelligence Report, Benin Division, Ministry of Local Government, Benin (1936) P. 6


8. Ibid, pp 122-123


11. For a detailed study on Chief Agho Obaseki, see P. A. Igbafe, Obaseki of Benin, (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1972).

12. P. A. Igbafe, Benin under British Administration, p. 136

13. Ibid, p. 197


17. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


29. Since most of the ceremonies were secret, an uninitiated person, like the present writer, cannot be informed of what really happened during the coronation.
Guitar Hero World Tour: a Creator of New Sonic Experiences?

By Matthew Ingram

The academic literature for sonic media and gaming is – too frequently – separated by method, politics and approach. To increase the dialogue between gaming and sonic discourses, this paper discusses the impact of the drum controller (for use with the Guitar Hero gaming software) and the potential for new auditory experiences and literacies. Sonic media is often more volatile than screen-based platforms. The advent of MP3s and the iPod has ensured that sound is the carrier for changes in media and meaning. There has been an evolution of technology which has subsequently configured a convergence or revolution in sonic media. Concurrently, there has been a growing trend in the gaming industry to replicate instruments into alternative controllers for rhythm games as a form of interactive entertainment. Generally, these input devices are considered as part of rhythm play rather that music generation. Predominant in this group of devices is the Guitar Hero© franchise where a controller is shaped like a guitar. While it does not feature strings, it has buttons that are pressed as part of the use of such controllers. In 2008, drums were added to this equation for the current seventh generation of consoles (PS3, XBOX 360, and Wii) with the release of a drum controller for the games Guitar Hero World Tour (GHWT), Rock Band (RB) and Rock Revolutions (it is worth noting that PS2 a sixth generation console is also supported to some extent). Whilst there have been previous instances of drum controllers with sixth generation consoles (Donka Konga, Game Cube), these have been limited. The latest incarnations have the potential to be electronic drum kits in addition to games controllers. This is a significant shift in controller potential. This capacity in the drums controller is reflected in GHWT and RB. GHWT also has the capability for the user to generate and share music through a platform known as GHTunes in a “music studio” mode. Rock Revolutions also has a limited music studio however the ability for sharing generated tracks in not available. The complexity of using GHTunes, the music generation tool in GHWT and the quality of the resulting songs has been questioned by some reviewers, however despite these reservations it is still a platform for music generation and sharing. Therefore it is useful in terms of developing the sonic media literature and to look at what has been achieved with the alternative controllers to date as the potential for this format in the future. The argument that the drum controller is now a musical instrument will be proffered. In addition their uses have a symbiotic effect with the uptake of traditional instruments.
There has been an international increase in the popularity of rhythmic and musical performance games since the late 1990s. This in part has lead to the interface of alternative controllers for games consoles. Initially, the input could be described as being specifically intended for rhythmic play (Blaine 2005) rather than music making. However with release of Guitar Hero World Tour (GHWT) this perspective needs reevaluating. GHWT along with Rock Band and Rock Revolutions were the first titles released for the domestic market that had a realistic drum controller. The guitar controllers featured are an evolution of the already established controllers that involve the pressing of buttons as opposed to strings. There have been attempts to incorporate parameters such as tapping, they are still distinct from actually playing a guitar. The shapes of these instruments range from the iconic Stratocaster format to a Gibson Les Paul. The plots of these games are as simple as the title suggests. Essentially, single users can play along to the tracks in either a career-type mode or a quick play. Multiple players can use the various instruments in a band mode arrangement allowing for social interaction. The connectivity of the internet is fully incorporated into these games in a range of activities. GHWT is differentiated from the other two titles in this paper due to the fact that the drum controller is significantly more advanced than the other two. Whilst there have been previous instances of drum controllers with sixth generation consoles (Donka Konga, Game Cube) these have been somewhat limited. Other attempts at deploying drum controllers have included removing the pads. These have included Wii music where the remote controller and nunchuk are used to simulate drum sticks. However this is not an attempt to simulate real drumming so is therefore excluded from this paper.

GHWT features the ability for users to generate music through a “music studio” mode and disseminate it. This ability to share music and online gaming has been aided with the ease at which fifth generation consoles can connect to the internet combined with storage capacity either in the form of a hard drive or solid state media (it is acknowledged that the PS2 can also connect to the internet but it is not an integrated function of the console). This paper probe these advances and the subsequent combination of output that this has produced.

**Importance of the drum controller for GHWT**

The drum controller on GHWT was designed to be realistic, with the inclusion of elevated cymbal pads, responsive pads and sticks. These inclusions in the design process were reported at the bequest of notable drummers; however this information may have been released as part of the marketing machine. The controllers of GHWT have received positive reviews. The drum controller that is supplied with the Guitar Hero package still looks like a toy and is non customisable unlike a traditional drum kit but the user is able to interchange between left and right handed drummers within the game software. It has evolved from the simple devises associated with generation six consoles (Donka Konga, Game Cube). However is it a musical instrument? The drum controller is no different to an electronic drum kit and hence could be classed as an instrument that can make music. However it may be inferred that the supplied drum controller is effectively a jumped up toy, simply based upon its appearance.
To this end, a third party drum controller has been produced and that is marketed as a premier ‘pro’ version (Drum Rocker) which has the ability to move the pads and therefore appears similar in appearance to a traditional electronic drum kit. As the premier kit, it has a premier price. Therefore, it is unlikely it will replace many of the “toy” like controllers, however its existence means that it is a defence against those who argue that the interface is not a real instrument. In addition to the aesthetics it has the ability to be converted to an electronic drum kit and is marketed as:

Drum Rocker delivers the most realistic drumming experience available to any gamer, better than any other system on the market. That’s because it was built by real electronic drum engineers from one of the largest manufacturers of professional electronic drums, Alesis.

They go further to stress the fact that is can be used as an instrument:

When you’re ready to move from playing Rock Band to playing in a real band, you can swap the game controller module with one made by Alesis.

With these grand statements of playing in a “real band” via the Drum Rocker, it is feasible that some gamers will evolve into seasoned musicians and may even encourage the uptake of “proper musical instruments” this is subsequently discussed. Perhaps more importantly this shiny new bit of technology has the potential for a new use: the generation of real music. The inclusion of a “pro” kit may give the drum controller the needed kudos associated with the characterisation as an instrument. For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that the reader is comfortable with the notion/argument that the drum controller, be it the pro version or the toy like version, is now an instrument.

**Music generation in GHWT**

GHWT contains a studio mode where users can create their own music GHTunes. This inclusion of the capability of being able to generate music is at the heart of GHWT. This is from one of the designer’s perspective.

We give the players the tools to compose music…people might even find hidden talent they didn’t know they had. “I can write music! Oh, I didn’t know…I can write music in the game.” I think it’s opening it up to a lot of people. It’ll be very cool.

Flores, 2008
They also appear to be very excited regarding the possibility of this.

Maybe become an Internet superstar of writing music in Guitar Hero

Flores, 2008

GHTunes has had significant criticism by reviewers regarding its complexity and the quality of music generated and yet there has been a massive uptake in writing songs and releasing them via this interface.

Debates around electronic music and whether software engineers are in fact musicians will rage probably until the end of electricity. GHTunes allows drum tracks to be effectively created in a “software” fashion. Beats can be added one at a time and endlessly looped. A drum track can also be laid down live. I believe this to be significant as it would hold true to many ideologies – particularly within the rock discourse - regarding live performance. Whilst that “live” performance is then captured by the software and can be altered and changed the fact remains it was ‘real’ to begin with.

Not the finished product

GHTunes has the ability to act as a live recording studio and also has the ability to act as a multi-track recording studio and includes the experience of software manipulation. Multi-track recording has revolutionised the recording process. Brian Eno the renowned performer and producer described the introduction of the multi-track studio as:

Now this is a significant step, I think; it’s the first time it was acknowledged that the performance isn’t the finished item, and that the work can be added in the control room or in the studio itself.

Eno, 2004

For people who are cynical regarding multi-track recording, there is an irony that the creator of the multi-track recorder Les Paul is also the creator of the ionic Gibson “Les Paul” to which the GHWT guitar controller emulates. The natural evolution of multi-track recording was to move into software-based technology as opposed to hardware-based productions, which further emphasises the debate around musicians/composers who use software to generate music. The use of such software and synthesisers has been commonly described as part of electronic music or electronica. Although some theorists and musicians treat this instrumental formation as different to other types of music, theorists are noting a decline in such demarcations and divisions (Holmes 2002). Holmes also suggested that due to the technical nature of producing electronic music, the composer/musician does not purely focus upon the nature of composition. The functions within GHTunes have the power to have similar editing abilities to many of the popular
domestic software such as Audacity (Audacity) and Mixcraft (Mixcraft). Potentially the drum controller interface has the ability for the musician/composer to move past the technical issues discussed by Holmes, however the use of GHTunes may still have the same technical issues associated with traditional music generation software. Once a user has created a track, they can choose to keep it for their own use or share via the internet.

**GHTunes and the internet**

Within the current software of GHWT, players can link via the internet to partake in ‘battle of the bands’ or simply play tracks together, part of the attraction of music has been to play in a group and create music. The uptake in the creation of tracks and sharing has been substantial (community). Players can only initially upload five songs and if those songs are rated highly by other members of the community, players can upload more. This feature will allow the community to allow expansion of players who create songs that are acceptable to that community. There will surely be power imbalances associated with this and possibly the case of “if you rate my song I will rate yours” although peer review has often been used as a fair system in many online fora. Currently the songs generated using these systems have come across critics but as the format matures the potential of “quality” might be achieved. However with some careful selection perfectly playable/listenable user generated content can be enjoyed.

**So should everybody be Guitar Heroes?**

Hell yes! Well only if they want too. As with many Web 2.0 activities, there have been calls that this will revolutionise our total existence, but how many blogs exist that have never been read and are of questionable quality. On the counter attack has been authors such as Andrew Keen, whose book “Cult of the Amateur” (2008) puts forward the argument that Web 2.0 type activities are killing professional material in an age of user generated content. Whilst this argument may hold true with some Web 2.0 activities - a blogger on Manchester City football club may never have contemplated writing a book on the area and all the necessary paperwork in getting a book published - amateur music production as a form of entertainment/enjoyment is as old as time itself. This activity is therefore a natural extension of traditional activity such as Karaoke or playing in a local pub band and can be further extended by looking at the professional in such areas. A professional journalist may have gone through higher education then joined a newspaper and worked his way up after serving a pseudo apprenticeship, however a professional musician may have been self taught, never reading a note of music and had a lucky break whilst playing in a local pub band. This presents the extreme of the arguments but it is hard to ignore artists such as Eric Clapton who have followed this route. However these arguments eventually unpack with the realization that technology is no replacement for talent. It has been argued by Florida (2004) that ‘creators’ need “technology, talent and tolerance to develop the creative industries”. This is further echoed in by Théberge (1997) that musicians
have become reliant upon technology and have formed a consumer relationship with electronic instrumentation. In addition the use of music as content for computer games has no harmful connotations or repercussions such as the first person ‘shooters’ or Grand Theft Auto. The worst that could happen is it could inspire a person to make some really poor music. There might be a possibility that the music could be played at excessive volumes and cause a public disturbance.

Benefits of GHWT

There have been many links associating the benefits of playing computer games and musical instruments (Bittman 2005) for the individual/groups so combining the two might have a synergy previously unexplored. To date the first study on health benefits of using a drum controller has involved a notable drummer from the band Blondie and a research unit committing to investigating the health benefits (Blondie). They are investigating the potential impact on relieving stress, obesity, autism and strokes. These are truly noble causes and will no doubt results in many scholarly outcomes. We are at the infancy of this type of technology and therefore we could make grand hypothesis about uniting the world through GHTunes and ushering a new age of world peace. We could then chose to remind the world of these hypotheses only if they came true and if they did not removed them from our untended blogs. But what might happen in a less headline grabbing way? In a more modest fashion, the first prediction that we must make is that this type of technology using a similar, if not more advanced interface will still be here. It is likely that benefits to individuals might be similar to those benefits of playing a “normal” instrument such as stress, physical workout, and better discipline. Maybe even Alan Flores’ hope that “people might even find hidden talent they didn’t know they had. “I can write music!” might come true. Putting aside the discussion of fame and fortune the most important consequence of GHWT is that it opens up a new form of leisure and pleasure. The fact that with GHWT you can do it:

1) With or without the internet.

2) With or without friends.

3) With or without creativity.

4) With or without talent.

Is Guitar Hero making ‘us’ less musical?

Other computer/web based activities that are used in place of traditional media have come under some criticism, Nicholas G. Carr argued in his article, “Is Google Making Us Stupid?: What the Internet is
doing to our brains” that using web based alternatives to traditional form of media could have “detrimental effects on cognition that diminish the capacity for concentration and contemplation”. This has been refuted by many workers such as Aaronovitch (2009). Carr’s argument is that reading on the internet is somehow shallower than being locked away with a good book and having a deeper form of reading. Similar arguments have been put forward by Brabazon (2006) with her work with undergraduates not effectively researching issues and relying just on whatever Google presents, based upon a few misspelt words. So if one chose to put a few semi appropriate words in to Google such as “guitar hero drums difficult real instruments” there would be many articles, blogs, Youtube video putting arguments for and against the fact that the Guitar Hero franchise is not as difficult as playing a real drum. However I do not intend to do this mainly due to the fact that primarily these drum controllers are allowing individual/groups access to types of instrumentation that was probably unavailable to users for a variety of reasons such as cost/space and noise pollution. So games such as Guitar Hero are probably not making us less musical they are just changing or expanding what music is. Could this interaction transform a previously non musically person into a musician? Many fora are suggesting this. We are seeing the first generation of this technology and to see if someone decided to become musical after playing GHWT remains to be seen. In addition, the reverse is also true where a real ‘musician’ could decide that creating and playing music within the GHWT platform is more desirable that playing real music in the real world and we could potentially have a shortage of real musicians and a surplus of plastic guitar heroes. This argument has echoes from the introduction of the synthesiser where the guitar and drums of real bands survived that onslaught there is no reason to suggest that they will not survive GHWT and probably coexist in harmony although data can always shed a glimpse on the future.

**Our survey says:**

In an initial attempt to quantify the issues around the migration between games and musician, the American guitar retailer “Guitar Center” conducted an online survey and the key findings from the 7,000 participants are summarised below.

Of the *Guitar Hero* and *Rock Band* players that do not currently play a musical instrument, two-thirds (67%) indicated that they are likely to begin playing a real instrument in the next two years.

Nearly three out of four (72%) musicians who play games like *Guitar Hero* and *Rock Band* have spent more time playing their real instrument(s) since they began playing these games.

Eight out of 10 (81%) of the *Guitar Hero* and *Rock Band* players that have been inspired to play an instrument because of the games would like to receive a musical instrument as a gift this winter holiday season.
Sales of gear for first-timers at Guitar Center has surged along with the peak in sales for *Guitar Hero* and *Rock Band*. In the holiday selling season in the last quarter of 2007, Guitar Center saw a +20.7% jump in comparable store sales for beginner-level electric guitar & amplifiers. This surge grew even stronger through the first nine months of 2008, when Guitar Center’s cumulative comparable store sales for the category increased +26.9%.

This initial survey suggests that coexistence for mutual benefit may indeed be possible for the game based (plastic) rock and the real rock. Dr Larry Livingston the Musical Director at the USC Thornton School of Music is quoted as saying:

> These games are a painless and fantastically seductive entrée to playing music. They engage your mind, body and soul, creating a whole sense of the movement of music.

> Having tasted the experience, players may want to move from the simulated to the real. Therefore, it’s no surprise that these games have whetted the appetite for the real deal.

Livingston, 2008

We are in an emerging period of this new technology and that once there has been a bedding in period it is possible that new data will have a more meaningful measurement into the status quo of this coexistence.

If we take the argument of Livingston forward, that this type of game involves a significant number of users moving from the simulated to the real instruments will these users ever become virtuoso musicians? To either prove or disprove this we will have to let time tell as these musicians emerge and to see if they receive the critical acclaim and perceived quality associated with virtuoso performers. Although it could be said that if the current generation of games inspires musicians of whatever quality then the benefits associated with that activity are positive.

**Future of GHWT type games**

Currently there are plans to provide links between the analogue guitar and rhythm-type games (Guitar Rising 2009), whilst this currently does not interface with the current generation of GHWT, presumably it is a natural evolution of the format and a replacement for the controller type guitars. This evolution of the guitar controller into a real controller may aid the symbiotic relationship discussed previously. This integration would surely please many past masters and dearly departed users of electronic and instrumental music (Stockhausen, 2004) The keyboard is already in an electronic format so should potentially be easy to incorporate, however many of the forums associated with GHWT suggest the keyboard will not be the
next instrument this may in part be due to the complexity of creating a game format for a typically five octave instrument or the lack of iconography associated with the keyboard. Although vocals are already in the game play of GHWT, they cannot be deployed in studio mode. This addition would potential open up GHTunes to the mainstream as the majority of music contains a vocal component.

**Generated music dissemination?**

Although the current quality of generated tracks is questionable, many of them are greatly used by the GH community and we accept that this format is in its infancy and it is expected to improve. But could a track ever break out of the GH world? Currently the software has no ability to add vocals which is probably the limiting step, but with this reservation aside if a suitable body of tracks was generated that had mass appeal the music industry would surely find a clever way of stripping that material from the GH world, unless the generators were savvy enough to broker a deal with the industry that left them in control. It is possible that is could be used as a scaffold for a musician or group of a musicians into the mainstream industry and traditional music generation. The potential is there but is the talent?

The software is currently at generation 1 for music generation, future iterations will add more and more capability than we ever dreamed a reality, and other possibilities for the future could include an online talent competition for groups of individuals to compete for a recording track, maybe Simon Cowell will make it to the Guitar Hero world.

**Conclusion**

There is a strong case to believe the drum controller can be a real instrument that can generate real music. This will never be uniformly adopted. Is the generated music any good? Well, how long have we got and possibly life it too short to debate if any generated music is any good? If it works for the players then what is the harm? Using initial data it appears that the use of GHWT and similar games support the uptake of traditional musical instrument, it is yet too early to say if this will result in any virtuoso performers or if the line between gamers, software engineers and musician will become too blurred to be able to differentiate.

The future of GHWT and its successors is sure to be great. It is suggested that a real guitar will be added to the next version; it is possible that the seventh generation consoles may have a hard time coping with that. After the guitar, surely the vocals will migrate into the GHWT studio. Maybe five years down the line the first live gig by musicians linked via a GHWT type interface will be possible. Maybe 10 years down the line the most popular track downloaded from iTunes will come from GHWT type genera. The next logical step is for a perceived piece of “quality” media to be generated from this type of software and then wait for the star to emerge.
For the causal user maybe this will not even register on their radar and they will just be having fun jamming with their new friends from Africa or West Bromwich.

Me? .. I am off to play “Go your own way” and hopefully these genera will too.

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Since its initial appearance in The History of Sexuality Volume One, Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower has indeed taken on a bios of its own. Ubiquitous in recent academic analyses of the contemporary socio-political landscape, the concept and its kin (biopolitics, governmentality) find their most provocative—though, as I hope to show, misguided—articulation in the collaborative work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (The Labor of Dionysius, Empire, and Multitude). Shifting Foucault’s focus from population and social management to labor, globalization, and sovereignty, these authors conceive of biopolitics in economic terms, detailing the consequences of the transition from Fordist to post-Fordist labor practices. Significantly, whereas Foucault designates sexuality the principal apparatus in the functioning of biopower, Hardt and Negri argue that sexuality in the post-Fordist era is no longer the privileged site of biopolitical control: when human affect, language, and cooperation are subsumed into the productive processes of capital, the gestures, expressions, and movements—indeed, the very flesh—of the social body become commodities. Their thesis raises a number of pressing questions that bear on the future of sexuality studies: Has sexuality itself been totally subsumed into the productive processes of postmodern capital? Is Foucault’s “deployment of sexuality” too blunt an analytical tool to understand biopower in post-Fordism? Indeed, is sexuality any longer a productive category for social analysis at all?

Although such questions are not the primary focus of this paper (my aim here is far more modest), they take on quite different meanings in the face of AIDS—a subject that receives no serious discussion in Hardt and Negri’s work. If, as I argue, AIDS is understood as a primary locus of biopolitical struggle, sexuality simply cannot be ignored or subsumed into a generalized concept of bios. Even a cursory glance at the focus and scope of recent HIV-prevention research reveals that the “life” valorized in biopower continues to turn on that most stubborn of discursive constructions: the homo-/heterosexual binary. A 2006 study by the US National Institutes of Health concerning male circumcision as an HIV-preventative for men engaging in “heterosexual intercourse,” for example, appears more invested in naturalizing the homo/hetero binary than in disseminating accurate and practical HIV-prevention information. Although AIDS education campaigns have attempted for decades to distinguish high-risk behavior from high-risk groups and identity-specific sexual behavior from corporeal acts (“gay sex” vs. vaginal, anal, oral sex, etc.), the very use of the phrase “heterosexual intercourse” in the NIH press release, as I will demonstrate, reveals the persistence of heteronormative assumptions and objectives in contemporary AIDS research and funding.
The scientific research which proved definitively that HIV does not discriminate based on sexual orientation, ironically, then, often serves to perpetuate discrimination against sexual minorities. The memoirs of David Wojnarowicz, written from the frontlines of AIDS activist battlefield in the 1980s and 90s, are instructive here in that they remind us of our continued failure to understand HIV as distinct from sexual identity and of our seeming incapacity to disentangle “sexuality” from subjective truth. In highlighting the importance of sexuality for biopower Wojnarowicz’s life-writings, though thirty-plus years old, remain salient for an interrogation into sexuality’s key role in contemporary AIDS treatment and funding. Moreover, with his concept of “sense” Wojnarowicz offers a strategy of resistance unwedded to the identitarian logic of biopolitical governance. Building upon Foucault’s insight that the discursive link between sexual desire and self-truth is a formidable tool of control that ultimately ends up repressing movements of collective revolt, Wojnarowicz’s “sense” ruptures the link between sexuality and individual truth and deterritorializes, or “communizes,” affect. A slippery and polyvalent term in his usage, “sense” emerges at the point of indistinguishability between life and death, between private emotion and common affect, and between rational understanding and a “body-knowledge” gleaned from sexual/sensual encounters. With “sense,” Wojnarowicz reveals the affective motor fueling his own AIDS activism and simultaneously calls attention to the political potential of sexual affect for contemporary queer social movements. By situating Wojnarowicz’s life-writings on a larger historical-theoretical grid concerning biopolitics, AIDS, and rituals of public mourning, I understand them as consistent with the Foucaultian project of toppling “the monarchy of sex” and useful for mapping sites of resistance to biopolitical administration in the present.

I. The Life of Biopower

At the risk of rehearsing the familiar story of biopower’s conceptual life, I begin by doing so for two reasons: first, to emphasize the centrality of sexuality in Foucault’s rendering of the concept; and second, to show precisely how Hardt and Negri desexualize it. Foucault begins his account in the seventeenth century when a “power over life” emerges as a tendency alongside an earlier, overtly repressive, penal form of power that disciplined subjects through juridical systems. In contrast to a negative form of freedom predicated upon “thou shalt not,” which found its logical conclusion in public spectacles of death, biopower encourages an art of living: thou shalt live a good life as devised by state-informed expert knowledge; thou shalt do what is best for you, which conveniently coincides with what is best for biopolitical administration. The family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers cooperate with state apparatuses to ensure a uniform standard of living, to produce subjectivities and forms of life that secure a “vital population.” A docile subject is produced when procedures of totalization combine with techniques of individualization, or, in Foucault’s vocabulary, when the anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population become two poles in the art of governance. These poles correspond chronologically to different historical moments: the anatomo-politics of the body, “the first to be formed it seems […] centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces,” while the biopolitics of the population, “formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes.”
anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population play two roles in the operation of biopower: the former, analytical, concerning the individual, the latter, quantitative, concerning the population. In an essay entitled “The Subject and Power” we learn that biopower derives from a form of power implemented in archaic Christian institutions—what Foucault designates pastoral power. Christian pastoral power promised individuals salvation in the afterlife while anchoring one’s earthly life in a community of believers. Its efficacy lay in its ability to govern a population both as individuals and as a mass. Now secularized, techniques of pastoral power function under biopower to ensure a worldly salvation of health, security, sufficient wealth, and citizenship (334-5).

On Foucault’s view, sexuality is the central dispositif deployed by the modern state and capital to manage life directly, the site at which biopower’s individuating and totalizing techniques converge. In the psychiatrization and medicalization of sexuality the individual becomes legible, recordable, disciplined: sexuality is mobilized as a hermeneutic of desire to reveal the truth of the subject and fasten it to an identity. At the same time this marker of individuality becomes useful in administering a social totality. Techniques of the state such as the population census, fertility rates, and statistics of life expectancy appeal to this hermeneutic to organize individual subjects into a manageable whole. The discursive link between sexual desire and self-identity—that is, “sexuality”—is thus implemented as a means of social control, deterring movements of collective revolt and imprisoning bodies and pleasures. In order to resist the biopolitical administration of life, according to Foucault, the link between sex and truth must be broken.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, by contrast, argue that biopower no longer utilizes sexuality as the principal apparatus in the social management of life. Whereas Foucault limits his analysis to the state’s across-the-board use of biopower, Hardt and Negri develop his insights, above all in Empire, to argue that the reach of biopower extends beyond the nation-state, which comes to play second fiddle in the supranational march of capital. They analyze in Empire the multiple processes of globalization—the worldwide saturation of capital, the steady “bourgeoisification” of the globe, the withering of the nation-state, the post-imperialist political landscape, etc.—and argue that the new sovereign, the new order of the globalized world, is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule they designate (capital ‘E’) Empire. Empire is neither a metaphor nor a term by which other historical empires can be characterized. Rather, distinguished by a lack of boundaries and a suspension of history, Empire is an extreme form—or the logical conclusion—of Foucaultian biopower. Though accorded a privileged status in the logic of Empire, neither the United States nor any other single nation-state is the superpower Svengali pulling the strings behind the scenes. Gliding on a smooth, unstriated plane of fluid boundaries and hybrid identities, Empire operates beyond the nation-state, beyond imperialism, unlimited and unbound by any geographical region—a topography at once liberating and daunting for any progressive political project. In a historical moment, “when language and communication, […] when immaterial labor and cooperation, become the dominant productive force,” a moment in which the material effects of global capitalism are mystified perhaps more than ever due to—not in spite of—the explosion of information technologies, exploitation proliferates in increasingly protean forms. As Hardt and Negri traverse this postmodern terrain of exploitation, they discern an emerging multitude seeking an alternative global society and examine political sites and phenomena in which the immanent workings of biopower are not so much countered as
comprehended and redirected toward alternative ends (e.g., demonstrations against immigration policies as a move toward global citizenship; the generality of biopolitical production prompting a demand for a new social wage, etc.). In doing so, the authors affirm and nurture the potentialities of a new constituent power in the form of a multitude.\textsuperscript{10}

The concept of multitude is the result of Hardt and Negri’s attempt to think beyond the limits of political models founded upon either identity or difference. These authors locate an organizational form for their multitude in the \textit{network}, a configuration that emerges at the point of contiguity between identity and difference. As they write in \textit{Multitude}:

\begin{quote}
The two dominant models posed a clear choice: either united struggle under the central identity or separate struggles that affirm our differences. The new network model of the multitude displaces both of these options—or, rather, it does not so much negate the old forms as give them new life in a different form. [...] In conceptual terms, the multitude replaces the contradictory couple identity-difference with the complementary couple commonality-singularity. In practice the multitude provides a model whereby expressions of singularity are not reduced or diminished in our communication and collaboration with others in struggle, with our forming ever greater common habits, practices, conduct, desires—with, in short, the global mobilization and extension of the common.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

The commonality-singularity dyad cuts a transversal line through the dialectic of identity-difference. The network form, characterized by decentralized leadership and horizontal linkages between autonomous nodes, is most effective in the struggle for (and the dismantling of) democracy in a biopolitical world. Resistance movements organized as networks are distributed, open, and thus mimic, or, at times, take advantage of, the dispersed structure of biopower. These struggles come into view on the political horizon in an era when life forms previously held in common—e.g., affect, language, indigenous knowledges; what Marx in the \textit{Grundrisse} designated “the general intellect”\textsuperscript{12}—become increasingly privatized and commodified. Because biopower promotes a standard of life and a form of individuality for all citizens and plays a part in realizing the capitalist dream of a “global village” of consumers, it likewise brings into being new forms of community, new power structures, and new avenues for creative cooperation. Progressive networks use the tools of biopolitical production to work towards an alternative form of globalization. Counterpoised by the G20 and the World Trade Organization, the multitude is formed “from below” through communicative networks that collaborate to actualize common goals. The small-scale Creative Commons project (software engineers who exchange ideas over the internet to create the best possible version of a free computer application) as well as the large-scale convergence movement (composed of diverse progressive groups protesting together, most famously in the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle, 1999) implement biopolitical strategy [\textit{biopotenza}]\textsuperscript{13} to reclaim the common and to resist the inhumane, profit-making imperatives of the market.

While much can be gained from such a Marxian undertaking, questions remain concerning the status of sexuality in the age of Empire. In a published conversation between Antonio Negri and Cesare Casarino
entitled “It’s a Powerful Life,” Casarino raises such questions. Concerning Foucault’s theorization of sexuality in relation to politics, Negri notes: “[R]ather than disregarding or neglecting Foucault’s elaboration of biopolitics in the context of the deployment of sexuality, I assumed such an elaboration and expanded it so as to account for the overall construction of the body in the indistinguishable realms of production and reproduction, that is, the realm of immaterial labor.”

Building upon a crucial insight of standpoint feminism—i.e. that labor power reproduces itself through sexuality—Negri argues that when immaterial labor is the primary productive force, production and reproduction collapse into one, and corporeality tout court—including but not limited to sexuality—becomes the link between individualizing and totalizing techniques of biopower. In a succinct formulation of this crucial shift in production, Sylvère Lotringer explains in his foreword to Paolo Virno’s *A Grammar of the Multitude*:

In the post-Fordist economy, surplus value is no longer extracted from labor materialized in a product, it resides in the discrepancy between paid and unpaid work—the idle time of the mind that keeps enriching, unacknowledged, the fruits of immaterial labor. [...] Workers used to work in servile conditions, leaving them just enough time to replenish. Now their entire life is live labor, an invisible and indivisible commodity.

By extension, when thoughts, affect, and human cooperation are for sale, when life itself is the chief agent of production, biopower “from above” [*biopotere*], according to Negri, no longer needs to deploy sexuality *qua* sexuality to achieve its ends.

Our multitude theorists, however, can de-emphasize the importance of sexuality for biopower only because the politics of AIDS figures so marginally in their analyses. When it comes to AIDS funding and research, sexuality remains without question a determining factor in the distribution of resources. A 2006 US National Institutes of Health HIV-prevention study, for example, calls attention to the continued relevance of sexuality for biopower. The study, conducted in Kenya and Uganda with 7,780 heterosexually-identified, HIV-negative men divided into circumcised and uncircumcised groups, tested the effectiveness of male circumcision in the prevention of HIV transmission from a woman to a man. Its press release concludes that “medically performed circumcision significantly reduces a man’s risk of acquiring HIV through heterosexual intercourse.” Tellingly, however, “the amount of benefit provided by circumcision is unknown” for men who have sex with men, among whom, at least in the United States, most new HIV infections occur.

The rationale for the study rests squarely on heteronormative assumptions and its findings obscure rather than illuminate the basic facts of HIV transmission. Its focus on “heterosexual intercourse,” as opposed to identity-less sexual behavior, for example, is vague to a fault. “Heterosexual” in the study’s wording qualifies an act, “intercourse.” Although the presumed behavior here is penile-vaginal intercourse, this is in no way clarified or specified. “Heterosexual intercourse” can be taken to mean, willfully or unconsciously, oral, anal, and/or vaginal penetrative sex between men and women—even though these behaviors carry radically different levels of risk and are understood in proper safer-sex education as unique and discrete acts. As we learned in the early days of AIDS panic, the use of sexual-identity terminology in
HIV prevention has done more to demonize sexual minorities than prevent the virus’s spread. In failing to use more precise language (penile-vaginal intercourse) and the less discriminatory, more scientifically accurate term “risk behavior,” this study, at worst, insinuates that risky *types of people* transmit HIV: sexually-specific “risk groups” become the infectious agents, not the ordinary, average citizens who do risky things when having sex. The effect of this casual slippage is that entire social groups are blamed for the transmission of a virus that cares little about the sexual or national identity of its transmitter. As Jan Zita Grover pointed out almost twenty years ago, the medical term “risk group,” when taken out of its epidemiological context, “has been used to stereotype and stigmatize people already seen as outside the moral and economic parameters of ‘the general population.’ [...] [It is used] to isolate and condemn people rather than to contact and protect them.” While reliable HIV-prevention campaigns discuss high-risk behavior instead of high-risk groups and corporeal acts instead of identity-specific “homo” or “hetero” sex, this study does more to naturalize the homo/hetero binary than to disseminate scientifically sound health information.

Indeed, quite disturbing questions follow the study’s conclusions: Following the identitarian logic of this study, is anal or oral sex between a man and a woman “heterosexual intercourse?” Or, are these activities by default “homosexual intercourse?” Is penetrative vaginal sex—apparently, the sole focus of the study—more important or more prevalent than these other acts? Do these findings intimate that unprotected vaginal sex is now safer sex for circumcised men? What is unspoken here speaks volumes. Do the categories “homosexual” and “heterosexual” hold the same meaning in Africa as they do in the US? Are women in general, or, perhaps even female sexuality itself—historically associated with insatiability and contamination—held symbolically responsible for the spread of sexually-transmitted disease? Would such an experiment—in which certain subjects are given a hypothetical advantage over others in protecting themselves from HIV—be conducted in the US? Bearing in mind the potential harm to the trial’s subjects, is an African life less valuable than an American one?

To add insult to injury, in *The New York Times* report on the study risk groups expand exponentially into “risk countries” and “heterosexual intercourse” becomes the vaguer—and more dangerous—“heterosexual sex.” The result is an even more confusing jumble of heteronormative disinformation and Western cultural bias: unprotected “heterosexual sex” is forty-eight percent safer with male circumcision; heterosexual sex is in general safer than homosexual sex, which remains unexplored. Kenya and Uganda are perilous and potentially contagious in their very existence as nations; Africa, by extension, remains—no surprise here—”The Dark Continent:” the dangerous, libidinal underbelly of the rational and enlightened West.

It is clear, then, that the rationale of the NIH study and the reportage surrounding it betray a patriarchal, heterosexist, and colonialist bias. Moreover, the conception of sexuality upon which this study rests and which it indisputably affirms is precisely the one Foucault understood as crucial to the functioning of biopower. Practicing two completely different types of sex, according to this study, heterosexuals and homosexuals become distinct species. Sexual behavior is assumed to be naturally linked to personal identity and the lives of the social groups associated with these sexual identities—one, heterosexual:
comprehensible and worthy of study; the other, homosexual: “unknown” and mysterious—are valued hierarchically and treated unequally. It is thus clear that in the distribution of AIDS treatment and funding, sexuality has not, contrary to Negri’s claim, been completely assimilated into a generalized concept of “life.”

Although in their first collaboration, The Labor of Dionysius, Hardt and Negri praise AIDS activists for calling into being a new form of subjectivity “that has not only developed the affective capacities necessary to live with the disease and nurture others, but also incorporated the advanced scientific capacities within its figure,” in Empire and Multitude such praise is by and large directed toward the organizational innovations of contemporary labor movements. The shift of focus raises further questions: what has become of these AIDS-activist subjectivities? Is their work only relevant for its influence on the “new,” apparently “post-sexual” multitude? Does the absence of AIDS from these discussions speak to the same historicidal “will to forget” that motivates the ideological relegation of the syndrome to the Third World?; the same will that fostered the false sense of security in the West after the discovery of the protease-inhibitor cocktail? In Empire and Multitude AIDS, when it is mentioned, is appropriated as a useful metaphor for the boundlessness of global capital, the fear of HIV’s spread becoming the symbolic crystallization of postcolonial anxiety surrounding “the new dangers of global contagion.” Such a rendering, to put it mildly, is somewhat cavalier: lest we forget, from its very inception AIDS was and continues to be a matter of life and death. And the new forms of life invented in AIDS activism still inhabit—and irrevocably alter—the global biopolitical landscape. Especially in regards to AIDS care, sexuality remains a vital factor in determining the value of life (and hence the time and money it should be allocated) and thus must be included in any and all discussion of biopolitics. In contradistinction to Hardt and Negri, then, I take seriously Foucault’s claim that sexuality is a linchpin between the individualizing and totalizing techniques of biopower and find in the writings of David Wojnarowicz a more productive strategy for resistance than our multitude theorists can muster.

II. Common Sense

Although Hardt and Negri rely upon a concept of affect for forging the multitude’s biopolitical networks “from below,” their rendering of this concept, like their understanding of biopower, is ultimately desexualized. For David Wojnarowicz, by contrast, sex, affect and politics are indivisible. His diaries, published in part as In the Shadow of the American Dream, foreground the importance of rethinking sexuality as a marker of truth in order to resist biopolitical administration. In particular, the entries from the mid- to late-1980s, chronicling his involvement in AIDS activism, include meditations on sex and affect, life and death that reveal the uniqueness and power of his political vision. In his excessive use of the word “sense,” significantly appearing most often in post-coital reflections (of which there is no shortage in the diaries), we see Wojnarowicz come to an awareness of the political potential of sexual affect. The politics emergent in his various sexual escapades involve a breakdown of the boundaries between self and Other, a de-linking of sexual desire and truth, and, later, an understanding of death’s immanence to life. These
knowledges, all of which seem to culminate in his political activism, not only give insight into a singular political awakening but also offer a primer of sorts on contemporary queer activist strategy. Understood in relation to Foucault’s writings on biopolitics, Wojnarowicz’s “sense” opens on to a politics against “sexuality.”

As noted earlier, Foucault argues, especially in his late interviews, that in order to resist the biopolitical administration of life the link between sex and truth must be broken. He writes in “The End of the Monarchy of Sex:”

They [sexologists, doctors, vice squads] basically tell us: ‘You have a sexuality, this sexuality is both frustrated and mute, hypocritical prohibitions repress it. So, come to us, show us, confide in us your unhappy secrets...’ This type of discourse is in fact a formidable tool of control and power. As always, it uses what people say, feel and hope for. It exploits their temptation to believe that to be happy, it suffices to cross the threshold of discourse and remove a few prohibitions. It ends up in fact repressing and controlling movements of revolt and liberation.22

And later, in the same interview:

A movement seems to be taking shape today which seems to be reversing the trend of ‘always more sex,’ of ‘always more truth in sex,’ a trend which has doomed us for centuries: it’s a matter, I don’t say of rediscovering, but rather of fabricating other forms of pleasure, of relationships, coexistences, attachments, loves, intensities. (218)

Foucault’s thoughts on sexuality thus pressure the in/out, repressed/liberated mentality of gay rights struggles and prompt some uncomfortable questions. Are gays ensnared within the truth-telling game of out-politics? Are they perhaps most enslaved to the historical construct of sexuality which in its deployment severely impoverishes the very sexual/relational life for which they are fighting? If Foucault finds worth in “fabricating other forms of pleasure, of relationships, coexistences, attachments, loves, intensities,” he is certainly critical, although never disparaging, of a liberationist politics that links truth and sexuality. His work demands, however, that we continually question the strategies and objectives of such a politics.

The use of the terms “gay” and “lesbian” in the political arena, for instance, runs the risk of reifying the categories that have historically disciplined and pathologized same-sex desire.23 Of course the deployment of these terms has proven quite successful in garnering rights and changing laws. The recent legalization of same-sex marriage in Canada, Spain, and an increasing number of US states reveals the effectiveness of GLBT identity-politics for institutional legitimacy. And while such victories are hard-won and worthy of celebration, the legalization of gay marriage should not, contrary to conservative critic Andrew Sullivan’s insistence,24 put an end to queer politics. As Foucault notes in “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will:”
I]f you ask [gay and lesbian] people to reproduce the marriage bond for their personal relationship to be recognized, the progress made is slight. We live in a relational world that institutions have considerably impoverished. Society and the institutions which frame it have limited the possibility of relationships because a rich relational world would be very complex to manage. We should fight against the impoverishment of the relational fabric.25

Fighting for a richer relational world involves the creation of unconventional forms of “union” and community. Privatizing and “normalizing” the radically indefinable relationships that comprise queer culture runs counter to this fight. Operating under the confessional imperatives of “out” politics, queer couples have deservedly earned State recognition, but in the process have also arguably become “better” neoliberal subjects. Sexuality, while not subsumed completely into the productive processes of postmodern capital as a mere tenet of commodified affect, as Negri argues, is redeemed in biopolitics as a site of neoliberal exploitation, primed for privatization. Armed with Foucault’s historicization of sexual identity, however, queers might invent relational worlds less amenable to the “morality” of the market and less in step with neoliberalism’s march. With an understanding of the “common sense” that moves amid and beyond the sexual encounter, David Wojnarowicz begins to build such worlds. Indifferent to sexuality, especially in its conjugal straitjacket, his excessive, unruly “sense” unlocks doors to new ways of relating, living, and resisting. In short, a politics of “sexuality” works well in the service of same-sex marriage; a politics of “sense” valorizes those intimacies and worlds that cannot be contained in privatized unions.

“Sense” in Wojnarowicz’s usage is utterly overdetermined: in its repetition it becomes a catchword for matters pertaining to the perceptual (data gathered through the five senses), the rational (a conscious understanding), the emotional (a feeling or mood), the signifiable (concerning the meaning or gist of something), and a sensibility (a mode of being). In the following passage, written in a romantic frenzy after an anonymous sexual encounter with a man from Texas at the Chelsea Piers, we see all of these “senses” at play:

Realizing with the Texan man, the sense he evoked in the meeting, the senses I’ve been left with that are a bit unsettling, unsettling in their intoxicating beauty, in their rarity, the sense that I’d gladly give this stranger my soul my life my time in movement in living for the rest of my life, would live with him immediately, the giving away of preoccupation or routine to be finely held in the mind and rough hands of a stranger, this produced in the meeting a series of movements along a darkening hall, the heavy sound of footsteps, the casual swagger of a character turning on the silent balls of his feet, the motion toward me erasing the definition of “stranger” making us less than strangers, the cocking of his head to the side, healthiness of the light in his eyes, the broad face, nose. How it is I’d give my life for/to him, not a sense of ego or egolessness, my life being very important to me in my personal freedoms, but like riding in a truck through the images of Texas, the badlands, the rolling vistas the buttes the cactus and fine sands of timelessness, the ever-present rouge line on metal, the continuous dusk at our feet, the guns over the visors, the bullets in the dashboard, the riding motion of the senses [...].26
And soon after this road-trip fantasy, Wojnarowicz laments the inadequacy of words in relaying his experiences:

[I]n the construction of words is the inherent failure to obtain the living sense of the desire. So although I’ve lived forms of movement that approach or start to come close to the scenes I desire, still when all is said and done, just as in the construction of these words I have still not touched the edge of it. (129)

The rawness of the language, the lack of grammatical structure, and the nearly punctuation-less run-on sentences bespeak an inspired, if somewhat adolescent, urgency to communicate ideas and feelings before they pass into neurological ether. At the same time I find in Wojnarowicz’s style a more studied attempt, apparent throughout his oeuvre, to extricate some truth from the snares of linguistic and grammatical structure. A literary approach akin to Genet’s excessive prose (repeatedly referenced in Wojnarowicz’s diaries) or even Nietzsche’s poetic aphorisms, Wojnarowicz’s style works to wrest life from the gallows of language, urging the escape of a perhaps extra-discursive, affective force from language’s proverbial prison-house. But although his manic and surrealistic prose reads well as an attempt to escape the death-grip of language, the author himself deems his efforts a failure. What goes unacknowledged in this passage, however, is the way in which the word “sense” in all of its semantic richness and polymorphous perversity arguably escapes the mortification of language as it mutates and reanimates at every turn. One moment a function of the mind, another of the body, at once the most intimate of personal feelings and the most public of shared sentiment, “sense” here approaches meaninglessness in its very excess of meaning. The “living sense of desire” that Wojnarowicz feels unable to communicate in his diaries indeed comes to life in a word that resists a singular meaning. The result, what I am calling a “common sense,” emerges through the production of “a series of movements” that give rise to an extra-linguistic form of communication at the interstices of self and Other—a sensibility emanating from the sexual encounter but irreducible to one or the other lover.

And here the very “identityless-ness” of the Texan Man becomes important. Shielded from the Other’s identity, Wojnarowicz is allowed to enter into the man’s life with an intensity that a personal knowingness might never engender. The Texan’s non-identity motivates Wojnarowicz to invent this stranger, their future together, and also, a new, extraordinary self. Anonymity and non-identity in this encounter thus open up a rhetorical space for a new political sensibility. Michel Foucault understands this process as the movement from subjection to desubjection: the undoing of socially, historically determined selves and the creation of new ones. He discusses this form of political awakening in an essay titled “Le Gai Savoir:”

I think it is politically important that sexuality be able to function the way it functions in saunas [in Wojnarowicz’s case, warehouses], where, without having to submit to the condition of being imprisoned in one’s own identity, in one’s own past, in one’s own face, one can meet people who are to you what one is to them: nothing else but bodies with which combinations, fabrications of pleasure will be possible. These places afford an exceptional possibility of desubjectivization, of desubjection, perhaps not the most radical but in any case...
sufficiently intense to be worth taking note of. [Anonymity is important] because of the intensity of the pleasure that follows from it. It’s not the affirmation of identity that’s important, it’s the affirmation of non-identity. [...] It’s an important experience in which one invents, for as long as one wants, pleasures which one fabricates together [with others].

It is necessary to highlight here the emphasis Foucault places on the political importance of the desubjugation. He offers here a concrete relational strategy for the cultivation of the self which might in turn lead to the formation of non-normative communities and resistant networks. In The Trouble with Normal Michael Warner likewise highlights the political potentialities and world-making capacities of impersonal intimacy. He writes:

When gay men or lesbians cruise, when they develop a love of strangers, they directly eroticize participation in the public world of their privacy. Contrary to myth, what one relishes in loving strangers is not mere anonymity, nor meaningless release. It is the pleasure of belonging to a sexual world, in which one’s sexuality finds an answering resonance not just in one other, but in a world of others.

Wojnarowicz’s “sense” gives name to the affective rush produced in such encounters, and in it can be found the seeds of an activist life. If Hardt and Negri replace the identity-difference couple with a completely desexualized concept of commonality-singularity, Wojnarowicz restores a lusty desire to this couple with his politics of anonymity. Loving strangers, the Texan one among many, allows Wojnarowicz to free himself from the shackles of identity and to relate in ways that run counter to the modern demand for navel-gazing self-knowledge. The affects produced in such sexual encounters encourage cooperative and consensual interactivity over a private comprehension of self-truth. As such, “sense” becomes the opposite or perhaps the “overcoming” of sexuality: creativity, community, and politics take precedence over privatized pleasure and normative relationality. In communizing sexual affect, “sense” breaks the link between sexual desire and self-truth—the first step, according to Foucault, in resisting the administration of life in biopower.

To better understand Wojnarowicz’s “common sense” as biopolitical strategy [biopotenza], it is necessary to analyze more closely the bios valorized in biopower. In Foucault’s estimation, this “life” is first and foremost the opposite of death: “Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its dominion: death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it; death becomes the most secret aspect of existence, the most ‘private.’” As long as death is made to mean the opposite of life, it perpetually hangs like a menacing storm cloud over the heads of a people. When conceived as life’s limit—rather than as immanent to it—death makes us all its subjects: living becomes an exercise in avoiding death, outsmarting it, foregoing its arrival. The state and its annexes offer training in normative life-management in the service of their own survival. Biopower thus operates not on the principle of taking life away, but of investing it with the highest value—promising a heaven on earth, a life worth living. Death, by contrast, is necessarily relegated to the category of pure negation and constitutes the normative framework of life’s value. In short, the biopolitical state does not turn away from death; it simply mobilizes it in a different manner.
If biopolitical disciplinarity functions through lived behavioral norms which aid in reproducing the status quo, it likewise benefits from a normative conception of death. Taking into account Lee Edelman’s claim in *No Future* that queerness plays the fantasmatic role of the death drive in a politics of reproductive futurism, we can see that the “death” so important to biopower is not only physiological but also imbued with a sexual, relational and communal essence. When AIDS emerges on the biopolitical landscape, the normative criteria of biopower’s “life” come to the fore. A statement made by Margaret Heckler, director of the Department of Health and Human Services in the Reagan administration, reveals precisely the forms of life deemed worthy of investment:

We must conquer AIDS before it affects the heterosexual population, the general population. We have a very strong public interest in stopping AIDS before it spreads outside the risk groups, before it becomes an overwhelming problem.

Shocking for its eugenic implications, this announcement makes clear that those lives initially affected by AIDS—gay men, IV drug users, prostitutes, by and large racial minorities—are utterly dispensable, unworthy of biopower’s “life” because of their very form of life. AIDS’ deaths from this vantage point are only tragic when they terminate a “life worth living,” a form of life consonant with the normative standards upon which the reproduction of biopower depends. Wojnarowicz clearly comprehends this aspect of biopower in his later writings and calls into question the strict division of life and death.

In a diary entry from 1988 written shortly after his best friend and artistic mentor Peter Hujar died from AIDS-related complications, Wojnarowicz notes the importance yet ultimate ineffectiveness of memorial services. Writing in capital letters, he notes:

THE THING THAT’S IMPORTANT ABOUT MEMORIALS IS THEY BRING A PRIVATE GRIEF OUT OF THE SELF AND MAKE IT A LITTLE MORE PUBLIC WHICH ALLOWS FOR COMMUNICATIVE TRANSITION, PEELS AWAY ISOLATION, BUT THE MEMORIAL IS IN ITSELF STILL AN ACCEPTANCE OF IMMOBILITY, INACTIVITY. TOO MANY TIMES I’VE SEEN THE COMMUNITY BRUSH OFF ITS MEMORIAL CLOTHES, ITS GRIEVING CLOTHES, AND GATHER IN THE CONFINES OF AT LEAST FOUR WALLS AND UTTER WORDS OR SONGS OF BEAUTY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PASSING OF ONE OF ITS CHILDREN/PARENTS/LOVERS BUT AFTER THE MEMORIAL THEY RETURN HOME AND WAIT FOR THE NEXT PASSING, THE NEXT DEATH. IT’S HEALTHY TO MAKE THE PRIVATE PUBLIC, BUT THE WALLS OF THE ROOM OR CHAPEL ARE THIN AND UNNECESSARY. ONE SIMPLE STEP CAN BRING IT OUT INTO A MORE PUBLIC SPACE. DON’T GIVE ME A MEMORIAL IF I DIE. GIVE ME A DEMONSTRATION.

This passage gives pause less for its ACT UP sloganeering and its caps-lock boldness—all of these qualities are typical of Wojnarowicz’s late style—but rather for two curious fragments that demand further investigation: “one simple step” and “if I die” from the consecutive sentences, “One simple step can bring...
it [grief] out into a more public space. Don’t give me a memorial if I die.” The latter phrase, “if I die,” must first be understood in its biographical context: written at a moment in the author’s life when memorial services were de rigueur due to the devastation wrought by AIDS on his New York community of friends, lovers, and artists, the implied meaning here seems, “If I too die from AIDS, like Peter, my memorial service should be a demonstration.” Unsurprising, especially coming from a man who was both an inspiration for and a participant in ACT UP actions, yet the unconscious of this likely slip reads more interestingly. The making-contingent of the inevitable in the phrase “if I die” speaks to an incomprehensibility or even a willed amnesia concerning the inescapability of death—a forgetting, that is, possibly crucial to survival and continued creativity amid death’s ubiquity. Nietzsche perhaps best describes this forgetfulness, what he calls an active forgetfulness, in an aphorism from The Gay Science. In the “The Thought of Death,” he marvels at people’s simultaneous incognizance of and perseverance to live within what he names, in typically masculinist fashion, the “brotherhood of death”:

How strange it is that this sole certainty and common element [i.e., death] makes almost no impression on people, and that nothing is further from their minds than the feeling that they form a brotherhood of death. It makes me happy that men do not want at all to think the thought of death! I should like very much like to do something that would make the thought of life even a hundred times more appealing to them.33

For Wojnarowicz, living through the early days of AIDS panic, witnessing the death of friends and lovers, himself succumbing to AIDS-related complications in 1992, this forgetting is not or not only a deliberate ignorance, but also an acceptance of death’s immanence to life. While life might become “a hundred times more appealing” when death is omnipresent, in the age of AIDS a clear separation between the two realms becomes a fantasy no longer sustainable. To return, then, to Wojnarowicz’s second curious phrase concerning the “one simple step” needed to transform private grieving into public outrage, such a step involves not only the destruction of the walls that house the rooms in which memorial services take place, but likewise and more importantly the destruction of the conceptual barriers between both private/public and life/death. The physical movement from the chapel into the streets and the mental leap from the individual life to the “brotherhood of death” follows, both conceptually and chronologically, Wojnarowicz’s political comprehension of the “common sense” between him, his lovers, his friends. This “sense” develops from the sexual encounter into an unprecedented form of activism that puts death to work in the service of a biopolitics “from below.”

Insofar as public AIDS mourning rituals make death communal and political, they render visible the forms of life against which normative life is defined in biopower. Moreover, these rituals foil the biopolitical imperative to keep death a secret, personal matter. Wojnarowicz insists that death must be brought out of the closet in order to expose the biopolitical manipulation of life. Echoing the earlier passage quoted from his diaries, he writes in Close to the Knives:

I imagine what it would be like if, each time a lover, a friend, or a stranger died of this disease, their friends, lovers, or neighbors would take the dead body and drive with it in a
car a hundred miles an hour to Washington D.C. and blast through the gates of the White House and come to a screeching halt before the entrance and dump their lifeless form on the front steps. It would be comforting to see how those friends, neighbors, lovers, and strangers mark time and place and history in such a public way.34

On October 11, 1992, Wojnarowicz’s dream became reality in the Ashes Action.35 Chanting “Bringing death to your door/We won’t take it anymore,” ACT UP members stormed the White House gate armed with urns containing the remains of friends and lovers. Citing Wojnarowicz as an inspiration for this “political funeral,” these rageful mourners threw the remains, urns and all, over the heads of the ever-present police force and onto the South Lawn, ashes flying in every direction. This blatant refusal to keep death tucked away in the private sphere is emblematic of ACT UP’s most radical gesture: the transformation of life’s morbidity into a politics of constituent potentiality. By forcing biological death in the service of a politics of life, these activists become their most dangerous and most creative. When death is mobilized in such a way, living deliberately, passionately, as Wojnarowicz’s life-writings demonstrate, is nothing to fear.

Symbolic of a radical acceptance of finitude wherein life itself is at stake in living, the Ashes Action serves as merely one example of the kind of politics that can emerge when death’s finality is incorporated as a source of potentiality. Wojnarowicz’s life-writings are nothing if not manifestos of the political potency of both sexual affect and death’s immanence to life. Exploding the conceptual boundaries between self and Other, between public life and private death, his “common sense” remains vital to a queer constituent power.

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Notes


4. My sincere thanks to the anonymous reviewers of this essay for helping me clarify this point here and in the pages to come.

5. Michel Foucault, “The End of the Monarchy of Sex” in Foucault Live: Interviews 1966-84. ed. by Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 214-225. I discuss the meaning of Foucault’s titular call-to-arms in Section II.

6. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 139.


8. This project remains unfinished and urgent; as I will demonstrate in Section II, David Wojnarowicz recognizes the salience of sexuality for biopolitical production and works to delink sex from truth with his concept of “sense.”


10. A portion of this paragraph has been published as a book review.


13. The distinction between a biopower “from above” [biopotere] and “from below” [biopotenza] in Hardt and Negri’s formulation is crucial in understanding the anti-authoritarian political forms emergent in biopolitics. Biopotere delineates a constituted power, and biopotenza a constituting one. Cesare Casarino describes these forms in the following way: “Potenza [pouvoir in French] can often resonate with implications of potentiality as well as the decentralized or mass conceptions of force and strength. Potere [puissance in French], on the other hand, refers to the might or authority of an already structured and centralized capacity, often an institutional apparatus such as the state.” See Casarino, Cesare and Antonio Negri, “It’s a Powerful Life: A Conversation on Contemporary Philosophy,” Cultural Critique 57 (Spring 2004, 151-183): 181. I find this distinction especially useful for articulating the politics emergent—the biopower “from below”—in Wojnarowicz’s concept of “sense.”


23. For a more detailed discussion of this dilemma, see Butler, Judith, *Bodies that Matter: The Discursive Limits of ‘Sex,’* (New York: Routledge, 1993) 227-8.


that the constitutive ground of modern politics is the promise of a reproductive futurism embodied in the figure of the Child. The protection of innocent life, a value so unquestioned that it becomes morally unquestionable, is the only politically responsible position. And yet, the fantasy of the future affixed to the Child delineates and authenticates a vision of social order that necessarily excludes queerness. In Edelman’s words, the terms of reproductive futurism “impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such, preserving in the process the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing principle of communal relations” (2). Edelman’s polemic thus embraces the queer force of negativity, disavows futural hope, and puts stock in a self- and social-negating jouissance.


32. Wojnarowicz, In the Shadow, 206.


